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Entrepreneurs seeking to commercialize science-based technologies face
considerable challenges including uncertain environments, policy makers and investors'
ignorance, and public opposition and ethical concems. Most research exploring the
emergence of technologies assumes the existence of accepted uses or products, despite
the fact that efforts to commercialize science-based technologies often begin before
specific applications exist. We have little empirical evidence of how individuals and
organizations influence the earliest development of technologies. To address this gap, I
conduct a real-time, seven-year, qualitative study of the nanotechnology venture
investing community. The study draws on extensive archival data, participant observation
of a complete series of annual nanotechnology investing conferences, and case studies of
the three venture capital (YC) fill11s specializing in nanotechnology through the period of
the study. The cases are based on semi-structured and website archives.
vI document the emergence of competing nanotechnology frames in the period
prior to the identification of product applications. I identify three sequential activities of
nanoteclmology business proponents: constructing a socio-semiotic space, positioning as
experts within the space, and translating scientific, opposition and futuristic discourse for
a target audience. I introduce the concept of a socio-semiotic space and develop a model
reflecting the three activities to explain the process through which technology proponents
project a business frame to suppoli the commercialization of science-based technologies.
This dissertation contributes to our knowledge oftechnology evolution by
focusing on the understudied period of early emergence and the sociopolitical process of
technology framing. I contribute to our knowledge of how science discoveries become
the basis for fields of commercial activity. The findings of this dissertation provide
knowledge that can assist business people and policy makers seeking to develop science-
based technologies and the fields that emerge around them.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Scientist alone is true poet he gives us the moon/
He promises the stars he'll make us a new universe ifit comes to that.
Allen Ginsberg (1961)
The means by which we live have outdistanced the ends for which we live.
Our scientific power has outrun our spiritual power. We have guided
missiles and misguided men.
Martin Luther King, Jr. (1963)
In the mid 1800s, in London, scientific experimenters claimed to have temporarily
resunected the dead, created life from inert matter and cured many seemingly incurable
ailments, all with the wondrous powers of electricity (Morus, 1998). Reactions to these
claims and the experimenters' demonstrations coincide with the contradictory views of
science illustrated in the two opening quotations. To some, with the aid of electricity
"man would ...be able to resolve into their elements the most refractory compounds, to
fuse the most intractable metals ... almost to annihilate time and space" (William Robert
Grove, 1842 in Morus, 1998: 3) To others, such efforts were "blasphemous meddlings
with God's laws" (Morus, 1998: 140). Those seeking to develop and commercialize
electricity had to overcome technical challenges. invent acceptable public roles for
inventor-scientists, challenge social disdain of those seeking monetary gain from
philosophy and assuage public fears regarding the application of the new knowledge
(f\1orus. I 99S).
2The claims of proponents and detractors as well as the challenges faced by those
seeking to profit from the new discoveries bear a striking resemblance to the discourse
sunounding nanotechnology and to the challenges facing those seeking to commercialize
it. Proponents claim nanotechnology will "improve on the gifts of nature ... bones would
become stronger. ..muscles ... more powerful. .. [and] people should be able to regain most
of their youthful health strength and beauty, and to enjoy an almost indefinite extension
of life" (Freitas, 2000: 6). Conversely, opponents argue that nanotechnologies "can
spawn whole new classes of accidents and abuses" and are "threatening to make humans
an endangered species" Joy (2000). Nanotechnology and electricity are both technologies
that promised to change life, challenge definitions and understanding, and breach
boundaries. Today, as in the early 1800s, definitions and boundaries matter.
In the 1800s, in response to his colleague's claim to have created life from inert
matter with electricity, a prominent inventor named Michael Faraday sought to define a
socially acceptable role for electrical experiments in relationship to life. Faraday
contrasted his experiments on the eel, which produced electricity by its own volition,
with those of his colleague, arguing that his own were "upon the threshold of what we
may, without presumption, believe man is permitted to know of the matter" (Faraday,
1838 in Morns, 1998: 143). In the nanotechnology domain, controversy raged around the
feasibility and possible effects of self-replicating nano-scale machines. While some
argued that this technology was feasible and would deliver on the most fantastic promises
of nanotechnology (Drexler, 1992), others claimed the technology was not feasible
(LoY). 2(04) or posed a serious threat to health and the el1\ironment (Feder. 2(J()2).
3Nanotechnology proponents recognized some positive effects of this public
debate. In response to Michael Crichton's novel, Prey in which intelligent nanoparticles
threaten to take over the earth, Mike Roco, the founding chair of the National Science
and Technology Council's subcommittee on Nanoscale Science, Engineering and
Technology (NSET), said, "The fact that the book speaks about nanotech, it brings in the
attention of the general public to this field" (Small Times January/February, 2003).
However, those seeking to commercialize nanotechnologies noted that if the science
fiction implications of the technology were largely accepted as feasible, public fears
might threaten regulation that could slow commercialization. "There will be a backlash
against nanotechnology, largely in the media, spurred on by Crichton's new book and the
movie to come. Expect to see ethical debates, like those on cloning, on what regulation
should be put in place to limit the manipulation of molecules" (Josh Wolfe, 2003).
Following calls for such limits, business and government suppoliers fOlmed a
collation and debunked the depictions of nanotechnology supported by futurists and some
scientists, which were associated with the grandest potential applications and threats.
Berube (2006) quotes University of Tennessee law professor Glenn Reynolds' summary
of the conflict:
A sometimes bitter war has been waged within the nanotechnology
community itself, between the scientists and visionaries on one hand and
the business people on the other. The business community is afraid that
advanced nanotechnology just seems too, well spooky--and worse, that
discussion of potentially spooky implications will lead to public fears that
might get into the way of bringing products to market.
4A House version of a nanotechnology bill was revised to exclude a description of
a feasibility study of molecular manufacturing and self replicating nanoscale machines,
leading a trade joumal reporter to argue that "by carefully selecting which theories are the
ones the general public is supposed to believe, then marginalizing the rest. .. [business
leaders are] redefining "real" nanotechnology to suit what is best for nano-business"
(Lovy, 2004: 2). Eric Drexler blames former executive director of the NanoBuisniess
Alliance, (NbA), Mark Modzelewki, for the exclusion of molecular manufacturing from
the House bill.
As did the scientists-inventors of electricity, in addition to overcoming technical
difficulties, those seeking to commercialize nanotechnology required the support and
funding of govermnent, corporations, and investors, who are influenced by media
pOlirayals of nanotechnology and the perceptions of their constituents. As evidenced by
baITiers to the commercialization of nuclear power and genetically modified foods (see
] asper, 1992 and Krimsky, 1992), in democratic societies, public perception can
influence economic success and failure. Importantly, public perception can affect the
outcomes of technology commercialization regardless of the actual threats posed by the
technology.
In the nanotechnology domain, technology proponents recognized this potential.
Authors ofa nanotechnology trade report argued, "NGO's with an axe to grind,
joumalists seeking the next big story, and consumers skeptical of what they perceive as
corporations ·playing God" could set otT a self-reinforcing groundswell that could make
the use ofntlnoparticles verbotcn .. e\CIl ifno real risks \\crc actually shcl\\11 to exist"-
(Nordan, 2005). Academic researchers drawing on technology management and
institutional literatures validate these concerns, arguing that the successful emergence of
a technology field necessitates the development of public trust (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994;
Garud, Jain and Kuraswamy, 2002). However, while the economic importance of
emerging science-based technologies is widely recognized and observation and theory
indicate that perception can influence the success of such technologies, we know little of
if and how entrepreneurs frame emerging technologies.
To address this gap, I undertake an interpretive, qualitative study set in the
context of the developing nanotechnology domain. I explore how technology proponents
project a technology frame into public discourse. I document the emergence in the
general press of competing nanotechnology frames and develop a process model to
explain how a small group of venture capitalists (VCs), attributed as builders of
nanotechnology business by the nanotechnology investing community, projected a
"nanobusiness" frame. I find that the VCs engaged in three sequential activities. They
constructed a socio-semiotic space, positioned themselves as experts within the space,
and translated scientific, opposition and futuristic discourse for their target audience,
large business corporations and government. These activities generated resources and
power that enabled this group to project their preferred frame into the public discourse.
Greater understanding of technology framing processes contributes to our understanding
of how new technologies emerge by focusing on the understudied period of technology
pre-emergence. In particular, by explaining how technology proponents create the
sociopolitical infrastructure necessary t<Jr emerging technologies ttl Ihri\ c. the tlndings of
5
6this study provide guidance to business people and policy makers seeking to develop and
support such technologies and the domains that emerge around them.
-------------_._----_.--
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The economic importance of emerging technologies and ventures founded to
commercialize them is widely recognized (Drucker, 1985). It is therefore not surprising
that how technologies emerge, evolve and are adopted has been a topic of interest to
management and organization scholars for some time (e.g. Dosi, 1982; Tushman and
Andersen, 1986; Utterback, 1994). After decades of research it remains of critical
impOliance to both researchers and managers (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008).
This disseriation is designed to explore the processes through which abstract
scientific discoveries become the basis for domains of commercial activity. Despite calls
for explorations of the emergence of commercial activity-in organizations, markets,
industries and organizational fields-the phenomenon remains under-explored and
difficult to approach (Meyer, Gaba and Colwell, 2005). Similarly, technology and
innovation management research has largely neglected the question ofhow new
technologies emerge (Munir and Philips, 2005; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). Most
technology and imlovation management research focuses, instead, on how technologies
with known product applications displace existing products in an established market.
Many technologies, however, develop from scientific discoveries that occur long
before the emergence of viable products. Consider, for example, the theoretical
arguments thai made computers possible or the scientific discoveries that f01l11ed the
7
8basis of the biotechnology industry. The understandings of proponents, opponents, users,
scientists, and designers of technologies that influence the end design and the success or
failure of commercialization attempts begin to fonn in this pre-emergent stage (Garud,
2001; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). Without explanations that consider the processes that
shape the early emergence of technologies, our knowledge of the technology
development cycle and the emergence of commercial activity based on technologies is
incomplete.
The study of emergence in general and of basic-science technologies in particular
poses some unique challenges. Despite frequent calls for explorations of emergence, we
know little of how new industries, fields, markets, and organizations come into being
(Chiles, Meyer, and Hench, 2004; Meyer, Gaba, Colwell, 2005). Early neoclassical
economics depicts perfectly competitive markets in which innovative entrepreneurs act
rationally to discover existing opportunities to supply unmet demands. From this
perspective, commercial activity in markets is structured through the price mechanism
and competition. This view is based on a conception of man as a rational optimizer,
largely immune to the influence of social relations. Although this view facilitates
empirical studies resulting in testable causal relationships, it has been criticized by
sociologists, organization theorists and new institutional economists for failing to
acknowledge the extent to which economic behavior is embedded in, and influenced by,
social relations and institutions (Granovetter, 1985; Denzau and North, 1994; Fligstien,
2003). Researchers are increasingly recognizing the influence of social and political
processes on technology. organizations and industries.
Because of the ambiguity and possible social implications of technologies that
develop from scientific discovery, research seeking to explain how such technologies
emerge and become commercial opportunities must be sensitive to social and political
processes (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). To successfully shepherd technologies
through the transition from scientific discovery to commercial application, technology
proponents require resources and support from potential stakeholders (Aldrich and Fiol,
1994). In the case of science-based technologies, proponents must ask constituents to
support a vision of an often complex something, which does not, and may not for some
time, exist. Furthermore, there may be no widely understood language through which to
ascribe meaning to the activity (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Hill and Levenhagen, 1995;
Fligstein, 1996, 2003). Gaining support requires collective sensmaking (Weick, 1995)
and sensegiving (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991), involving cognitively bounded human
agents, political conflict, and framing (Dowell, Swaminathan, and Wade, 2002;
Hargadon and Douglas, 2001; Gamd, Jain, and Kumaraswamy, 2002).
I adopt a sociopolitical perspective to explore the question: How do science
discoveries become the basis for domains of commercial activity? Meyer, Gaba, and
Colwell (2005) argue that researches studying fields in flux, such as an emerging
technological field, should collect longitudinal data, engage in process theorizing, and
adopt context sensitive designs. I conduct a longitudinal, embedded case study. I use a
grounded theory analysis approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990)
such thut my initial analyses guide udditionul datu collection und cOl1ceptualizution.
Through this pn)cess. grounded in data. j mow hom my general research question. how
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do science-based technologies become the basis of commercial activity, to focus on the
framing processes of entrepreneurs in emerging technology domains. Speci fically, I
explore the question: How do entrepreneurs project a technology frame into the general
discourse?
This study contributes to our knowledge of how areas of commercial activity,
such as industries, markets and organizational fields emerge by focusing on how
scientific discoveries-which fonn the basis for many such entities-transition to
business opportunities. Through this dissertation, I contribute to our knowledge of the
technology life cycle by studying the heretofore largely neglected period of pre-
emergence. Specifically, I explore the role of technology proponents in actively
projecting a teclmology frame that supports the development of commercial activity.
In the remainder of this chapter, I review the literature that provides the
foundation for this research. I begin by elaborating on the emergence of organizations
and technologies. Next, I review work that identifies and explains the unique
characteristics of science-based technologies and I discuss the implications of these
characteristics for the management of technology. Then, I review sociopolitical
approaches to the emergence of commercial activity-termed organizational or
technology fields in this literature-and researchers' recent applications of the concept of
institutional entrepreneurship to the study of emerging technologies. I focus on one
social skill, framing, which is identified but not elaborated in the technology management
literature. Finully. I dravv' on additional concepts from studies of the social construction of
11
technology and science controversy and risk to develop and describe the conceptual
framework that guides this dissertation.
The Emergence of Organizations and Technologies
The term "entrepreneurship" has a variety of meanings. It is used to mean
economic risk taking, technological and organizational innovation to bring to market a
new product or process, and finally, the creation of novel forms of organization and of
the ideas to deploy and exploit new technologies (Constant II, 1987). However, most
entrepreneurship literature has focused on the first or second definitions, exploring the
attributes of individual entrepreneurs and their propensity to found new ventures
(Schoonhoven and Romanelli, 200 1). "This approach ... does not adequately depict the
creation of macrosystems and related grand entrepreneurship. Nor do these perspectives
adequately capture the interaction between cultures of technology, organizational
cultures, and society at large" (Constant II, 1987; 241). Schoonhoven and Romanelli
(2001: 369) argue that although it is the market-creating activities of collectives of
entrepreneurs that merit researcher attention,·· ... little attention has been paid to the
question, "Where do new fimis come hom?" The authors illustrate their point by noting
that of 130 papers on entrepreneurship in the 1999 Frontiers of Entrepreneurship
Research only two papers explore the origins of new firms and conclude that as "Neither
new organizations nor the new populations they spawn are the creation of single
individuals ... the Myth ofthe Lonely Only Entrepreneur can be and should be laid to rest"
(Schoonhoven and Romanelli. 200 I: 3~7).
12
The dominant model of technology evolution is based on a life cycle metaphor. A
new technology is said to elicit competing designs that usher in an "era of ferment." The
competition and uncertainty ends with convergence on a dominant design (Tushman and
Anderson, 1986). This model has been tested and found robust in many industries
(Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). As with much entrepreneurship literature, underling the
model is the assumption that a market exists. Research has focused on how new products
influence the market. With few exceptions (e.g. Hargadon and Douglas, 2001; McGuire
and Granovetter, 2003) the attention of management research has focused on product
technologies for which for an application is already defined (e.g. Garud and Rappa, 1994;
Tripsas, 1997; Munir and Philips, 2005). Similarly, popular attention and academic
scholarship focus on standards wars and the era of fennent between technologi es
embedded in products with largely specific and known uses, such as the classic case of
the war over f01111ats for videorecording (Beta vs. VHS). As with studies of
entrepreneurship, much less attention has been devoted to the phenomenon of emergence.
We know little of the pre-emergent period, before a discontinuity occurs and products are
developed.
This neglect perhaps results in part from the difficulty of studying emerging
systems. Meyer, Gaba, and Colwell (2005) note that despite frequent calls for studies of
organizational dynamics, researchers of management and organizations have generally
avoided studying fields undergoing discontinuous change. The authors argue that the
study of organizational fields in flux makes unique demands, requiring longitudinal data,
process theori;:ing. and conte\t-scnsili\C. 111lilti-le\el resG1I'ch designs. Not surprisingly.
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given the demands of the phenomenon, the rare empirical examples of studies exploring
emergent phenomena are generally qualitative and emphasize complex, social processes
(e.g. Garud and Rappa, 1994; Hargodon and Douglas, 2001; McGuire, Phillips, and
Hardy, 2001; Chiles, Meyer, and Hench, 2004; Munir and Philips, 2004).
An emerging technology is by its nature a system in flux. Furthermore, some our
most significant technological innovations are born in the realm of basic science long
before a known application exists and these innovations often introduce systems of
applications (i.e. computers, the internet, bio-technology). The evolution oftoday's
computers begins before Macs and PCs, with mathematical research such as that of Alan
Turing published in 1937 (Wikipedia, accessed 2009). Before a technological
discontinuity can occur, a basic science-based technology must traverse a difficult path
from scientific discovery to a marketable product or useable process. However, despite
the fact that the frames and expectations that develop as a basic science discovery
transitions to a commercial technology influence future technological trajectories, we
know little of how frames emerge (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2004; Kaplan and Tripsas,
2008).
Traditionally, most organizational theories have treated technology
deterministically and have ignored the role of human agency in shaping its development
(Orlikowski and Barley, 2001). Although this approach has enabled researchers to better
understand how technologies influence organizations and has provided the robust life-
cycle model, it is less well suited to explain the social and political processes that
dominate the pCrlod before a technological problem and sl1111tioll timl c<leh other in the
14
fonn of an application or product. Recognizing this gap, researchers have begun to call
for explanations that take into account the social aspects of the phenomena that influence
the evolution and adoption of technologies and recognize that emerging technologies are
embedded in larger social systems (Garud and Rappa, 1994, Hargadon and Douglas,
2001; Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy, 2002; Munir and Phillips, 2005; Kaplan and
Tripsas, 2008).
Science-based Technologies and Technology Stigmatization
Because science-based technologies often have national consequences,
governments are more likely to be involved in research funding, standard setting, and
regulation (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). In democratic societies, the public may
influence decisions regarding regulation and standards. Studies have shown that public
perceptions of the risk associated with science-based technologies are ambiguous and
often inaccurate and can contribute to the "stigmatization" of technologies (Gregory,
Flynn, and Siovic, 2001). Technology stigmatization "represents an increasingly
significant factor influencing the development and acceptance of scientific and
technological innovation and, therefore, presents a serious challenge to policymakers"
(Gregory, Flynn, and Siovic, 200 I: 4). Technology stigmatization can lead to
burdensome regulations, lack of investment and failure of product markets, thereby
posing a serious threat to the success of emerging science-based technologies and the
nascent industries which develop from them.
A stigma is a deeply discrediting attribute of people, places, or technologies.
Stigl11<1ti/ation refers to the prucess hy \\hich an attribute is singled out ancl the people.
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places or technologies possessing the attribute are denigrated. Stigmatization results in
the widespread devaluation of the possessor of the attribute and frequently includes
labeling and the communication of labels. Stigmatization of technologies occurs when the
perceived risk associated with a technology is socially amplified. The social amplification
process usually begins with a trigger event such as an accident or report of a hazardous
condition and involves three stages: 1) the risk-related attributes of the technology
receive high visibility in the media, 2) the technology is perceived and marked to identify
it as risky, 3) the marking and the social amplification of perceived risks alter the image
of the technology such that those encountering it change their behavior (Kasperson,
Jhaveri, and Kasperson, 2002).
Risk perception is a critical part of risk amplification and stigmatization. As
noted, public perceptions of technology risk are often ambiguous and inaccurate. Recent
studies in the field of risk analysis have highlighted the strong role played by feelings in
how risk is assessed. While any manager will recognize that in the world risk and benefit
tend to be positively conelated--high lisk, high gain--these studies show that risk and
benefit tend to be negatively conelated in people's minds (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and
MacGregor, 2002). This inverse relationship is linked to the strength of the positive or
negative feelings associated an activity or technology. Ifpeople like an activity or
technology, they are more likely to judge risks as low and benefit as high and likewise if
they dislike and activity or technology they are more likely to judge the risks as high and
the benefit as low. According to this model, feelings come prior to and direct judgments
of risk and bellcflt (SI(l\ic ct al.. 2(02). Additionally. risks that are pcrcei\l:d as Ilew or
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potentially catastrophic, connect to a group agenda, or pose a threat to deeply held values
or social institutions are particularly likely to generate the strong public concerns and
high media coverage that lead to the social amplification of risk and stigmatization
(Kasperson, Jhaveri, and Kasperson, 2002).
Science-based techno logies often invol ve risks of this nature. While the
successful emergence of a technology domain is dependent upon the development of
public trust, the risks associated with new science-based technologies are particularly
likely to generate public concern. If public concerns are amplified, the end result may be
teclmology stigmatization, or the complete absence of public trust. The ambiguous nature
of science-based technologies, combined with the potential for extreme positive and
negative social and economic consequences (e.g. from new products and industries, or
unforeseen catastrophes and failed investments) supports the appropliateness of a
sociopolitical perspective and qualitative approach to this study.
Sociopolitical Approaches-The Emergence of Technological Fields
Technology management scholars have recently adopted the concept of
institutional entrepreneurship to examine the emergence of technology fields, and in
particular the generation of public trust or legitimacy. The realization of opportunities
created by new technologies requires sociopolitical legitimacy (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994).
Stakeholders such as the general public and government officials come to accept
emerging technologies as appropriate and feasible through the process of social
legitimization, whereby norms and rules--ineluding definitions. identities, boundaries,
standards. and practices--becLlllle institutiullali:--:ed (-\Iclrich and Fin!. 1(94). Researchers
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have increasingly recognized that interested individuals with sufficient resources can
influence the legitimization of new technologies and the fields emerging around them by
creating and promoting valued institutions (DiMaggio, 1991; Fligstein, 1997; Garud,
Jain, and Kuraswamy, 2002). These "institutional entrepreneurs" utilize social skills to
build support for institutions they value (Fligstein, 200 I).
While traditional entrepreneurs create new businesses or products, institutional
entrepreneurs work to create new institutions by gaining institutional and societal
acceptance of new standards, practices, and definitions (Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott,
2002). Perhaps one of the most well known examples of institutional entrepreneurship is
illustrated by the efforts of Thomas Edison and his allies to commercialize electric power.
Electric industry founders in the U.S. mobilized resources and influence to gain
acceptance of standards that supported their business model (McGuire and Granovetter,
2003). By creating and gaining acceptance for the infrastructure on which new
technologies depend, institutional entrepreneurs playa key role in the emergence of
technology based ventures, industries, and sectors.
Origins of the Concept ofInstitutional Entrepreneurship
A fundamental assumption of institutional theory is that institutions matter:
organizations are influenced by an environment made up of taken-for-granted institutions
and other organizations responding to the institutional environment and each other (Scott,
2001). The focus on the taken- for-granted aspect of insti tutions led to cliticisms that
institutiol1al theory could cxplain ollly static, homogcnous populations whereJs
Clhsenatilll1 illustratcs th~l! illstitutillns change (1\cr timc and arc challenged ~lS \\cll as
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contested (Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott, 2002). Arguing that to explain institutional
change and emergence researchers must consider interested actors, DiMaggio (1988)
introduced the concept of institutional entrepreneurship. The topic of institutional change
has since emerged as a central focus for organizational researchers (Dacin, Goodstein,
and Scott, 2002). However, as discussed below, little exploration has been devoted to
either the origins of institutions in new fields or institutional entrepreneurs' efforts to
create institutions in support of emerging fields.
Early empirical work on institutional change reintroduced to organization scholars
the role of power and interested actors emphasized in Selznick's "old institutional theory"
(Selznick, 1957). In a study of the of the changing role of art museums, DiMaggio (1991)
found that the art museums came to fill the role of educational rather than curatorial
institutions as interested actors including the Carnegie Foundation and museum
professionals constructed field-wide structures such as professional associations to
legitimize the new role. The process involved conf1ict over definitions and metaphors as
well as struggle for power as control shifted from patrons, trustees and donors to museum
professions, educators and government. Similarly, in a study of the redefinition of the
role of community colleges from liberal arts to vocational institutions, Brint and Karabel
(1991) found that the vocationalization of community colleges was driven initially by
administrators interested in securing a labor market niche and in increasing their status by
moving two-year colleges from the bottom of the liberal mis academic hierarchy to the
top of a newly created occupational training hierarchy. After years of eHort, the support
ofpo\\crful outside sponsors such a pri\'ate found,ltions and the kclcral go\crI1l11cnt
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helped to legitimize the new role. Galaskiewicz (1991) found that new organizational
fonns to encourage corporate community involvement emerged when a cadre of business
leaders with corporate clout and long-standing community ties orchestrated changes in
the control of the largest corporations in the area. Consistent with DiMaggio's (1988)
definition, these studies illustrate the existence of interested actors using resources to
create and legitimize institutions that they value. However, the creation of new
institutions in these studies occurs as a response to existing institutions rather than in the
context of an emerging field.
Many studies of institutional dynamics continue to attribute the emergence of new
institutions to a reaction or challenge to existing institutions. For example, Haveman and
Rao (1997) anal yzed mul ti -level changes in institutions and organizations in California's
thrift sector to show that institutional entrepreneurs deployed new organizational forms
that coevolved with institutions. The authors note however, "The period covered by
our. .. analysis does not include the earliest history of thrifts in California" (1615). More
recently, in a special issue devoted to institutional change, several studies support the
notion that actors are not passive adherents of institutions, but rather, through their
"perceptions, interpretations, and enactments of institutional logics ... give meaning and
life to institutions" (Dacin, Goodstein, and Scott, 2002). Technology researchers have
adopted this perspective, arguing that technology standards are institutions, to explore the
emergence of technology fields. However, as with studies of institutions in other
contexts. most work has 110t foclIsed on the early emergence of technologies hom science
discoveries.
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Institutional Entrepreneurship and Technology Management
Researchers have recently explored the role of institutional entrepreneurs in
emerging technology fields. This work addresses calls for greater attention to the role of
agency in the development of technology (e.g. Orlikowski and Barley, 2001). However,
these studies do not explore the early emergent period of technology evolution.
In a historical study of the emerging electric power industry McGuire and
Granovetter (2003) show that electric industry founders mobilized resources and
influence through social networks to construct a business model and build a system of
governance that supported the diffusion of their model. They note however that the
process through which this occurred requires additional study.
Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy (2002) studied Sun Microsystems' sponsorship
of Java as a technology standard. They found that institutional entrepreneurs require
political and social skills, including framing, to address challenges to collective action
fostered by the constraining and enabling characteristics of technology standards. The
authors argue that Sun Microsystems attempted to create a common interest among
computer vendors and users by framing Java as a network standard 'solution' mobilized
against the 'problem,' "Microsoft's desktop-centric view of computing." Sun's collective
action frame helped them gain support for Java among systems assemblers, software
firms and component manufacturers.
Munir and Phillips (2005) investigate "The Bilih of the "Kodak Moment''" to
explore the role of institutional entrepreneurs in the process of technology adoption. They
finclth~lt technology promoters Llsed a \aricty of (lisclIIsin: str~ltcgics to influence the
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meanings that consumers attributed to roll-film cameras. Importantly they note
"Technologies are not, therefore, simply disruptive, or not as much as research seems to
suggest (e.g. Christensen, 1997). At least from a user's perspective, it is the degree to
which some institutional entrepreneur can mange the meanings oftechnology ... that
detennines how disruptive the technology will be" (Munir and Phillips, 2005; 1683).
The three studies discussed above provide a foundation for, but do not address the
overall question of this research: How do basic science discoveries become the basis for
domains of commercial activity? Each ofthese studies began after a best use for the
technology had been detennined. The studies' findings suggest the importance of framing
processes to the emergence of new technologies and their small number provides
evidence in support of Hargrave and Yen de Yen's (2004:13) asseliion that although
scholars of organizations and technology have begun to view battles over the meanings of
technologies as central to institutional change in technological fields, they have said little
about the creation and manipulation of technology frames.
Summary
The diverse studies discussed above show that interested actors and collective
action playa role in the development of institutions to support new technology. However,
the institutional studies depict shifts in existing organizational fields rather than the
creation of institutions to support emerging fields and thus only partially address
DiMaggio's call for an exploration of the dynamics and emergence of organization fields.
And, while researchers of entrepreneurship and technology have begun to explore
cmcrging technologiccd fields. studies h3\e not examincd hll\\ scientitic disco\crics
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become disruptive technologies. Our investigations and knowledge begin after much of
the story has transpired. Thus, while providing a foundation for this study, previous work
cannot fully explain how science-based technologies become the basis for commercial
activity.
The realization of opportunities inherent in new technologies requires public trust
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Researchers argue that emerging technologies must have
technology, safety and business standards in order to gain public trust and legitimacy
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy, 2002). Such standards emerge
from sociopolitical processes. which can be influenced by institutional entrepreneurs who
generate collective action (Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy, 2002). While the importance
of collective action and public trust to the emergence of new technologies is recognized,
and researchers have argued that institutional entrepreneurs fill the role of generating
collective action and trust (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997;), we know little ofhow this
is done (Aldrich, 1999; Dowell, Swaminathan, and Wade, 2002). This dissertation
addresses this gap.
Conceptual Framework
I began this dissertation with the concept of a technology frame and a set of
theoretical assumptions derived from social studies of science and technology, in
particular from studies of the social construction of technological systems (Bijker,
Hughes, and Pinch, 1987) and science controversy and risk (Nelkin, 1992). Researchers
from these disciplines seek [0 explain huw science and technology progress and why they
progress as they do. The litcr~ltLlrc:; ki\l' ill common a rejection of deterministic \ie\\s of
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science and technology and adopt instead a socio-political perspective (Calion, 1987). In
contrast to rational models, which focus exclusively on researchers and inventors and
depict the development of science and technology as a linear march down one path
toward scientific fact or technological efficiency, socio-political models depict the
development of science and technology as a political process involving many social
groups with diverse definitions of problems and conflicting favored solutions (e.g Bijker,
Hughes, and Pinch, 1987; Garud and Rappa, 1994; Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy,
2002; Garud and Karnoe, 2003).
These literatures share a concern with framing, a view ofboundedly rational
human action, and a socially constructed environment. From this perspective, the end
meaning and uses of technology are socially constructed (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch,
1987, Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy, 2002). Collectively, the literature that provides
the foundation for this study suggests the following concept, theoretical presuppositions,
and definitions, which along with a process perspective, serve as conceptual framework
for this study.
Technology Frames
Due to the fundamental character of emerging science-based technologies, what
the technologies will mean and how consumers and producers will use them, is unclear.
Technology fi-ames define and bound technologies in much the same way that collective
action frames define social problems, facilitating collective action and creating
sociopol itical legitimacy by answering the questions, . \Vhat problems does this
technology ,1ddress'J' and 'With what solutions'?' (Orliko\\ski and Clash. 1994: Bijker.
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1995; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). Technology frames comprise "all elements that
influence the interactions within the relevant social groups and lead to the attribution of
the meanings to technical artifacts," including, problems facing the technology and
problem solving strategies and solutions (Bijker, 1995: 123). A technology frame is
institutionalized, as the solution presented in the frame comes to be seen by stakeholders
as an acceptable, trustworthy solution to relevant problems. Like an institutional practice,
such as marriage, an institutionalized fame comes to be taken for granted and no longer
questioned. For example, as explained below, we no longer question that the dominant
purpose of a bicycle is transportation, whether for pleasure or need, and two wheels of
the same size are the preferred solution.
The creation of a technology frame is attributable to the actions of many actors,
including not only those who discover ideas but those in institutional forums, those who
develop complementary assets and those who oppose the research or technology (Bijker,
1987; Garud and Karnoe, 2003). These actors can be identified as "social groups"--
formal organizations or unorganized groups of individuals that attach the same shared set
of meanings to a technology (Bijker, 1987). The institutional acceptance of a technology
is a process of struggle between social groups with competing technology frames (Bijker,
1987; Garud and Karnoe, 2003). The contested nature of technology frames means that
the end fonn of the technology and meaning given to it are not known a priori.
Technology frames shape technologies at the same time that technological developments
,md political maneuverings by supporting groups shape technology frames. The process
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ends in closure when a particular frame dominates and is publicly accepted, becoming an
institution.
In accordance with constructionist interpretations of institutional theory, the
physical attributes and understanding and use of a technology interact with each other
and evolve over time. The initial interpretations of the uses and meanings, problems to be
solved and suggested solutions related to a technology are flexible, and socially
constructed interpretations influence the end design of the technology (Bijker, 1987,
Orlikowski and Gash, 1994;). While in hindsight, the evolution of a technological
development may appear to be linear, it is actually the end result of many possible paths
created by many interpretations, needs, and uses, which constitute the technology frame
(Garud and Kamoe, 2003).
Researchers can trace the development of a technology by analyzing the problems
and solutions encompassed in the technology frames of relevant social groups. For
example, Bijker (1995) shows how competing technology fi:ames influenced the
development of the bicycle such that the bicycle with two equally-sized wheels, once
known as the 'safety bicycle' to differentiate it from competing designs, has become
emblematic of our current understanding of the term bicycle. At one time, the dominant
bicycles were high-wheeled 'Ordinaries,' used by aristocratic young men with the goal of
showing off for their lady friends in parks. For this social group, the primary function of
the bicycle was sport and daring. The high-wheeler's meaning as a 'virile, high-speed'
bicycle supported the development of ever larger fi'ont wheels to solve the problem of
cC1l1tinLially impressing belies. For these ~lthletic youl1g men. an importal1t characteristic
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of the bicycle was that it could easily topple over--impressing ladies required risk.
However, for the social group including women and elderly men with the goal of safe
transport, the key characteristic of the high-wheeled Ordinary bicycle was its lack of
safety. It was a "non-working machine." As the frame defining the bicycle from the
perspective of women and elderly men became dominant in English society, the accepted
meaning 'virile' attributed to the high-wheeled bicycle was superseded by the accepted
meaning 'unsafe.' The high-wheel 'problem' was then corrected and the bicycle
developed into a 'working machine' with a low front wheel recognizable today as a
bicycle.
Human Agency
A critical principle of a sociopolitical perspective on science and technology is
that the emergence of a scientific or technological path is attributable to the actions of
many actors (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch, 1987; Martin and Richards, 1995; Garud and
Karnoe, 2003). Actors may include individual people, groups of people or organizations
who paliicipate in defining the developing path. This includes not only those who
discover ideas but those in institutional forums, those who develop complementary assets
and those who oppose the research or technological path. In accordance with
constructionist interpretations of institutional theory, actors influence the development of
a scientific or technological path by using strategic tactics to collectively build attributes
of their technologies into emerging institutional structures (Constant II, 1980; Gamd,
Jain. and Kumaraswamy, 2002). Strategic tactics are actions invohing social skill
(Fligstcin. 1997. .lOOI). the ability to 111oti\atc cooperation by prcnicling C01111110n
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meanings and identities to justify action, made in an attempt to create stable
organizational fields. The principle of collective human agency implies that the
purposeful actions of individuals in a collective can influence the development of a
scientific or technological path.
Social Construction
The social construction of technological systems literature maintains that
alternative paths of technological development exist (Bijker, et a1., 1987, Garud and
Karnoe, 2003). The initial interpretations of the uses and meanings, problems to be
solved and suggested solutions related to a technology are flexible. Socially constructed
interpretations influence the end design of the technology (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). Thus,
while in hindsight, the evolution of a technological development may appear to be linear
and determined by effici ency, it is actual! y the end resul t of many possible paths created
by many interpretations, needs and uses.
A similar perspective is evident in studies of science controversy and risk.
Controversies provide alternative accounts of the natural world suggesting that such
accounts are not given by nature but are the products of a social process of negotiation,
which mediates scientific explanations (Martin and Richards, 1995). The principle of
social construction suggestions that in order to understand the development of science
and technology one must identi fy con f1 icti ng defini tions and accounts.
Political Struggle
A third principle ofa sociopolitical perspective on science and technology is that
of political struggle. The il1~titlltiOIl~lI accl'ptalll'C pf a technology is \'iewed as a process
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of political struggle between social groups with competing technological frames (Bijker,
et al., 1987, Garud and Karnoe, 2003). Social groups may be institutions, organizations or
organized or unorganized groups of individuals that attach the same shared set of
meanings to a technology (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). Similarly, a political approach to
science risk and controversy studies views controversy as a form of politics: a process of
compromise involving competing groups in a political marketplace (Nelkin, 1992).
Scientific knowledge may become a tool used by competing groups to advocate their
positions (Martin and Richards, 1995). This principle suggests the need to identify key
groups and their definitions ofthe problems and solutions related to an emerging
technology.
Additional Definitions
Researchers studying the development of technology have described interrelated
components variously as communities, systems and fields (Constant II, 1987). For this
study, I will rely on the concept of a technology field. The concept of a technology field
is similar to that of an organizational field. Organizational fields are comprised of a
shared set of meanings (Scott, 2001). Technology fields "represent a pattern of
relationships among objects and humans related to a product-market domain" governed
by an institutional environment (Garuel, Jain, and Kumaraswamy, 2002: 197). This study
is an investigation of the early emergence of a technology domain, before a field has
fonned, I will refer to an emerging field or technology domain. As the effOlis of actors to
project a technology frame are the focus of this study, the social, political and discursi\c
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elements of the emerging technology domain will be of greater concern than the physical
or scientific elements of the technological system.
The entrepreneurship literature contains many sometimes conflicting definitions
of entrepreneurship based on many dimensions. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
define entrepreneurship in general. For this study, I will adopt a definition of
entrepreneurship as a societal phenomenon in which actors introduce new activity that
leads to change (Davidsson, 2002). I will focus on entrepreneurs involved in institutional
entrepreneurship. As discussed previously, following DiMaggio (1988) I define
institutional entrepreneurship as the action of interested agents deploying resources to
create and empower institutions that they value. Institutions constrain the choices of
actors and include norms, rules, culture, and laws (Ingram and Silvennan, 2000).
Process Perspective
I view the projection of a technology frame as a process. This is congruent with
Weick's (1979) view of structure, as applied by Barley (1986: 79) to the study of
technology: structure is "patterned action, interaction, behavior, and cognition." Process
researchers seek to understand how things evolve over time and why they evolve in the
way they do. Process data deal with sequences of events, involve multiple levels and
units of analysis, are temporally embedded and are often eclectic including in addition to
events, changing relationships, thoughts, and interpretations (Langley, 1999). Process
theories provide explanations in tenns of the sequence of events Ieading to an outcome
and must consider temporal ordering and probabilistic interaction (Mohr, 1982). A
process perspecti\'e \\"Ill direct me to collect stories ,1Ild inforlll,ltioll ahoLit c\cnts.
----------_._--------------
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activities and choices ordered over time. Methods appropriate for analyzing this type of
data will be discussed in a following section.
Conclusion
Following previous theory and research I begin this study with the following
expectation: Entrepreneurs attempt to influence the development of technological
systems by actively mobilizing collective action and utilizing collective resources to avert
perceived and expected threats. Their tactics involve the use of social skills and are likely
to include the creation of a favorable technological frame. The concept of a technology
frame, theoretical presuppositions and definitions described above along with a process
perspective provide a conceptual framework from which to explore the broad research
question posed in this disseliation: How do scientific discoveries become the basis for
domains of commercial activity') And, the more focused question that emerged from the
data, How do technology proponents project a technology frame in the general discourse?
Emerging technologies and ventures founded to commercialize them have wide-
ranging economic and social impact. Although researchers have for some time explored
how technologies emerge, evolve and are adopted, little attention has been devoted to
early emergence, prior to the identification of applications and products, when the
assumptions and definitions that drive technology trajectories are forming (Kaplan and
Tripsas, 2008). Recent \Nork by technology management scholars addressing calls for
greater attention to the social and political aspects oftechnology evolution with suggests
the importance of the role of tj'aming in the process of technology emergence. evolution
and adoptjpn (Orlll,(l\\ski ami 8'lrlc~. 2001: j(;lplan and Tripsas. 20(8). Ho\\C\cr.
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management scholars have said little about the creation and manipulation of technology
frames (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2004). This dissertation contributes to our knowledge
of technology emergence, evolution and adoption by focusing on the understudied period
of early emergence and understudied sociopolitical process of technology framing.
Specifically, I contribute to our knowledge of how science discoveries become the basis
for domains of commercial activity by explaining the process through which technology
proponents project a technology frame into the general public discourse.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS
Overview
As explained in the previous chapter, despite the economic importance of science-
based technologies, our knowledge of the path they take from science lab to commercial
arena is limited. Extent theories and studies that focus on the development of
technologies begin after a problem has been generally agreed upon, at the point that the
likely commercial uses of a scientific discovery are known (e.g. Garud, 1994;
Christensen, 1997). Wi thout an understanding of the earliest stages of the science to
technology path, our knowledge of how commercial activity emerges from scientific
discoveries will remain incomplete. In this chapter, I describe the methodological
approach I use to I explore the general research question, How do new areas of business
activity emerge to commercialize science based technologies? And, specifically, How do
technology proponents project technology frames? As I explain in this chapter, consistent
with my grounded theory approach, the more specific question emerged during the study
from the data rather than from my review of the literature.
This chapter builds from the assumptions and definitions derived from the
literature and detailed in the previous chapter. First, I describe and explain the overall
approach to this study including my assumptions. the research design, empirical setting,
case boundaries, and units ol'analvses Next J describe my approach to data collection
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and organization. Finally, I describe and explain my approach to data analysis, threats to
the validity of analyses based on qualitative data, and how I have addressed these threats.
Research Methods
This dissertation is a qualitative, inductive study exploring how basic science
discoveries become the basis for new areas of commercial activity. As detailed in the
previous chapter, because economic explanations of industry emergence assume the
existence of a product and market, they are not well suited to explain the emergence of
commercial activity from science-based technologies. Emergence is a complex, novel and
understudied phenomenon (Chiles, Meyer, and Hench, 2004) and requires longitudinal
data, process theorizing, and context-sensitive, multi-level research designs (Meyer, Gaba
and Colewell, 2005). Characteristics of science-based technologies, including their
extreme ambiguity and unforeseeable social and economic consequences, suggest that
sociopolitical processes, and in particular technology framing, play an important role.
While the emergence of any new industry can be expected to involve some
political struggle (Fligstein, 1996, 2003), new industries based on new scientific
knowledge are an extreme case. Innovation based on new knowledge has a long lead
time; requires the convergence of many types of knowledge, not limited to the scientific
or technological; and unlike other innovation which exploits a change that has occurred,
knowledge-based innovation brings about the change (Drucker, 1985). During the early
emergence of knowledge, or science-based technologies, the dimensions of merit on
which the new technology will be judged are unclear because neither founders nor users
are certain which characteristics will be critical (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). This
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uncertainty fosters increased political activity: "The more complex the system, the more
complex the social and technical uncertainty, the greater the intrusion of social and
political processes on the nature of technological progress" (Tushman & Rosenkopf,
1992: 337). An exploration of sociopolitical processes requires an approach that takes
into account participants' interpretations and use of language (Creed, Langstraat, and
Scully, 2002).
The design of this dissertation is consistent with researchers' suggestions for
exploring emergence and sociopolitical processes. I use an embedded, single case study
design (Yin, 1984) and inductive, grounded theory approach to analyze the data (Glaser
and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). This approach allows me to explore
emergence of science-based technologies and the role of social issues and political
maneuvering in the emergence process.
Interpretive Assumptions and Research Strategy
As explained in the previous chapter, research on emergent phenomenon,
including technology emergence is limited. Researchers that address related questions
frequently use case studies (e.g. Garud and Rappa, 1994; Hargadon and Douglas, 2001;
Munir and Phillips, 2006) and analysis techniques that include discourse, frame,
narrative, and grounded theory analysis.- These approaches have in common an emphasis
on participants' interpretations.
Interpretive studies draw on several key assumptions. First, a premise of such
research is that people act on the basis of their interpretations of the world. Through their
actions. people enaet social realties and endow them \\"ith meaning (Berger and
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Luckmann, 1967; Smircich and Stubbard, 1985; Weick, 1979; Orlikowski and Gash,
1994). Second, individuals and groups draw on frames of reference, which are implicit
guidelines that shape and organize peoples' interpretations and give meaning to events
(Weick, 1979; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994). Frames are created through social
interchange, negotiated over time, and come to represent the dominant logic of a group
(Isabella, 1990). Finally, interpretations are made after an event has occurred, as people
attempt to make collective sense of what has happened (Daft and Weick, 1984).
Building from the suggestions of researchers exploring emergence (e.g. Chiles,
Meyer, and Hench, 2004; Meyer, Gaba, and Colwell, 2005) and the interpretive
assumptions described above, I use an inductive, grounded theory approach to explore
how scientific discoveries become the basis for commercial activity and, in particular,
how technology proponents project a technology frame.
This dissertation is designed to explore the processes through which abstract
scientific discoveries become the basis for domains of commercial activity. Consistent
with an embedded case design, which I explain below, my research occurs in three
phases. In the first phase, I analyze the case of the emergence of nanotechnology
beginning with the first mentions of nanotechnology in the New York Times in 1985
through 2008. In the second phase, I focus on the period in which nanotechnology start-
ups were being founded (2000-2008) and three particular venture capital (VC) firms. In
the third phase, I consider the larger and embedded cases together. I collected data
through participant obsenation. inteniews. and extensive searches of archived electronic
WebPagcs. 1 supplemented this delta \\ith print and electronic docLlments from public and
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proprietary sources. I analyzed the data using an inductive, grounded theory approach
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990).
The inductive approach I take is appropriate for this study for several reasons.
First, empirically, the process by which scientific discoveries become the basis for
commercial activity is economically important, inherently risky and not well understood
(Drucker, 1985). Second, theoretically, the organizational literature says little about the
early emergence of technologies (Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008). Finally, this approach is
consistent with my research goals and the methodology and assumptions used in similar
studies (e.g. Hargadon and Douglas, 2001, Munir and Phillips, 2005).
Research Design
I use a embedded, single case design for this dissertation. Yin defines a case study
as, "an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly
evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1984: 23). Case
studies focus on understanding the dynamics of a setting and are typical of process
research (Langley, 1999). Case studies are particularly appropriate for exploratory
research focusing on "why" and "how" questions (Yin, 1984). Additionally, case studies
offer a distinct advantage over other designs when, "A 'how' or 'why' question is being
asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no
control" (Yin, 1984: 20). Given the questions this dissertation seeks to answer, a case
study design is appropriate.
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There are many types of case studies, including longitudinal, comparative, single
and embedded (Yin, 1984). Aldrich and Fiol argue that in order to study the emergence
of industries, "when a new industry's origin is identified, researchers must focus
intensively on its early years" (1994: 665). This suggests that researchers seeking to
develop a thorough understanding of how new areas of business activity emerge to
commercialize science based technologies focus on a single case. In order to capture fine-
grained detail, I focus on the single case of emerging nanotechnology, including three
smaller cases of particular VC firms embedded within the larger case. An investigation of
embedded cases can improve the validity of a study based on a single case. An embedded
case design involves the study of smaller subunits within a larger case, allowing for some
comparison between the embedded cases (Yin, 1984)..
Empirical Setting
I introduce the empirical setting for this study here and elaborate on it in Chapter
IV. The term nanotechnology was first suggested by NOlio Tanguchi of the Tokyo
University of Science to describe technology that strives for precision at the level of one
nanometer, or a billionth of a meter. While the term did not originate until 1974, credit
for inspiring nanotechnology is generally attributed to a lecture given by Richard Feyman
in 1959, titled There's Plenty ofRoom at the Bottom. In this lecture, Feyman proposed
the possibility of maneuvering matter atom by atom and suggested research to make
computers smaller and to create mechanical surgeons that could travel to trouble spots in
the body. Feyman offered two prizes to get things started: $1000 to the tlrst person to
make a working electric l11utor that was no bigger that unc sixty-forth or an inch on any
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side, and another $1000 to the first person to shrink a page of text to 1/25,000 its size.
The first prize was awarded in 1960 and the second in 1985 (Keiper, 2003). My analysis
of the single case extends from Feynman's 1959 speech through 2008, however, few
events occurred prior to the 1980s.
The embedded cases include the only three venture capital firms focusing solely
on nanotechnology during the period of early emergence. These firms were identified
through my initial analysis and were credited by participants as being instrumental in the
creation of the nanotechnology investing space. The firms were founded in 1999 and
2000 and my study includes their activities from founding through 2008.
My selection of this setting can be characterized as a combination of "planned
oppOliunism" (Pettigrew, 1997) and theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and
Strauss. 1967). The development of nanotechnology has a clear beginning and
encompasses many small dramas, such as groundbreaking innovations and the passage of
specific legislation, which may "provide a glimpse into the social system" at a patiicular
time (Pettigrew, 1990: 275). Between 2000 and 2008, nanotechnology was evolving from
a science discovery to business opportunity. The first nanotechnology start-ups were
being founded with patents but no products. Investors, policy makers and corporate
leaders were trying to figure out what nanotechnology is and what were the likely
implications. Proponents and opponents were organizing and taking stances, which were
reported in the media. Nanotechnology was making its way into mainstream fiction.
When the phenomena of study are contained within a single case, researchers should "go
for ntrcmc situations. critical incidents and social dramas ... where the progress is
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transparently observable" (Pettigrew, 1990: 275). The emergence of the nanotechnologies
involved such a public drama and, given the lack of familiarity, observability and
complexity of the technology, it represents an extreme situation.
From a theoretical perspective, although the literature points to the importance of
sociopolitical processes on the development of new technologies (Hargadon and Douglas,
2001; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008), empirical studies begin after the meaning of the focal
technologies are largely understood (e.g Garud and Rappa, 1994) or focus on
technologies for which known products exist (e.g. Hargadon and Dougnlas 2001; Munir
and Phillips, 2005). The case of the emergence of nanotechnology offers the opportunity
to study a technology at the earliest stage of its emergence from its basic science roots, in
real-time, and in context. During the period of the study, sensemaking and sensegiving
were actively OCCUlTing and the meaning of the technology was contested, allowing for
the collection of rich data in the fonn of st0l1es and histories as they were being
constructed. The efforts of individuals and organizations to make sense of
nanotechnology and promote their perspectives are "transparently observable"
(Eisenhardt, 1989, Pettigrew, 1990).
Data Sources
The data for this study were collected between January 2002 and December 2008,
from five sources: 1) participant observation and infonnal interviews at a series of annual
nanotechnology investing conferences, 2) journalistic reports and commentary, 3) semi-
structured interviews with ve and startup founders and executives, 4) Internet media
including; ve and startup wehsitcs. press releases. interviews, electronic journal articles.
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blogs, newsletters, and electronic conference presentations and marketing materials, and
5) trade publications and proprietary reports. The journalist reports and commentary and
trade publications provided a means to triangulate and buttress my naturalistic
observations and interviews (Eisenhardt, 1989) and to extend my investigation to include
the earliest years of the case. The Internet data document a real time, less fonnal account
of events and provide an additional basis for triangulation. The data sources are
summarized in Table 1.
Nanotechnology Investing Conference Series
I began collecting data for this dissertation by directly observing and informally
interviewing participants in nanotechnology investing at the 2003 Nanotechnology
Investing Forum, a two-day industry conference organized by International Business
Forum (IBF). Meyer, Gaba, and Colwell (2005: 467) call such conferences "field
configuring events" - settings where people from diverse social organizations assemble
temporarily with the conscious, collective intent to construct an organizational field."
This affords an excellent setting to observe and interact with field founders (DiMaggio,
1991, Fligstein 1997). Attendees included representatives of trade associati ons, economic
development agencies, private investors, and networking organizations actively engaged
in institution-building projects.
The conference series began in 2002 with what organizers and participants
recognize as the "the first conference in the States ... to specifically focus on
[nanotechnology] private equity investing:' The conference continued annually with
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minor modifications in fonnat through 2008. In 2009, the meeting was reduced to a two-
hour workshop between other conferences at the same venue.
Table 1: Data Sources
Traditional media
Nell' York Times Articles 1985-2006 313 docs.
Participant observation
, Remain Elusive 2006
8 notebooks/
1513 entries
2000-2008
1997-2008
2002
2003
1997-2008
2009
2005
2002-2006
2008
2001-2004
Conference agendas, 2002-2008
names/organizations of sponsors,
s eakers, attendees
Transcribed audio recordings of 2002-2008
resentations
Field notes & memos 2003-2009
Transcribed audio recordings and 2003-2008
field notes
Websites
Journal aniclcs, ress releases
Conference agendas. newsletters,
b)oos, videos
Nanobusiness leaders
\Veb Archive
Nanolnvesting Event
HighBeam Research
Google
Electronic Media
Semi-structured interviews
I personally attended six of the eight conferences and with the help of colleges who
attended the two e\ents I missed. I compiled a complete record of the conference series. I
collected notebooks. which. wntainecl lists pf attendees, sponsors. speakers and the titles
42
and descriptions of presentations, audio recordings and field notes from each of the eight
conferences. I had the audio recordings of key presentations transcribed, yielding 98
pages of single-spaced text. I took notes at and after the events and conducted numerous
informal (Lofland and Lofland, 1984).
Print Journalism
After attending the 2003 Nanotechnology Investing Forum, I began collecting
archival data from journalistic media sources. I initially used Lexis-Nexis Academic
Universe to obtain all articles on or related to nanotechnology published in the New York
Times from the first article in 1985 through July of 2005, which yielded a total of 226
articles. I selected the New York Times because it was a crucial medium for
communication about nanotechnology to the general public. The Times has the largest
circulation of US daily newspapers, is targeted to a general news audience, and is
headquartered near Boston, a nanotechnology center. Additionally, at the time I began
collecting data, the New York Times was publishing more stories about nanotechnology
that competing newspapers, as shown in Table 2. As time progressed, I collected articles
published in the Times through December 2008. This yielded a total of 313 articles.
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Table 2: Prevalence of Nanotechnology Articles in Major Papers
East Coast U.S. Circulation Rank
National Re ional
New York Times I I 211
Boston Globe II 5 89
Washin ton Post 3 2 71
West Coast U.S
San Francisco Chronicle 16 2 74
Seattle Times 20 3 25
LA Times 2 1 0
Source: Lexis Nexis Academic and 85" Editor and Publisher International
Yearbook EnG)'clopedia ofthe New~paper lndustrj' Part1: Dailies, 2005.
Semi-structured Interviews
At the IBF Nanotechnology Investing Forums, I approached participants,
described my project, and conducted infonnal face-to face interviews. I took detailed
notes of these conversations. Between]anuary 2006 and]anuary of 2008, I conducted
follow-up open-ended, semi-structured telephone interviews with 11 nanotechnology
business leaders. I recorded and transcribed the interviews.
The individuals selected for follow up interviews included the founders of the
three (3) focal VC firms in my study, four (4) leaders of the media, research and political
organizations founded by the VC finns, and four (4) business leaders who had either
received funding from or palinered with the VC finns. The interviews lasted from 45 to
90 minutes and I interviewed one founder multiple times. I asked interviewees to first tell
me the story of the founding and evolution of their organizations. I then asked them to
elaborate on specific domain building activities that they had engaged in, which I had
identified from my previous analyses. I focLised on the actions and decisions of the
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founders, changes in strategic direction, rationale behind the actions, decisions and
changes, and the benefits and costs the founders perceived they gained from their domain
building activities. In sharing their perspectives, interviewees gave detailed histories of
their goals and rationales driving their actions, which helped me to understand how they
made sense of their actions and impact. I recorded and transcribed these interviews
yielding 119 pages of single spaced text. The interview questions are shown in Appendix
A.
Internet Media
I began my data collection process by collecting articles on nanotechnology
published in traditional media outlets, newspaper articles and trade reports. As my study
progressed, it became apparent that much of the public information about
nanotechnology, and about my focal ves was available only on the Internet. One
organization founder explained the importance of the Internet to the dissemination of
infonnation about nanotechnology as follows:
Nanotech has been the first wave of technology to come along whilst we
have been living in the Internet age and infonnation age. When nanotech
came along, you know, '98, '99, suddenly everybody was on the web or
was on Wikipedia, or all these types of things. So the amount of
misinfonnation and disinfonnation probably outweighed the
... [infonnation] in scientific journals. You could imagine ten, fifteen years
ago, people didn't have Internet; didn't have all these hordes of emails and
newsletters and WebPages to research things with.
Organizations and individuals posted blogs and newsl~tters. Each of the print
sources I collected had, or created during the course of my study, a cOITesponding
electronic forum that disseminated inf01l11ation more frequently than the traditional print
articles. Much of this infonnation did not enter print articles. Additionally, each of the
focal YCsput out press releases using electronic wire services. Although the events
described in some of these press releases were picked up and reported in print outlets,
many were not. But, the press releases remained available to interested readers on the
Internet. Thus, the Internet media offered a vital source of data documenting real time
sensemaking of nanotechnology. I collected Internet media using three different search
tools, Google, Highbeam Research and the Web Archive. I searched using the name of
each of the three focal YCs from the first appearance (1999) through 2008.
I conducted searches using Google with a search by date command that allowed
me collect web pages posted within stated dates. These searches generated electronic
newsletters, blogs, conference promotions and materials, biographies, and interviews
organized by year posted. I collected 2386 uris. I used HighBeam to locate electronic
versions of print articles, articles published only on the web, and press releases. This
search yielded 519 electronic documents.
Finally, I searched the Internet Archive for the archived websites of each of the
focal YCs. The Internet Archive is "a non-profit organization that was founded to build
an Internet library, with the purpose of offering pennanent access for researchers,
historians, and scholars to historical collections that exist in digital fonnat" (Internet
Archive, March 30,2009). It is searchable by urI. A search results in a list of hyperlinks
to WebPages for the specified urI, by date, that are included in the archive. A change to
the website is indicated with an asterisk. For each focal ve, I collected one complete
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website from each quarter in which the VC site appeared in the archive, unless no change
had occurred. I converted the WebPages to PDF documents, yielding 1837 pages.
Trade Publications and Proprietary Reports
I collected trade publications and propriety reports as they became available. I
collected editorials from the print version of the nanotechnology trade journal Small
Times, the Forbes Wolfe Nanotechnology Report in whole, and the following proprietary
reports:
• Nanotechnology Opportunity Report (2002, Cientitifca)
• Nanotechnology Opportunity Report, 2nd ed., (2003, Cientitifca)
• Nanotechnologies in 2009: Creati1'e Destruction or Credit Crunch (2009,
Cientifica)
• A Prudent Approach to Nanotech EI11'ironmental, Health, and Safezv Risks (2005,
Lux Research)
• Nanotechnology Corporate Strategies (2008, Lux Research)
• Exits/or Venture Capita! in Nanotechnology Remain Elusive (2006, Lux
Research)
I organized the data into four databases, depending upon the type of data and my
use of it. I used computer assisted qualitative analysis software, NVivo and Atlas.ti to
organize and analyze the text documents and WebPages that I coded most intensively
(Lewis, 2004; Muhr, 2004). These included the Times articles, the transcriptions of the
conference presentations and semi-structured interviews, and the PDF files generated
from the VCs' archived websites. I used Scrapbook, a Mozilla Firefox add-on, to
download, store, and organize Internet media in intact web pages and web sites.
Scrapbook allows users to specify the number of hyperlinks on a web page to capture. I
saved a copy of entire websites including at least tvm hyperlinks so that the links can be
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followed in the future, even if the webpages on the Internet are changed or deleted. Data
from conference notebooks are organized and stored in an Access database. Finally, my
field notes and conceptualizations and printed trade journals and proprietary reports are
stored and organized in a file cabinet. The organization of the data is shown in Table 3.
This wide array of data from multiple sources and time periods provide rich,
contextual detail of the emergence of commercial activity around nanotechnology. Those
data revealed key events, individuals and organizations, and their actions and
motivations. Informants' causal attributions revealed their interpretations of the
relationships between events and the actions of key players. These interpretations formed
the basis the actions that influenced the social structure of the emerging space and
meaning of nanobusines.
Table 3: Data Organization
NVivo & Atlas Ti
NeH' York Times articles
Semi-structured interviews
Web archive web sites
Key IBF presentations
Firefox Scrapbook
Electronic journal articles
Press releases
Conference agendas
Blogs
Newsletters
Interviews
Access Database
NanoInvesting Event notebooks
File Cabinet
Field notes and memos
Printed reports
text files
transcribed audio files
PDFs
transcribed audio files
html documents
org & individual names, presentation titles
handwritten & typed mix
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Data Analysis
I followed a grounded theory approach formalized by Glaser and Strauss (1967)
and recently elaborated by Corbin (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) to analyze the data. This
approach involves comparing and contrasting the data with the researcher's evolving
theory throughout the data collection and analysis process. The researcher's evolving
theory directs her attention to important dimensions that have been identified through the
initial research and the data simultaneously focuses attention on how well the evolving
theory explains the most recently collected data (Isabella, 1990). The iterative movement
between theory and data results in re-conceptualization. which should account for the
nuances in the data. This re-conceptualization is often based on a creative leap (Isabella,
1990).
In accordance \vith my grounded theory approach, my study progressed through a
process of iterative cycles of data collection, data analysis, conceptualization and
literature review. Each iteration was influenced by, and built upon, previous iterations
such that my question, focal groups and conceptual models were refined as the study
progressed. I constantly compared my evolving theory with new data, and allowed the
theory to suggest additional data collection. After attending conferences, I wrote memos
and drew diagrams to reflect my understanding. I discussed my ideas with academic
colleagues and attendees at subsequent conferences, where I used my diagrams as an
entry to informal interviews (Meyer, 1991). A simplified depiction of my process and the
evolution of my theory in shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Data Collection and Analysis Process
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Initial Impressions-Participant Observation
The process of evolving theory in this dissertation began with my field
observations at a confer'ence I attended as a research assistant. After the conference, I
conducted broad review of the literature. I then returned to the conference the next year, I
took notes of the facts, details, and frequently reported information and concerns of
individuals at the conferences. This frequently repeated information augmented my
evolving theory and provided the basis for general research question, research approach
and initial categories (Van Maanen, 1983; Isabella, 1990).
[ndividuals with \vho111 I spoke at the IBF Nanotechnology Investing FOlUm
claimed to be making strategic decisions and taking action to influence the development
of nanotechnology business. I also observed many heated discussions about how the
nanotechnology "space" (a word used by the pmiicipants) should be characterized.
Participants debated whether nanotechnology was an industry, a science project, an
enabling technology, or an investment space. They also discussed the likely impact of
public perceptions of these characterizations, public concerns about nanotechnology
health and safety risks, and the possibility that "nanohype" would lead to a backlash and
reduction in public support. These observations and the literature suggested my initial
theory, that individuals acting strategically can influence the emergence of commercial
activity and that technology frames are a key aspect of the process. This theory and the
literature suggested the initial categories: key events, social groups, problems and
solutions. As I collected data, I compared it with my theory and sought to identify
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themes. I discussed my impressions with academic colleagues and conference
participants and my ideas evolved to account for the data.
After formulating my general research question, the data collection and analysis
occurred in three phases. In the first phase, I collected and analyzed data on the
encompassing case, at the level of the emerging nanotechnology domain. The units of
analyses include organizations involved in building the space and their characterizations
or frames for nanotechnology. In the second phase, I focused on the embedded cases, the
VC firms. The units of analyses include the histories, actions and rationales of the
individual founders and the strategies and actions of the VC finns. In the third phase, I
considered the larger and embedded cases together. I sought to identify thematic concepts
that could provide a theoretical explanation for the pattems that I observed in the data.
The units of analyses included persistent themes and participants' perceptions of
outcomes and causal attributions.
Phase i-Exploratory Research
In phase 1 of this study, I collected newspaper articles, trade and proprietary
reports and attended the 2003 IBF Nanotechnology Investing Forum. I used these data to
construct timeline of events (Lang1y, 1999; Chiles, Meyer, and Hench, 2004). I identified
key events in news reports and organized them in a timeline to depict the history and
development of nanotechnology. In keeping with the interpretive assumptions that guide
this study, I identified as "key events," events that were mentioned in multiple sources,
events that continued to be mentioned over time and events that were speci fically
described as milestones in reports. For example. a brief description of the discovery of
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the Buckyball-a spherical molecular cage assembled from carbon atoms-is included in
most early articles.
Next, I conducted a qualitative analysis of the content of the New York Times
articles. I used NVivo qualitative analysis software to systematically code the articles. I
began by coding at the level of the article as a whole. I created an attribute table within
NVivo showing the title and date of each article, the section of the newspaper in which it
appeared (for example, business-financial, metropolitan, science), the word used for
nanotechnology (e.g. Buckyballs, "nanotechnology," nano-technology), and the general
topic. I recorded the title, date, sections, and word used for nanotechnology as they were
listed in the articles. I generated the codes for themes through a process of emergent
coding. I identified 35 initial themes, which I grouped into the final 8 coding categories
shown in Table 4.
I used this table to identify temporal phases in the timeline, separated by
breakpoints (Langly, 1999; Chiles, Meyer, and Hench, 2004). These breakpoints were
based on the annual number of articles on nanotechnology in the New York Times and the
main topic of each article. I identified four temporal phases, separated by breakpoints
based on jumps in the number of articles and shifts in the topics: research and discovery,
introduction of nanotechnology, applications and implications and nanousiness. The
findings from this analysis with examples of the data are described in Chapter V.
Then, I conducted a qualitative analysis of the content of text within the articles.
Again, using NVivo and a process of emergent coding, I began by identifying social
groups. problems and solutions mentioned in the text (Bijker. 1987; 1995; Pinch and
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Bijker, 1987; Maguire, 2004). I identified a total of 1127 individual segments of text,
selected as "free nodes," meaning that I selected the text and saved it using the first part
of the segment as the name for the segment.
Table 4: Initial Categories and Codes
fnitial··ltatcl:!orV Final Code
Feasibility
controversy
Investment fraud Protests/Concems
Over hype
Environmental
health and safety
Prey Science Fiction
Books I read
Meeting
Profile
image of science Science/Scientists
Nobel prize
Development of
nano
Buckyballs
Nanotechnology
"nanotechnology"
Nanotubes, nano- Term for
composite, etc. nanotechnology
Nanosystems
Nanophase
Nano-technology
Research Report
Product or Breakthrough or
application
Research near finding
application
Intel
HP Business and Finance
IBM
Sandia
Government spending
Song or fiction Peripheral
Weddina or obituarv
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Thus, each segment initially had its own name. I then grouped these segments
into categories allowing the categories to emerge and evolve as I went through the data. I
coded the text segments into 123 categories and then, working between my emerging
codes and the text, I grouped the text into the final codes. Table 5 shows examples of the
initial categories and final codes for Phase 1 (Isabella, 1990).
Table 5: Phase 1 Categories and Codes
Initial Category Initial Codes Final Codes
Public perception
Evil uses Threat to health and
Health risks safetyProblem Social Implications
Unknown risk Barrier to R&D
Inadequate control
Barrier to Bus Dev
Experts Experts
Start-up Start-up
Government Rep Government
Government Scientist
Social Group Foresight Futurist
IMM
Trade publication
Trade group . Trade and Industry
Industry
Increase regulation Regulation
Limit R&D
More research Increase Research
Research risks
Solution Dev bus infrastructure
Reduce research cost Develop infrastructure
Educate public Manage Perception
No Problem
I then used NVivo's analysis tools to identify links between the social groups and
problems and solutions. I conducted a proximity search to identify problems and
solutions discussed in the same paragraph as social groups. I reviewed each of these
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paragraphs and then created visual maps diagramming the connections. Graphic
representations of data are useful for the analysis of process data because they allow the
simultaneous representation of multiple dimensions (Meyer, 1991; Langley, 1999). An
example of a diagram that assisted my analysis is shown in Appendix B.
.
I created visual maps for each of the temporal periods and used these maps to get
a sense of how nanotechnology was portrayed over time and who was associated with
each portrayal. Working iteratively between my timeline, diagrams, tables, coded
segments of text and evolving conceptualizations, I traced emergence and evolution of
nanotechnology technology frames across the temporal phases that I identified in my
earlier analysis. The decomposition of data into adjacent phases separated by breakpoints
facilitates the analysis of processes in a sequential fashion by allowing one to examine
how actions and context change and inf1uerice each other across phases (Langley, 1999).
The findings of this analysis are described in Chapter V.
Phase 1 of my analysis allowed me to gain overall understanding of the case and
the subunits within in it. I sought to understand what was happening, who was involved,
and what they were doing. This analysis provided a grounded basis for the identification
of the embedded units within the larger case.
Phase 2-Technology Framing by Nanotechnology VCs
Phase two of my analysis focuses on the embedded cases, the focal VCs and the
media, research and political organizations they founded. I sought to identify the VCs'
actions and understand the rationales behind them. The units of analyses included the
actions. "strategic tactics'" and stated rationales of the participants.
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I began my analysis of the embedded cases by constructing a timeline of key
events and actions for each VC based on participant observation and the VCs' current
web sites. I read my notes and printed the web sites and highlighted key events and
actions to construct a visual timeline. Again, I selected as key those events that were
mentioned frequently or given described as key or a milestone on the websites. This
provided me with an overall understanding of the three cases. This analysis guided my
construction of a protocol for semi-structured interviews. I continued to fill in details in
the timeline and narrative as I moved to systematic coding of the interviews, VC web
sites and conference presentations.
Next, I turned to my semi-structured interview and web archive data. To develop
a rich sense of the strategies and tactics of the VCs and how they unfolded over time, I
systematically reviewed the interviews, conference presentations and web archive pages.
I began with the notion of "strategic tactic," from the literature (Fligstein, 1997) as part of
my guiding framework (Miles and Hubennan, 1994). Using "open coding," in Atlas.ti-
selecting quotations with out assigninga particular code----I marked text describing
actions and decisions as quotations (Muhr, 2004; Sheon, 2007). Then, I used Atlas.ti's
network view function to view the selected quotations and sort them into similar "piles"
(Sheon, 2007). The network view allows a researcher to view the selected text on an
"index card." The researcher can move the index cards on the screen and draw links
between them to construct a network diagram. By selecting a particular card, the
researcher can view the selected text in the larger document from which it was pulled.
This mode of analysis allows the researcher to view the pi les in a Iist to determine if Zllly
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segments do not fit and move them to different piles. These piles became the categories
of activities and themes that form the basis of a descriptive model, which I will present
and elaborate on in Chapter VI. The categories and themes are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Phase 2 Categories of Themes and Activities
Preliminary First order Examples Second order
cate20ries cate20ries cateuories
Nature of Unknown field In the micro technology world ... most people Niche-space
Nanotech didn't know anything about it.
Definition war You get people talking about what's
nanotechnology, microtechnology its like a holy
war.
Industry vs. tech It is a common industry.
Its iust an enabling technology.
Rationale Be at the center [t is public and actual perception of us being at Positioning
the epicenter of everything going on In
nanotechnology.
Actions Launched and When NanoTech was founded ... we were looking Constructing
founded entities to focus ... one of the ideas that we had was there
needed to be a leadin(] media outlet.
Help people It was more of an educational message ... So this Translating
understa nd is what nanotechnology is and this is where its
getting applied.
Benefits Credibility They could walk into a room of investors or meet Symbolic
with startups and have instant credibility. Resources
Exposure [The] exposure that came attracts a lot of
entrepreneurs and people to vou.
Opened doors Well the benefit. .. ,vas it opened a lot of doors for
them.
Raising money And from a raising money standpoint focusing on Substantive
nanotechnology proves to be a fairly big Resources
advantage.
Deal flow They attracted all the deal flow.
Information/ [One of] the benefits of what we did is we still
knowledge know more about small tech than probably
anybody around.
I crosschecked my understanding against reports in the electronic media,
highlighting and annotating text using Scrapbook tools. Scrapbook is an add-on program
for the Mozilla Firefox search engine. It allows for the download and storage of
indi\idual \\eb pages as well as complete websites. Scrapbook also a]]ows one to se3l'ch,
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highlight and annotate text. Scrapbook does not have sophisticated tools for searching
and retrieving coded text. I chose to store and review the electronic articles in Scrapbook
because the program allowed me to deal directly with the WebPages without converting
them to PDFs or text documents. This retained the actual presentation of the information
and allowed for much more efficient reviewing of the documents as I could use the
original hyper-links saved in Scrapbook. Because I did not code these documents as
intensively as the interviews and conference presentations, I determined that the benefits
of viewing the original presentation and traveling efficiently through the sites outweighed
the better search and retrieval functions of qualitative analysis software.
Through Phase 2 of my analysis, I sought to identify the actions of the focal VCs
and the rationales behind them. I identified three activities based on my categorization.
These activities f01111 the basis for the descriptive model I discuss in Chapter VI.
Phase 3-A Process Model of Technology Frame Projection
Phase three of my analysis focuses on the data and cases as a whole. I sought to
understand the participants' perceptions of the outcomes of their actions and to develop a
theoretical explanation of the data. The units of analyses included the outcomes and
causal linkages as perceived by the participants.
I reviewed all of my notes, memos and draft conceptual models. I identified
persistent themes in my understanding. I wrote memos on these themes and checked my
understanding with academic colleagues. I returned to the Atlas.ti database and reviewed
my pile sort. I marked additional text describing paliicipants' motivations, explanations
and perceptions of causal influences. I then worked back and fOlill between the data. my
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memos, my descriptive model, and the literature to explain the data (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The resulting model and examples of the supporting text
segments are displayed and discussed in Chapter VI.
Asdescribed above, my grounded theory approach involved constant comparing
and contrasting of the data with my evolving theory throughout the data collection and
analysis process. This iterative movement between theory and data resulted in the
findings I describe in Chapters V and VI ofthis dissertation. Single cases and a grounded
theory approach often provide rich descriptions, useful for future comparisons, and
context-sensitive theoretical explanations (Dyer and Wilkens, 1991). However, as
discussed below, this approach has limitations.
Limitations and Threats to Validity
A principal limitation of this research design is its reliance on a single case.
Organizational researchers have debated the value of single versus multiple case studies
for theory building, and have made strong arguments in favor of each (Dyer & Wilkins,
1991; Eisenhardt, 1989). However, single case research has long been considered an
acceptable research approach in the social sciences and is accepted as particularly
valuable for gaining in-depth understanding of unique and/or little understood
phenomena (Yin, 1984; Dyer and Wilkins, 1991). An analysis of a single case cannot
confirm or disconfirm causal relationships and the findings are not generalizable to a
larger population. Rather, single-case studies provide fertile ground for extending and
building theory (Yin, 1984). Thus, cases should be selected so as to generalize to
theoretical propositions rather than populations (Yin. 1984). Thus, the emergence of
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nanotechnology is not a representation of similar cases, but rather an extreme case likely
to illuminate our theories of how technologies emerge.
Validity in qualitative research corresponds to the question "How can an inquirer
persuade his or her audiences that the research findings ... are worth paying attention to?"
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 290). To provide a check on the reliability of this study, I rely
on triangulation. I triangulate data obtained from my observations, interviews, Internet
sources and journalistic media. I include in my report the data that were corroborated
across sources. Additionally I triangulate across time periods by comparing accounts
from early web pages with later accounts given in the interviews I conducted, in
conference presentations and in interviews in the journalistic press. Throughout my
analysis, I rely on the constant comparative method. This method provides validity
checks as new data are integrated into the emerging categories. When new data conflicted
with my conceptualizations or offered additional insights, I modified my developing
theory to incorporate them. I repeat this process until I achieve theoretical saturation
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967).
This chapter builds from the assumptions and definitions derived from the
literature and detailed in the previous chapter. The setting of this study is well suited for a
study of the emergence of a science-based technology. My grounded theory approach is
consistent with the setting, question and similar research. While a single case design has
some inherent limitations, the wide array of data collected and analyzed for this study
serves to mitigate the limitations to the extent possible.
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CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT
Overview
In the previous chapter, I described the research design for this dissertation. This
dissertation is a qualitative study, with an embedded, single case design, set in the context
of the emerging nanotechnology domain. As I explained in the previous chapter, the
nanotechnology domain is a setting well suited for this study. The literature suggests that
..
framing in general is a driving component of political debates such as those sUlTounding
the emergence of nanotechnology and technology framing, in particular, is likely to be
most evident when a new technology emerges (Bijker and Pinch, 1987; Orlikowski and
Gash, 1994; Fulk, 1993). In this chapter, I describe the empirical context of this
dissertation induding the larger setting of the nanoteclmology domain and the three
organizations that are the focus of the embedded cases.
I begin by restating a definition of nanotechnology. Next, I describe the
development of nanotechnology over time and present a timeline of key events. I
constructed the timeline from trade publications and proprietary reports. I collected
additional data and checked this timeline against reports in the general press and in my
interviews. In keeping with the constructivist assumption that knowledge of a situation
accumulates as agents' interact with and make sense of a context (Weick, 1979), I
identified as "key" those events that were mentioned in multiple sources, events that
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continued to be mentioned over time, and events that were described as milestones in
accounts. For example, a brief description of the discovery of the Buckyball, a spherical
molecular cage assembled from carbon atoms, is included in many early articles and I
thus, selected this discovery as a key event. Additional examples of frequently mentioned
events include the discovery of a method for mass-producing Buckyballs, the invention
of the scanning tunneling microscope--which can image and manipulate the height of
individual atoms-and the passage of the $422 million National Nanotechnology
Initiative.
I conclude this chapter by describing the role of venture capital in the emerging
nanotechnology domain and the three VC organizations that became focal cases of this
study. I selected the three organizations that are the focus of the embedded cases because
they were identified as playing a key role in the development of the nanotechnology
business community in their own WebPages and my interviews with them, in general
press repOlis, and by other members of the community. I generated descriptions of the
focal organizations by collecting stories about them from my interviews and in their
WebPages. I checked these stories with other members of the community and against
accounts in the general press.
The Nanotechnology Domain
The setting for this study is the emerging nanotechnology domain.
Nanotechnology is the study (sometimes referred to separately as nanoscience) and
output of the control of matter on an atomic and molecular scale, at dimensions of
between 1 LInd 100 nanometers. A nanometer is one billionth of a meter. which is about
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the width of three or four atoms. By comparison, a sheet of paper is about 100,000
nanometers thick (NNI, 2009), a human hair is about 25, 000 nanometers wide (Center
for Responsible Nanotechnology, 2009). A man's beard grows a nanometer in the time it
takes to lift a razor to his face (Kahn, 2006).
Size matters because matter behaves differently at the nanoscale. Unusual
chemical, biological, and physical properties that differ from the properties of single
atoms may emerge. For example, calcium carbonate molecules alTanged in a sawtooth
pattern form chalk, whereas the same material stacked like bricks forms the shiny shell of
abalones (Kahn, 2006).
These properties and the ability to manipulate the constmction of matter suggest
dramatic and wide-ranging applications. Nanotechnology promises economic and societal
impacts likely to exceed those of comparable discoveries such as plastics and
biotechnology. For instance, "Merely sprinkling carbon nanotubes into epoxy strengthens
the glue by more than 30 percent" and scientists are actively researching medical
applications to detect and eliminate cancerous cells (Kahn, 2006). The National Science
Foundation estimated in 2000 that the market for nanotechnology products will be over
one trillion dollars by 2015 and that the industry will employ over 250 million workers
(NSF, 2001). While the commercial development ofnanotechnologies and their diffusion
into many sectors seems certain at the present time, the path to this point has involved
contentious positioning and discussion among government, investment, commercial, and
opposition communities.
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Chronology of Events
A timeline showing key events in the early development of nanotechnology is
shown in Figure 2 and discussed in this chapter.
The term nanotechnology was first suggested by Norio Tanguchi of the Tokyo
University of Science to describe technology that strives for precision at the level of one
nanometer, or a billionth of a meter. While the term did not originate until 1974, credit
for inspiring nanotechnology is generally attributed to a lecture given by Richard Feyman
in 1959, titled "There's Plenty ofRoom at the Bottom. ., In this lecture, Feyman proposed
the possibility of maneuvering matter atom by atom and suggested research to make
computers smaller and to create mechanical surgeons that could travel to trouble spots in
the body. Feyman offered two prizes to get things started: $1000 to the first person to
make a working electric motor that was no bigger that one sixty-fOlih of an inch on any
side, and another $1000 to the first person to shrink a page of text to 1125,000 its size.
The first prize was awarded in 1960 and the second in 1985 (Keiper, 2003).
Feyman's ideas have blossomed into the growing nanotechnology domain.
Growth in nanotechnology was spurred by research discoveries such as the discovery of
Buckyballs in 1985 and the ability to mass produce them in 1990; supporting inventions
such as the scanning tunneling microscope, which can detect and manipulate the height of
Figure 2: Timeline of Events
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individual atoms; public funding, such as the passage in 2001, of the $422 million
National Nanotechnology Initiative and, in 2003, of the $3.63 billion 21st Century
Nanotechnology Research and Development Act; and private venture capital investment,
which rose from one investment of $3.3 million in 1998 to estimated investments of $650
million in 2006 (Lux Research, 2006).
Growth in the nanotechnology field resulted in increased visibility and public
opposition. Organized opposition emerged in 2002 with a call for a moratorium on the
commercial production of nanomaterials by the ETC group, a self-proclaimed technology
watchdog. [n 2004. there were three protests. Berkeley residents concerned about the
potential release ofnanoparticles from the Lawrence Berkely National Laboratory,
Topless Humans Organized for Natural Genetics (THONG), and The Heavenly
Righteous Opposed to Nanotech Greed (THRONG) gained attention for their protests
against nanotechnology. Supporters of nanotechnology recognized that public concerns
posed a threat to the emerging technology. Mark Modzelewski, executive director of the
Nanobusiness Alliance (NbA) announced the creation of a group devoted to dealing with
safety concerns and expressed hopes that the new group could dispel some of the fears
prompted by the media attention.
As competition to define nanotechnology increased, proponents of a
"mainstream" definition framed nanotechnology as an extension of ongoing
miniaturization, which would result in improvements to existing products. This
conception was at odds with the vision introduced by Eric Drexler (the first scientist to
receive a PhD in nanotechnology and author of the first comprehensive texts about
nanotechnology), which includes "molecular manufacturing" and self-replicating
machines that might be able to manufacture anything manufactured by traditional
processes at drastically reduced cost and improved perfonnance. The so-called
mainstream and more radical views were contrasted in press accounts:
"Mainstream nanotechnology will soon be used by cosmetics companies
to help their current products ... last longer and work better. But if
Drexler's version of nanotechnology were to corne to
fruition ...nanomachines could precisely adjust your hair and skin color to
your liking; wrinkles could be smoothed and excess fat removed" (Keiper,
2003).
Proponents of the mainstream definition won a victory when they argued successfully
that a feasibility study of the more radical molecular manufacturing and self-replicating
machines, which were featured in Michael Clichton's Prey, be removed from the House
version of the Nanotech Act of2003 (Lovey, 2004).
Nanobusiness has become a recognized area of commercial activity. In 2007,
Cientifica, a European research and consulting finn specializing in nanotechnology,
confirmed that the NFS' s estimate of a one trillion dollar market by 2015 is likely
accurate and may even underestimate the size of the future market for nanotechnology
products (see Figure 3). Government and public investment in nanotechnologies
continues to grow.
The proposed National Nanotechnology Initiative budget for the fiscal year 201 0
is $1.64 billion and will bring the cumulative investment to nearly $12 billion (NNI,
2009). Recognizing the public concerns that emerged in 2002, in 2005 NNI began
investing in research on environmental health and safety and in education and research on
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ethical, legal and societal implications. Investments in research in these areas now total
over $350 million and $220 million, respectively.
Figure 3: Growth in Global Nanotechnology Market
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These investments support a desire ofnanobusiness and govemment interests to prevent
public fears from slowing commercial development. Reflecting this interest, a NNI
brochure describes the risks of nanotechnology and the benefits of research into such
risks:
Knowledge... can guide researchers and engineers in creating handling and
disposal guidelines ... [and] can help them to avoid using certain materials
in products or to modify the matelials to make them safe. Researchers
have found, for instance, that special coatings can make potentially
hazardous nanoscale materials safe for use.
Risk, according to expelis, involves two factors--hazard and exposure. If
there is no exposure, even a hazardous material does not pose a lisk ...The
National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety has recommended
that employers take appropriate precautionary measures for handling new
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materials-including engineering controls, administrative controls, and
personal protective equipment--to avoid worker exposure to nanoscale
materials (NNI, Big Things From a Tiny World, 2009).
These efforts, along with the emergence of businesses and products, seem to have shifted
public discussion away from regulation specific to nanotechnology towards risk
management.
Likewise, private investment in nanotechnology is growing. Private investment in
nanotechnology is dominated by large global corporations, which had invested more than
$6.6 billion on nanotechnology R&D as of 2006 (Lux Research, 2006). Venture capital
has also contributed to growth in the nanotechnology field, investing $650 million in
2006. bringing the cumulative total ofVC investment to $3 billion.
Research and investment in nanotechnology have resulted in actual businesses
and products. By 2006, 18 Ve-backed nanotech startups achieved successful exits
through acquisition or IPO (Lux Research, 2006). Products using nanoscale materials and
processes that are now available include: anti-bacterial wound dressings using nanoscale
silver; a nanoscale dry powder can neutralize gas and liquid toxins in chemical spills;
batteries for tools to deliver more power, more quickly, with less heat; sunscreens
containing transparent nanoscale titanium dioxide or zinc oxide; and eyeglasses,
windows, and car mirrors with scratch and glare-resistant coatings (NNI, 2009).
The Role of Venture Capital
It is widely accepted that collective action is necessary to capitalize on
oppOliunities inherent in new technologies (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994, Rao, Morrill, and,
ZalcL 2000; Dowell, S\vaminathan. and Wade. 2002). Founders of a technology domain
i()
must act collectively to reduce uncertainty, develop an institutional environment and
generate social acceptance (Shane and Venkataraman, 2003). In the case of
nanotechnology, VC firms were the first to undertake collective activities to support the
commercialization of nanotechnology.
Venture capital (VC) is a specialized source of financing generally focused on
young, growth-oriented companies (Hellmann, 2000). VCs are professional fund
managers who invest on behalf of other investors. They raise funds from wealthy
individuals, insurance companies, pension funds and other investors who seek to invest in
entrepreneurial start-ups. but lack the necessary expeliise (Gaba and Meyer, 2008).
After raising funds. VCs invest in companies that they select, nurture and sell. VCs
consider a potential prospect's business plan, intellectual property, and management team
and often become actively engaged in building the companies they select for investment.
Venture returns are realized when a VC backed start-up is acquired by an established
corporation or through an initial stock offering (IPO). An IPO is the preferred outcome as
it achieves the highest valuation for the start-up and provides liquidity to the investors
(Gompers and Lerner, 2001).
A large VC firm may have several funds at different stages. The funds are
managed as separate entities and can be equated to business units within a corporation.
Each fund has a stated lifetime, typically 10 years, and is liquidated after that period so
that investors can receive returns. The limited partners who invest into the fund typically
contribute 99% of the capital and the VCs contribute about 1%. VC finns charge a
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management fee of approximately 2% to 3 % annually. If capital gains are realized, they
are typically divided 80% to the limited partners and 20% to the VC firm.
VCs invest predominately in technology-focused industries such as computers,
semiconductors and biotechnology (Hellmann, 2000). Because investments are typically
early stage, they are often very risky. VCs try to minimize their risks by spreading
investing among a portfolio of companies, co-investing with other funds, managing many
funds simultaneously and collecting market intelligence (North American Venture
Capital Association, 2003).
Start-up firms require different levels of funding depending upon their stage of
development. Contrary to popular perception, venture capital plays only a limited role in
funding the earliest stages. The range of funding provided by VC finns includes (Runhka
and Young, 1987):
• Seed capital-investment in a company with a concept but no commercial
production, activities may include research and product development.
• Early stage or start-up capital-investment in companies that have developed a
specified product, activities may include initial marketing, manufacturing and
sales efforts.
• First round capital-investment in companies with products in development or
commercially available, the total size of this first round is usually not less than $5
million.
• Second round capital-investment made in a company that is producing
inventories and has growing accounts receivable, the funds are used for working
capital for expansion.
• Third round-investment provided for major growth expansion of a company
with increasing sales volume which is breaking even or close to it, activities
include marketing and development of improved or additional products
• Later stage capital--investment in an established start-up that is producing and
shipping product and increasing its sales volume.
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Although YCs do invest in each of the above stages, much YC investment is made at the
first round, rather than the seed or start-up stage. The majority ofYC investment does not
fund research and innovation but goes to "follow-on funding for projects originally
developed through the far greater expenditures of governments and corporations" (Zider,
1998: 132).
This general trend is evident in nanotechnology, where government and large
corporations have provided the majority of research and seed funding. However, it was
YC firms that made the first efforts to create a business infrastructure to support the
commercialization of nanotechnology. VC finns founded and sen'cd on the board of the
first nanotechnology trade association. They established, sponsored, and distributed
newsletters and trade journals, spoke frequently at conferences and govel11ment hemings,
and undeliook significant effOlis to educate government and business leaders. Berube
(2006: 243) refers to VCs as the pioneers of nanotechnology and concludes his
description of the nanotechnology industry, "The quest for economic dominance in
nanotechnology is being led by the pioneers."
Participant Observation Site
My data collection began at a conference sponsored by International Business
Forums (IBF). International Business Forums is a private firm that produces upscale
financial and business conferences on venture capital, private equity investing, corporate
finance, mergers and acquisitions, corporate strategic investing, and related topics. IBF
promises to provide its attendees with leading-edge info1111ation and new business
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contacts to achieve business objectives. In 2002, IBF introduced what is recognized as
the first nanotechnology investing conference in the United States.
IBF launched the Nanotech Investing Forum in 2002, in the wake of the dotcom
investing collapse. Venture investment in nanotechnology was increasing rapidly,
triggering the formation of a new community comprised of technology entrepreneurs,
academic researchers, federal scientists and administrators, venture capital funds,
professional associations, university technology transfer professionals, and others. One
informant likened the 2002 conference to California's 1849 Gold Rush: "You've got
prospectors staking claims, rapacious mine o\vners, suppliers of services and equipment
(think Levi-Strauss), and a throng of camp followers." Traditional VCs were exploring
the nanotech space, brand new nanotech venture funds were being raised, and nano-
focused industry associations were f01l11ing and vying for dominance. The questions
"What is nanotech?" and "What is not nanotech?" spurred often-heated informal
conversation and were included topics on conference's formal program. This debate
lasted for several years and then subsided, as attention shifted to showcasing actual
applications of technologies. Although the nanotech conference flourished after the bust
of the dotcom bubble, it was restructured and downsized to a 2-hour workshop held
between other investment-focused conferences in 2009.
Focal Cases
In this study, I focus on the efforts of three VC firms that claim to be, and were
recognized as being, paI1icuiarly active in attempting to create a commercial domain for
nanotechnology. Each of these ves was active at the lBF conference as sponsors,
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speakers or session chairs. Each was recognized by other participants as playing a key
role in the development of nanotechnology investing. Key characteristics of these three
finns are their focus on nanotechnology, their engagement in very early investing
activity, their relative small size and lack of status, and their intent to use their focus on
nanotechnology to ameliorate their relatively weak position in the ve marketplace.
The three ve firms that are the focal cases of this study were the only national
ve firms specializing in nanotechnology in 2000. They were each were identified by
field participants as actively engaging in public effOlis to promote nanobusiness. The
firms were sponsors. speakers. or chairs ofthe first nanotechnology investing conference
held in 2002. Two of the firms were identified and described as focal nanotechnology
entrepreneurs by David Berube in his 2002 book about nanotechnology. Additionally,
individually or in paJinership, the three \vere responsible for founding of the first
nanotechnology trade association, the first nanotechnology trade magazine, the first
nanotechnology report for corporations, the largest nanotechnology investing newsletter,
and undertaking some of the first ve investments in nanotechnology.
In general, the investments made early in the life-cycle of a stmi-up are more
risky than later stage investments due to the unproven nature of the business idea and the
time required to bring a product or service to market. As explained above, many
investors, including Yes, avoid investing in start-ups that are still refining their business
plans. Funding at the earliest stages is typically provided by family and friends,
govemment programs, business competitions, and angel investors. In contrast, the three
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focal YCs of this study claim to be unique because they become involved at the very
early stages of start-up development as indicated on one finn's 2002 website:
[We] believe the most innovative venture opportunities will emerge from
centers of intensive research, particularly top engineering and computer
science programs. With relationships at over 25 leading research-driven
universities since inception, [we] are the forerunner to this new model of
technology creation and development. [Our] university network includes
top faculty, researchers and PhDs at the nation's top Computer Science
and Engineering schools and research labs ... [our finn] has positioned
itself as the premier early-stage financier of nanotechnology ventures.
Two of the three finns devoted considerable time to making connections with university
scientists, while the other hired science PhD's in order to identify and assess very early
ventures.
An additional characteristic of each of the three finns is their relative small size
and status and their intention to use nanotechnology to differentiate themselves. This
intention is evident in the excerpt from the website above and also in the explanation of
one finn's decision to focus on nanotechnology during an interview with the author "it
[our focus] afforded us a brand differentiating strategy."
Two of the focal YCs were recent start-ups themselves, the third had recently
refocused on nanotechnology. Each had only one or two funds of approximately $100
million. In 2000, two had made less than a dozen investments in nanotechnology and one
had yet to make any. In contrast, compare this with one of the larger finns involved in
nanotechnology investing, Draper Fisher lurvetson (DF.l). DFl is active, but does not
specialize in, nanotechnology. The finn has a 24-year history, manages over $6 billion,
and has made more than 600 investments in technology companies.
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Star Venture Capital
Several young entrepreneurs founded Star Venture Capital' in 2000, about a year
after they earned undergraduate degrees. As explained by one of the founders:
We've gone in 6 years from literally nothing like sleeping on the floor in
New York City as we started the company to hiring 45 employees and
have an 80 million dollar venture fund under management and I'm 30
years old and my partners are 28 and 29. So its been a ton of work for us.
We've gone through some very challenging times over the years but I
think we finally feel that we've graduated from high school and we're
entering college and we have to prove that we can actually put some
money to work and make money off of nanotechnology.
As is typical of many new ventures, the start-up VC finn was funded with under
$100,000, from credit card debt and family contributions. The founders had no
experience as venture capitalists and no status within the filed. One peer explained his
initial perception the finn in an interview with the author:
I remember making fun of them. I was looking at it [their report] and the
first thing I did was I flipped to the people who had written it. I went to
my partners and I was like look at these, these investment bankers. Their
not technologists, their not VCs their not experienced with anything even
closely related to anything. What morons right? And I wanted to say that
because I have been so impressed with what they've done. Considering
that they did start off as that. A peer group that was very skeptical of
them ...
Star Venture Capital's founders positioned their finn as the sole VC focusing on
commercializing federally funded academic research. On their webpage in 2002, the
founders described their finn as follows:
I To protect the confidentiality of the participants in this study, the names of the fil111S are
pseudonyms and direct quotations have been revised if necessary to protect the identity of
the firms.
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Star believes the most innovative venture opportunities will emerge from
centers of intensive research, particularly top engineering and computer
science programs. With relationships at over 25 leading research-driven
universities since inception, Star is the forerunner to this new model of
technology creation and development. Star's university network includes
top faculty, researchers and PhDs at the nation's top Computer Science
and Engineering schools and research labs. Star has targeted industries
gaining traction due to an influx of capital and resources from academic
and government research funding. DARPA funding was instrumental in
creating the Internet industry. J\JIH funding helped build the
Biotechnology industry. Star believes the same trend exists with the
government's $1 billion R&D expenditures to the Nanotechnology
industry in the past two years. Star has positioned itself as the premier
early-stage financier of nanotechnology ventures.
The young entrepreneurs attracted the support and attention of an experienced
private investor who provided strategic guidance and bankrolled their first fund. They
used this fund to make investments of up to $2 million each in six stat1ups. Their 2005
website listed many "firsts:"
Star Capital is credited with introducing the first investment ±l-amework
for nanotechnology adopted by other venture capital funds and top-tier
Wall Street investment banks. Some other Star "firsts":
• First to discover and publish on nanotechnology investing
• First to introduce nanotechnology to Wall Street (Merrill Lynch, Credit
Suisse, First Boston)
• First to found political industry association on nanotechnology
• First to launch nanotech investment publication [with prominent national
publisher]
• First to be invited by the President to the White House's Oval Office to
represent nanotech investors
By 2009, the founders had successfully raised their second $100 million fund and made
investments in over 20 companies.
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NanoTech Investing
Experienced YCs, including an entrepreneur who made a personal fortune as the
president ofa computer industry startup, founded NanoTech Investing in October of2000
after raising and investing a separate fund that was not focused on nanotechnology. As
explained by one of the founders in an interview with the author:
I think that the original concept was there's a new industry and there was
an opportunity to be the glue for the industry. To be the party in the
middle that was able to take, was able to create the bridge between
research and finished products. And it could be through intellectual
property, it could be the gathering of intellectual property it could be
through the creation of standards, it could be through the creation of
manufactUling techniques there \vere a lot of ways to bring value in that
chain that you know in between research and finished product. And
basically as a company we could choose where in that chain we wanted to
play and we could fill in that role.
The YC film began with a $100 million fund backed by a group of high profile investors.
NanoTech planned to invest in start-up and early-stage companies working with
microelectromechanical systems technology. The firm's stated intention was to become
"an industry accelerator in the microsystems industry, combining traditional venture
capital and commercial incubator capabilities with industry-building resources such as
fabrication facilities and new trade publications." As explained to the author in an
interview, "The primary function of Nanotech was to identify technology, in many cases
coming out of universities, license it, support it long enough to be commercialize and
either sell off or own the investment and make a return on their money." In 2001,
NanoTech's webpage emphasized the firm's industry building role:
NanoTech is more than just a company - we're igniting the future of small
tech and microsystems. This enahling technology will change how we
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communicate, how we interact with the environment, and how we treat
and prevent illnesses. We'll be the leader in bringing commercial small
tech solutions to the global marketplace.
Others may do similar things, but what makes NanoTech stand out is the
one thing we do that others don't. NanoTech develops industry-building
resources such as trade publications, web sites and trade shows. We're
investing in an entire industry, not just one company.
NanoTech attempted and failed to generate enough investment for a new fund and as of
2009, had completed its investing activities. The firm's web page summarizes
NanoTech's contribution to nanotechnology, emphasizing NanoTech's role in building a
commercial domain for nanotechnology:
Through its investment in Small Tech companies, NanoTech has become a
leader in bringing Small Technology products to the global marketplace.
NanoTech was fonned in October 2000, when it raised almost $100
million in private funding. NanoTech had since established itself as the
leader in commercializing Small Tech products. NanoTech served as the
bridge between the universities/research laboratories involved in cutting
edge basic research and the customers searching for product solutions that
Small Tech can provide. In that role, NanoTech created five Small Tech
start-up companies (many involving technology licensed from
universities) and had invested in a number of early stage companies
focusing on Small Tech's role in next generation products for the areas of
Communications, Energy, Environmental Safety/Security, and Medical
Diagnostics and Treatment.
T&T Group Investments
T&T Group was formed as an investment company in 1984 and made its first
investment in nanotechnology in 1994. The founder explained the firms' transition to an
emphasis on nanotech in an interview with the author as follows:
In 1994, a finn called Venture Partners brought us a deal to look at that
they had spun out of[a national lab]. And so we looked at it and quite
frankly we had not really paid any attention to nanotechnology prior to
this. We got intrigued \ve made the investment and at the end of the day
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we became the second largest shareholder. .. In the course of doing the due
diligence on that I began to realize that nanotechnology was going to be an
enormous scientific technological and commercial phenomenon in time.
Ao, I looking at other nanotech deals whenever I could find one, but I
couldn't really find any that weren't to science projects for a long time.
And so, we didn't make another such investment, one that one might
identify as a nanotechnology investment, until 2001. .. .In 2001, I felt or
believed that I saw what I needed to see and since then we've never
invested in anything else.
The firm described this decision on its website as follows:
Although we are not restricting our small-tech investing to
nanotechnology per se, we are inspired by the National Nanoteclmology
Initiative's plan, which envisions nanotechnology as "a revolution in the
making! leading to the next industrial revolution," promising "to be a
dominant force in our society in coming decades." We concluded earlier
this year that if we wanted to specialize in small technology, we either had
to take the risk of being too early or too late. We decided to take the risk
of being too early. We decided that for us, as the President's Committee of
Advisors on Science and Technology has stated, "now is the time to act."
Like the other two finns, T&T founders saw nanotech as an opportunity to
position, and gain power for, their relatively small firm, as explained by the founder in an
interview, 'This focus gave us an identity. We have been able to emerge as a leader and
as a result have a much more robust deal flow than a firm of our size could normally
expect to enjoy."
In contrast to the other two VC finns T&T Group does not claim to be building
the nanotechnology domain for their own benefits, but sees their efforts as a duty to
stakeholders. The founder explained his perception of his finns' activities as follows:
Well, I would say in a small way we think that part of our duty to our
portfolio companies is to make sure that there is a healthy infrastructure
out there for them ... We feel that every industry or in this case every area
needs trade publications. And so we think that part of our job is to lend
some support. .. And we will speak on occasion at research universities that
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ask us to do that...support conferences about nanotechnology by giving
some time to them. And these are to our minds normal good citizenship
things that one does.
Despite this firms' more modest claim in regard to domain building activity, peers
recognize the firms as a leader. The company's founder is recognized as '''one of the true
investment sages of the nanotechnology business' known for 'opening up nanotech VC to
the masses'" (Berube, 2002). The finn currently has over thirty nanotechnology
companies in its portfolio and on its website claims to be, "one of the most active
nanotechnology investors in the world."
The development of nanotechnology has a clear beginning and encompasses
many small dramas, such as groundbreaking innovations and the passage of specific
legislation, which may "provide a glimpse into the social system" at a particular time
(Pettigrew, 1990: 275). The ve fil1115 that are the embedded cases claim to have, and are
credited as having, played a key role in the overall drama. The literature suggests that
framing in general is a driving component of political debates, such as that surrounding
the emergence of nanotechnology (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Fligstein, 2003). And,
technology framing in particular is likely to be most evident when a new technology
emerges (Bijker and Pinch, 1987; Orlikowski and Gash, 1994; Fulk, 1993). Thus, the
emerging nanotechnology domain is a setting well suited to this study.
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CHAPTER V
EXPLORATORY RESEARCH
Overview
In the preceding chapter, I described the setting for this study and the focal cases
within it. In this chapter, I explore the emergence and evolution of a technology frame.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. I present and provide support for my argument
that a nanobusiness frame emerges in the general press and that business leaders are
widely attributed to playa leading role in projecting this frame. As explained in Chapter
III, a grounded theory approach requires that data collection and analysis occur
throughout the research process. Early analyses guide the collection of additional data,
which are used to generate refined conceptualizations through a process of constant
comparison of data and emerging theory. The findings presented in this chapter provide
the grounded basis for the findings and conceptual models I present in Chapter VI.
In this chapter, I document the chronology of the development of nanotechnology
over time and create a timeline of key events using trade publications and proprietary
reports. Next, I analyze the portrayal of nanotechnology in the general press from the
first mention in the New York Times to the present (1985-2009). I check the key events I
identified from proprietary reports against the portrayals in the general press. I identify
temporal periods that are separated by breakpoints. The breakpoints are based on the
annual number of articles on nanotechnology in the Nell' York Times and the main topic
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of each article. Then, using a process of emergent coding, I identify the elements of
technology frames (Bijker, 1985) social groups, problems, and solutions. I map social
groups, problems and solutions across the breakpoints and describe changes in the
technology frame portrayed in the general press, represented by the New York Times. I
find that business proponents are attributed with creating and projecting a nanobusiness
frame. In keeping with a grounded theory approach, this analysis provides the basis for
initial conceptualizations and the refinement of the sub-unit case boundaries and
subsequent data collection and analyses.
Introduction
And, you know, I've always said that I believe that we're gonna end up
winnin' this battle for the hearts and minds of the public.
Nanotechnology Business Leader. Intervie,ved by author, 2006.
I begin this analysis with the general question, How do scientific discoveries
become the basis for commercial activity? My initial fieldwork and literature review
suggest the importance of teclmology framing in this process. I begin by exploring 1)
What happened, when? And, 2) Which social groups were associated with particular
perspectives and initiatives? Based on the data, I divide the development of
nanotechnology into four temporal periods. I find that a nanobusiness frame emerged in
the third temporal period of my study. This period is characterized by competition
between several technology frames. While it is too early in this ongoing process to make
a definitive conclusion, the nanobusniess frame appears to have gained legitimacy and
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dominance over competing frames, as expressed in the above quote by a business leader
in an interview with the author. The projection of this frame was attributed in press
accounts to the actions of individuals and organizations representing business interests.
Temporal Periods in the Portrayal of Nanotechnology
This analysis builds upon the timeline I develop from trade and proprietary
reports, shown in Chapter IV. My analysis shows that the development of
nanotechnology as covered in the general media can be divided into four temporal
periods. Articles about nanotechnology first appeared in the Nnv York Times in 1985. A
jump in the number of articles in 1991,2000, and 2003 demarcates the periods. The
number of articles per year and the average over each period are shown in Figure 4.
One article was published in 1990 and eight in 1991. The initial articles and the
jump demarcate the borders of Period 1-1985 through 1990. The average number of
articles per year during this period was 0.83. The next jump occun-ed between 1999 and
2000. Eight articles were published in 1999, jumping to 35 in 2000. This jump
demarcates the border ofPeliod 2-1991 through 1999-with an average of7 articles per
year. Between 2002 and 2003 the number of articles jumped from fOliy-nine to sixty-
seven. This jump demarcates the border of Period 3--2000 through 2002-with an
average of38.7 articles per year. The number of articles peaked at 67 in 2003. This peak
demarcates the border of Period 4. Period 4 is characterized by a tapering of the number
of articles per year, with a noticeable drop from fifty-eight in 2007 to thirty six in 2008.
The breakpoints dividing the periods coincide with significant events identified as
such in both the trade and general press; the discovery in 1985 of Buckyballs and in 1990
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the ability to mass produce them, the passage of the National Nanotechnology Initiative
in 2000, and the emergence of the first organized opposition to nanotechnology in 2002.
In 1985, the Times reported the discovery of Buckyballs:
Carbon atoms can be linked together in practically limitless combinations,
and some chemists devote themselves to creating carbon molecules with
highly unusual shapes. The latest of them, shaped like a soccer ball, has
been named for the late Buckminster Fuller, developer of architectural
designs based on the geodesic dome; it is called buckminsterfullerene.
The creation of buckminsterfullerene (also called truncated
dodecahedrane) was a joint project of researchers at Rice University in
Texas and the University of Sussex, England ...The synthesis of
dodecahedrane, which involved an extremely complex series of chemical
steps. took 19 years. (Nell' York Times, December 3. 1985)
This discovery of Buckyballs was followed in 1990, by the discovery of
how to mass-produce them, bringing forth the potential for industlial
applications as explained in articles at the time, " Buckyballs ... unique
properties suggest a bounty of commercial uses, including new lubricants,
drugs, fueL batteries and high-strength materials" (Nell York Times, April
23, 1991). However, the Times noted,
"Buckyballs remained esoteric laboratory curiosities until last year, when
physicists ... discovered a way to make them in large quantities ... In recent
months, scientists all over the world have obtained large samples of the
material to conduct their own experiments, and an international research
explosion has ensued." (New York Times, April 23, 1991)
Similarly, a 1996 article announcing the award of the Nobel Prize for the 1985
discovery attributes the birth of the nanoscience to these events noting,
"The carbon-60 BuckybalL .. was kind of a Rosetta Stone that opened a
universe of possibilities, based on how nature likes to bond carbon atoms
together. ..The potential uses are tremendous" (quoting award winner Dr.
Richard Smalley). But, "In 1985, the first fullerenes were little more than
laboratory curiosities, because only tiny amounts could be
produced ... [until] two other scientists cited in the Nobel announcement
but not honored with prizes ... found a way to make Buckyballs by the
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pound. Since then, fullerene chemistry has burgeoned." (Browne, October
10, 1996)
Figure 4: Number of Articles by Temporal Period
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In 2000, the passage of the National Nanotechnology Initiative increased
nanotechology research spending to $497 million in 2001, and doubled federal spending
over the subsequent 5 years. As early as 2002, the Times attributes the development of
nanotechnology to the act:
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"The National Science Foundation's National Nanotechnology Initiative
has spent more than $600 million in the last year. .. [and] The first fruits of
these efforts are emerging in products like pants woven from nanofibers
that resist stains, tennis balls that keep their bounce and more efficient
light-emitting diodes." (Markoff, January, 21, 2000)
In 2002, the ETC Group, an organization dedicated to monitoring technology
development, publicly advocated for a moratorium on the commercial development of
nanotechnology. The Times reported on this in an article titled "Nanotechnology has
arrived; a serious opposition is forming:"
From its earliest days, nanotechnology has had its fear-mongers, warning
of novel and terrifying risks, ... Until recently, though, the debate was
restricted to the relatively small community of nanotechnology researchers
and experts. The risks they discussed often seemed cartoony or vague
compared with the dazzling breakthroughs they projected in fields like
medicine, supercomputing, energy and environmental cleanup ... For the
first time, nanotechnology is encountering the kind of real-world
headwinds that have impeded biotechnology. The ETC Group's call for a
moratorium continues to be mentioned in later reports on risks. For
example, a 2007 report of DuPont's voluntary release of guidelines for
evaluating the safety and environmental risks of nanotechnology products
concludes by quoting the ETC's research director and noting that the ETC
group" has called for a moratorium on the commercialization of
nanotechnology." (Feder, August 19,2002)
My analysis indicates that the portrayal of nanotechnology in the New York Times
can be divided into temporal periods, which demarcate increases in the visibility of, and
public interest in, nanotechnology. The timing of the breakpoints is evidenced by
increases in the number of articles and the occurrence of events that reports in later years
attribute with significance. In accordance with a grounded approach, my subsequent
analyses build upon this finding. In the following sections, I describe findings from my
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analysis of the emergence of competing social groups and nanotechnology frames across
the temporal periods.
Nanotechnology Frames: Discovery, Salvation, Annihilation or Business
Four technology frames are evident in the general press accounts of the
development of nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is framed as discovery, salvation,
annihilation and business opportunity. Table 7 summarizes the defining characteristics of
the frames including, the characterization of nanotechnology, the focal time perspective,
and the problems the technology will solve and the solutions it will offer. I explain each
frame belo\\'.
Nanotechnology as Discovery
The term nanotechnology is not widely used in the Times reports until 1991. Prior
to that reports refer to "Buckyballs," which are sometimes described as
"nanotechnology" in quotes, in reference to Eric Drexler's 1986 book, Engines of
Creation. Discoveries that make up what we come to know as nanotechnology, are
described factually. Nanotechnology is pOlirayed as an avenue of scientific inquiry,
which solves the problem of our need for knowledge with cutting edge scientific
research. This frame is exemplified in the first report about nanotechnology (called
Buckyballs) in the Times, in 1985, titled, "Molecule is Shaped Like a Soccer Ball." The
report gives a factual, present oriented, description of the activities of scientists:
"Carbon atoms can be linked together in practically limitless
combinations, and some chemists devote themselves to creating carbon
molecules with highly unusual shapes." Then continues with a factual
description of the discovery. "The latest of them. shaped like a soccer ball.
has been named tor the late Buckminstcr Fuller. .. Buckminsterfullerene is
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apparently a stable compound, and the Rice researchers surmise that it
may be a common form of carbon in interstellar space, especially in the
vicinity of exploded stars (novas) with high carbon content." (New York
Times, December 3, 1985)
The topic is discovery and the report doesn't mention of possible applications.
Nanoscience as Salvation
In the salvation fi'ame, nanotechnology is depicted as applied science. The
technology is described in tenns of scientific discoveries, but the emphasis shifts to
distant applications and positive implications that will arise from them. Broad
applications of nanoscience are presented as solutions to almost all great human
challenges, from environmental degradation and resource scarcity as suggested above, to
cancer and even death.
This frame is exemplified in the article, "They've seen the future and intend to
live it" (Schechter, July 16, 2002). The rep011 describes a meeting of the Foresight
Institute, "an organization founded on the belief that nanotechnology will transform
almost every facet of human existence by giving people mastery of matter." The article
explains:
"Smaller computers built from atomic-scaled carbon tubes, ultrastrong
cables that could be used to build an elevator into space, better drug-
delivery systems and much more," are on the horizon. And,
"Nanofactories will chum out everything from rocking chairs to rocket
ships, superior to any ever made, at "the cost of potatoes and
wood" ...Nanocomputers will interface directly with the brain, vastly
increasing human intelligence. And nanobots will cruise through
bloodstreams, banishing disease and debility" (Schechter, July 16, 2002).
The focal topic of the article is a profile of nanoscience with a focus on the positive
implications of future applications.
Table 7: Timing and Characteristics of Frames
Time of
Emergence
Nature of nano
Focal time
perspective
Problem solved
Solution
Exemplar
article title
Exemplary
statements from
article
Focal topics
Pure science
Present and distant
future
Quest for knowledge
Scientific discovery
Molecule is shaped
like a soccer ball
Buckminsterfullerene
is apparently a stable
compound... [and]
may be a common
fonTI of carbon in
interstellar space
Research reports
Applied science
Distant future
Great human challenges
(i.e. cancer, death)
Broad applications (i.e.
space travel)
They've seen the future
and intend to Iive it
nanotechnology ... [will]
reverse disease and
agmg
Profiles of science and
scientists
Applied science
Distant and near future
Creates problems
-n/a-
Nanotechnology has
arrived; A serious
opposition is forming
nanotechnology could
create a divided and
inequitable world
where the rich live
forever
Descriptions of health,
safety and security
threats
Technology
Present and near
future
Quest for economic
achievement
leadership
New businesses,
products and processes
Nanotechnology near
the point when it's
time to go public
by 2015
nanotechnology will
playa crucial role in
$1 trillion worth of
products
Descriptions of start-
up firms and products
and contribution to
economIC
development
'-0
o
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Nanoscience as Annihilation
Reports adopting the annihilation frame share with the savior frame a portrayal of
nanotechnology in terms of applications of future scientific discoveries. However,
whereas the salvation frame emphasizes positive implications that allow humankind to
conquer all obstacles, the annihilation frame emphasizes negative implications, up to the
annihilation of humanity. From the perspective of the salvation fi'ame, applied
nanoscience solves problems; fi'om the perspective of the annihilation frame it causes
them.
This frame is exemplified in the article, "Nanotechnology has anived; A serious
opposition is forming" (Feder, August 19, 2002). The article begins by referencing the
so-called "Gray Goo" debate noting, "The great Gray Goo debate is beginning to matter.··
The debate is about whether it is possible or likely that self-replicating microscopic
robots could fill the world and wipe out humanity. While this is the extreme example of a
threat, the at1icle presents less encompassing, yet still devastating possibilities:
"The characteristics that make carbon nanotubes and similar nanoscale
particles attractive candidates for calTying drugs into the brain could also
allow such particles to transport toxins ... nanotubes, because of their
needle-like shape, could become "the next asbestos ... [and] nanoparticles
absorbed by bacteria might enter the food chain" (Feder, August 19,
2002).
Although the article focuses on distant applications of nanoscience, the focal topic of the
at1icle is threats to heath and safety that may result from such applications.
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Nanotechnology as Business Opportunity
In reports adopting the business frame, what we now know as nanotechnology is
portrayed as a technology. That is, a tool that enhances production or end products. The
time perspective shifts to the present and near future. Nanotechnology will solve
individual, organizational and national quests for economic achievement through the
creation of new businesses, products and processes. This frame is exemplified in the
miicle, "Nanotechnology near the point when it's time to go public" (Flanigan,
December, 20, 2007).
The aJiicle goes beyond potential applications to emphasize actual. in-use
products noting, "There are 200 commercial products in cosmetics, apparel and sporting
goods in which nanotechnology plays a role ... [such as] clothing with a coating of
nanoparticles - from the Nano-Tex Corporation of Oakland, Calif. - that repels stains."
Discussions of the future are likewise in terms of products in the near term, as opposed to
the descriptions of distant future, general applications that are found in miicles
exemplifying the salvation and annihilation frames, for example "Increasing numbers of
nanotech products are in the offing...by 2015 nanotechnology will playa crucial role in
$1 trillion worth of products, 'which would require two million workers. '" The focus is
on nanotechnology enabled start-up businesses, founders and products, such as Unidym,
Inc. described as follows:
[Unidym, Inc.] works with clusters of carbon nanoparticles that possess
extraordinary ... Our carbon nanotube technology makes the light-emitting
chipsets less brittle and able to emit more light. .. Our screens can take a
pounding (Flanigan, December, 20, 2007).
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Social Groups' Use of Nanotechnology Frames
The nanotechnology frames emerged in the sequence discovery, savior,
annihilation, and business. Social groups generate and evoke frames to shape perceptions
and direct discourse (Benford and Snow, 2000; Dowell, Swaminathan, and Wade, 2002).
My analysis of the emergence of frames documents the use of the four frames by five
social groups: scientists, futurists, nano-foes, business and government. These groups are
shown with examples from the data in Table 8. I describe the emergence of the frames
and social groups below.
During Period I scientists were the only social group represented in accounts and
they evoked the discovery frame. During period 1, futurists and governments appear in
the reports. Both groups evoke the savior frame. During Period 3, nano-foes and the
business social group appear in the rep011s and conflict begins. Although, the business
and government social groups originally at times evoke the savior frame, both groups
emphasize the nanobusiness frame by Period 4. At the present time, although they remain
committed to their positions, nano-foes and scientists have begun to evoke modified
frames that incorporate elements of the nanobusienss frame. This, along with funding and
regulatory decisions suggests that the nanobusiness frame has gained legitimacy at the
expense of the savior and threat frames. The time period each social group and frame
appeared in the data is shown in Table 9.
Description
... said Richard E. Smalley. the Rice University chemist who shared the
Nobel Prize in 1996 for the invention of buckyballs, a similar carbon-based
molecule
... according to specialists like Dr. Peter R. Cavanagh, chainnan of the
department of biomedical cngineering at the Cleveland Clinic Foundation,
one of the nation's largest hosoital and health research centers
Richard
Smalley
Scientists I University and
non-affiliated,
not for profit
research groups
Table 8: Social Groups and Examples
Group I
Futurists I Futurist
individuals and
organizations
Nano-foes I Individuals,
environmental
groups, other
NGOs
Business I Stalt-ups, YCs
trade groups,
corporations,
industry eXDerts
(;overnment I Govt. reps.,
departments, and
scientists
Eric Drexler,
Foresight,
IMM
Bill Joy, ETC,
Green Peace
DFJ, NBA
Merrill Lynch,
IBM
DARPA,EPA,
Pres. George
Bush
Dr. Drexler popularized ills ideas by presenting a vision of the future of
material plenty and physiC<11 well-being made possible by armies of
invisible machines.
All were members of the Foresight Institute, an organization founded on the
belief that nanotechnology will transform almost every facet of human
existence by giving Deoole mastery over matter.
Bill Joy warns that the human species may be on the verge of collective
suicide. "The 21 st-century technologies -- genetics, nanotechnology and
robotics -- me so powerful that they can spawn whole new classes of
accidents and abuses," hc \\frites.
The ETC group, a Canadian watchdog organization for socially responsible
technology, released "The Big Down," a reDort on nanotechnolo
... the NanoBusiness Alliance, a trade group for businesses at work on
nanotechnology
Industry experts say nanotechnology applications have the potential to
make almost anything smaller, sturdier, stronger and more Dowerful.
... the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has had the daunting
assignment of making sure that no ... has access to tomorrow's technology
faster than does the Defense Department. Daroa, as the agency is known ...
'-D
+-.
Table 9: Frames and Social Groups by Period
Primary IDiscovery IDiscovery
frame(s) Salvation I Annihilation Risk (revised
Business annihilation)
Evoked by I Scientists Scientists Scientists Scientists
(both) (sal vation/annihil ation) (business/risk)
Futurists Futurists (salvation) Business
(both) Foes (annihilation) (business)
Government Business Govemment
(both) (sal vationlbusiness) (business/risk)
Foes
Theme(s) of Factual reports Descriptions Descri ptions of Profiles of
discussions of discovery and negative outcomes of founders and
moving to exp Ic111ations applications vs. start-ups,
descriptions of of negati ve outcomes of descriptions of
distant future nanOSClence, failure to lead products
examples of profiles of development Heath and
'hypothetical' scientists 'Grandiose'vs. safety risks
applications with 'mundane'
with positive grandiose applications
outcomes 'likely
possible'
applications
with positive
outcomes,
\0
(...JI
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Periods 1 and 2: From Discovery to Salvation
During periods 1 and 2, nanotechnology is introduced. Two social groups and the
discovery and savior frames appear during these periods. However, neither the groups nor
frames are in conflict.
Scientists are the only social group represented in Period 1. When quoted, they
evoke the discovery frame and primarily give reports of their scientific discoveries, with
few potential applications. When applications are mentioned in reports, they are
presented as hypothetical and are usually not attributed to an individual. For example, the
.Ve1l York Times (Brown. 1991) reports on findings to be published in The Journal of
Applied Physics, referring directly to the scientists as follows:
Dr. Arthur L. Ruoff and his colleagues at Comell's depm1ment of
materials science and engineering reported their calculations ... Diamond,
they said, should become very much stronger as the pressures to which it
is subjected approach double the pressure at the center of the earth. Above
this pressure -- between eight and ten megabars, or eight and ten million
times the pressure of the atmosphere at sea level -- diamond would be
tranSf0I111ed into a metal and lose its strength, however. Before the new
study, Dr. Ruoff said, it was believed that diamonds could not survive
stresses produced by pressures greater than about 3.2 megabars, somewhat
less than the pressure of 3.61 megabars that prevails at the center of the
earth.
However, individual scientists are not mentioned in connection with possible
applications, for instance, "High-pressure experiments are also expected to benefit
practical technology...Many important applications are foreseen ... " And, when the
account mentions specific scientists and applications, the scientists stress the difficulties
of practically achieving what is theoretically possible: "Dr. Ruoff and other investigators
using diamond anvils note that even if it is theoretically possible to achieve pressures of
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eight megabars or more, each increase in pressure makes an anvil more difficult to
assemble."
During Period 2 government representatives and futurists appear in the reports.
Although government representatives give less grandiose examples of how
nanotechnology will change the future, both groups evoke versions ofthe savior frame.
A report describing the upcoming announcement of the 2000 National Nanotechnology
Initiative notes that President Clinton will set out "grand challenges" which include:
Shrinking the entire contents of the Library of Congress into a device the
size of a sugar cube; assembling new materials from the "bottom up" --
from atoms and molecules~ developing ultralight materials that are 10
times as strong as steel; creating a new class of computer chip millions of
times as fast as today's Pentium 3; doubling the efficiency of solar cells;
using gene and drug-delivery technologies to detect and target cancerous
cells, and developing new technologies to remove the smallest
contaminants from water and air (Markoff, January, 2000).
Bill Clinton is not attributed with stating the implications of achieving these grand
challenges. However, efficient solar cells could eventually lead to the end of polluting
process as suggested by futurist Eric Drexler "Strip mines, clear-cutting, refineries, paper
mills and oil wells are some of the crude 20th century technologies that will be replaced".
And, cures for cancer might eventually support futurist Ray Kurzweil predictions that we
will be able to "reverse disease and aging." The groups and frames and not in conflict
during these periods.
Periods 3 and 4: From Nanoscience to Nanobusiness
Period 3 is characterized by conflict and coalition building that by period 4
appears to have resulted in the legitimization of the nanobusiness frame. During Period 3,
nano-foes and businesspeople appear in the articles. These groups begin to evoke the
atmihilation and business frames respectively. Initially, government, business and
futurists appear united in opposition to nano-foes. However, the business group's framing
comes to openly conflict with that of the futurists. The business group distances
nanobusiness from nanoscience as portrayed by both the futurists and nano-foes. By
Period 4, the salvation and annihilation frames have been eclipsed by a broader business
frame that incorporates familiar risks which can be identified and managed through
scientific research. Government and business evoke this frame. Futurists become less
visible in press accounts and both scientists and nano-foes adopt the business groups'
language and framing of "manageable risks" over the nano-foes' previous suggestion of
"uncontrollable threat."
Government and business interests f01111 a coalition and seek to distance
nanotechnology from the extreme characterizations of both futurists and nano-foes. Mark
Modzelewski, one of the founders of the NanoBusiness Allience (NbA), announces the
formation of a taskforce of business leaders, scientists and government:
Mr. Modzelewski said that many members of the [trade and business] group had
decided, in light of growing speculations about potential dangers posed by
nanotechnology, that they wanted a forum for sharing research and developing better
public explanations of the issues ... Onejob of the task force is to keep fears of such a
[gray goo] nightmare, which the industry views as science fiction, from playing much of
a role in tbe debate over nanotechnology (Feder, 2003a).
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The coalition downplays the uniqueness of nanotechnology arguing that the
particles are not very different from materials that occur naturally: "People who worry
excessively underestimate the number of natural materials that size that have surrounded
us for years .. .It requires the usual good care but I don't see any new or unique threat"
(Greg Blonder quoted in Feder, 2003b). This framing conflicts with the salvation and
annihilation frames in which the extreme uniqueness of nanotechnology is the basis of
exceptional feats or catastrophe.
The business and government coalition comes to directly conflict with the
futurists. arguing that nanotechnology poses no real problem because concems are based
on applications of the technology that are infeasible. The coalition frames nanotechnology
as an extension of ongoing miniaturization, which will result in improvements to existing
products. This conception is at odds with the vision introduced by futurist, Eric Drexler
(1992), which includes "molecular manufacturing" and self-replicating machines. While,
"Mainstream nanotechnology will soon be used by cosmetics companies to help their
current products ... last longer and work better. . .if Drexler's version of nanotechnology
were to come to fruition ... nanomachines could precisely adjust your hair and skin color
to your liking; wrinkles could be smoothed and excess fat removed" (Keiper, 2003). The
coalition distances 'real' nanotechnology from Drexler's vision, which they portray as
science fiction. For example, Angela M. Belcher a university scientist and
nanotechnology company founder, is careful to point out that her discovery involving
sel f-assembl y is quite different from self-replication, "These materials don't replicate
themselves'" she says. She describes them instead as self-healing, "You design a circuit.
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and if there's a break, it can heal itself' (Anne Belcher quoted in Eisenberg, 2(04). In a
well-publicized debate Nobel Prize winner Richard Smalley admonished Dr. Eric
Drexler:
You and people around you have scared our children ... I hope others in the
chemical community will join with me in turning on the light and showing
our children that while our future in the real world will be challenging and
there are realllsks, there will be no such monster as the self-replicating
mechanical nanobot of your dreams (quoted in Chang, 2(03).
Proponents of the mainstream definition won a victory \vhen they lobbied
successfully for cutting funds to study the more radical molecular manufacturing from the
House \-efsion of the Nanotech Act of2003. This event led a trade journal repotier to
argue that "by carefully selecting which theories are the ones the general public is
supposed to believe, then marginalizing the rest. .. [business leaders are] redefining 'real'
nanotechnology to suit what is best for nano-business" (Lovey. 2004: 2).
Individuals and organizations in the business social group began to emphasize
familiar problems and solutions and to portray the less familiar as infeasible possibilities,
which belong in the real of science fiction. The coalition including the business and
government groups portrayed nanoteclmology as an extension of existing technology and
something that has been used without a name or understanding for some time. Thus,
nanotechnology requires only additional research to identify risks similar to those caused
by naturally occuning materials, rather than a moratorium to prevent disaster.
From this perspective, nanotechnology will address our quest for economic
achievement by giving us faster computers, pants that don"t stain and windshields that
have to be cleaned only once a year. This version ofnanotechnolngy is much less likelv
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to be feared than nanotechnology that will change our understanding of life and create
health and safety threatening, self-replicating robots. From the business technology
frame, the problems facing nanotechnology are similar to those of many familiar
technologies, we just need more research to identify and mitigate risks related to the
small size of the particles.
While it is too early to know for certain the ultimate framing and outcome of
nanotechnology-a tragic disaster or miraculous discovery could drastically change
perceptions and outcomes-this analysis suggests a trend towards the dominance of the
nanobusiness frame. By Period 4, nano-foes had joined business leaders in calling for
research into the risks of nanotechnology, rather than a moratorium development. While
this certainly does not indicate that this social group now supports nanotechnology, it is
an indication that the framing of nanotechnology as a business opportunity has achieved
dominance over the framing of nanotechnology as "Grey Goo."
Conclusion
Considerable attention and public financial support is devoted to the
commercialization of basic science research (Kamoe and Garud, 2003). This is not
surprising given the apparent financial impact of new ventures based on these
technologies (Chandler, 1990). Recent history has shown that public opinion may play an
influential role in detennining the success of emerging science-based technologies.
However, we know little of if and how individuals and organizations shape public
perceptions of emerging technologies.
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Public evaluations of science-based technologies are often inaccurate. Laypeople
rely on qualitative characteristics to make risk assessments. Science-based technologies,
which are often unfamiliar and ill-defined are perceived as posing a greater threat (Slovic,
Fischoff, and Lichtenstein, 1980). In general, risks that are new, involuntary and
potentially catastrophic tend to elicit very strong concerns (Kasperson, Jhaveri and
Kasperson, 2001). The characteristics inherent in emerging science-based technologies
subject them to potential stit,rrnatization, which can limit or curtail research, development
and commercialization threatening entire technology domains and the many ventures in
them.
Public trust, or sociopolitical legitimacy, can be viewed as an antidote of
technology stigma. Stakeholders such as the general public and government officials
come to trust in and accept emerging science-based technologies as appropriate and right
as the norms and rules governing their production, distribution and consumption become
institutionalized (Aldrich & FioL 1994, Garud, Jain, and Kuraswamy, 2002; Van de Ven
and Garud, 1994). Before norms and rules become institutionalized, a problem and
solution, must be theorized (Suchman, 1995). Technology frames define the problems
that technologies will solve and the solutions with which they will solve them.
Researchers increasingly argue that interested individuals can influence the
emergence of organizational fields and markets. Individuals or organizations acting as
institutional entrepreneurs utilize social skills such as the creation of collective action
frames to build support for emerging fields (Fligstein, 1997, 200 I). Collective action
frames articulate problems. identify causes and propose solutions, facilitating collective
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action. I draw on a related concept, the technology frame, to examine the role played by
individuals in influencing public perception of emerging science-based technologies.
Like collective action frames, technology frames generate sociopolitical legitimacy by
defining and bounding novel undertakings. Technology frames provide meaning by
identifying and articulating problems and solutions related to technologies.
This analysis of the developing nanotechnology domain illustrates a strategy on
the part of nanotechnology proponents to generate sociopolitical legitimacy by creating a
trust-worthy technology frame. A collective of actors in the emerging nanotechnology
domain recognized public fears as a threat and coalesced on a nanobusiness frame. The
comments of these proponents suggest that the creation of a technology frame is an
intentional strategy and that the proponents are actively attempting to tiame
nanotechnology in a non-threatening manner.
The business-government coalition emphasizes familiar problems and solutions
and pOlirays the less familiar potential applications of nanotechnology as infeasible
possibilities, which belong in the realm of science fiction. The frame supported by the
coalition of nanotechnology proponents defines nanotechnology as an extension of
existing technology and something that has been used without a name or understanding
for some time. According to this frame, nanotechnology requires only additional research
to identify risks similar to those caused by naturally occuning materials. It will give us
faster computers, pants that don't stain and windshields that have to be cleaned only once
a year. This version of nanotechnology is much less likely to be feared than
nanotechnology that wi]] change our understand ing of Ii fc and create heal th and safety
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threatening, self-replicating robots. Given proponents' technology frame, the problems
facing nanotechnology are similar to those of many familiar technologies, we just need
more research to identify and mitigate risks related to the small size of the particles.
While it is too early to know the outcome ofthe efforts of nanotechnology's
proponents, this analysis suggests a trend towards public acceptance ofthe coalition's
frame and increasing trust of nanotechnology. Nano-foes have joined the coalition's
identification of risk as a problem and have identified solutions other than a moratorium
on research. Nano-foes have acknowledged regulation and research into lisk as potential
solutions. While this certainly does not indicate that this social group now supports
nanotechnology, it is the first indication of any agreement between foes and proponents.
Institutional entrepreneurs in the emerging nanotechnology domain recognize
public fears as a threat and are actively seeking to generate and disseminate a
nanobusiness frame. This analysis shows that a nanobusiness frame has emerged and
appears to be gaining legitimacy in the national press. The projection of this fi"ame was
attributed in press accounts to the actions of individuals and organizations representing
business interests. Because I am interested in understanding how science based
technologies can become the basis for new areas of commercial activity, I focused
subsequent data collection and analyses on understanding the period during which the
nanobusiness frame emerged and the role of the business social group in its emergence.
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CHAPTER VI
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Overview
In the preceding chapter, I outlined the chronology of the development of the
nanotechnology field and displayed a timeline of key events based on trade publications
and proprietary reports. I described my analysis of the portrayal of nanotechnology in the
general press from the first mention in the New York Times (1985) through 2008, and
presented my findings. This analysis provides the basis for the analysis of the embedded
cases I report in this chapter.
In this chapter, I build upon the previous analysis, using it as a starting point to
guide data collection and conceptualization (as described in Chapter III). In the previous
analysis, I identified temporal periods in the development of nanotechnology. I found that
the predominant nanotechnology frame changed over time. Initially nanotechnology was
portrayed as scientific discovery. There was very little discussion of applications. As the
field matured, nanotechnology was portrayed as a pOlient of salvation or annihilation.
Both of these frames draw on extreme, distant future applications. These frames ushered
in a period of conflict. The nanobusiness frame emerged next. At first, this frame did not
conflict with the salvation frame. However, as public concern increased, nanobusiness
leaders distanced nanobusiness from the extreme versions of nanoscience portrayed by
both the salvation and annihilation frames. The nanobusiness frame pOlirays
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nanotechnology as an extension of existing technologies. My analysis shows that
participants in the emerging nanotechnology domain attributed the projection ofthe
nanobusiness frame to a small group of business proponents. Given this finding, I
continued my study by collecting data specific to this small group.
The three VC finns in this study are focused on very early stage deals, even
compared to their VC counterparts. They were the only VCs operating at a national level
that chose to focus exclusively on nanotechnology at the time of this study. They sought
to encourage research funding and build support for the commercialization of
nanotechnology". Using a grounded theory approach, I identify the actions. goals, and
motivations ofthese key players and the outcomes they perceive to be the results oftheir
actions. Next, I identify themes and pattems in the data and working iteratively between
the data, my conceptualizations. and the literature. r develop a process model to explain
how this group projected a frame into the general discourse.
r introduce the concept of a socio-semiotic space, likened to a meaning and
interaction construction zone. I find that business proponents engage in three sequential
activities in their attempt to create an infrastructure to support commercial activity around
nanotechnology: constructing a socio-semiotic space, positioning themselves as experts
within the space, and translating scientific, futuristic, and opposition discourse for their
desired constituents. I discuss how symbolic power, accumulated through these activities,
can allow small group can project a technology frame.
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Introduction
Now the problem... .is that PCs are easy to count. You know somewhere
in [this company] there is a number on what we spend on PCs every year
and I am sure that you could find somebody that has it. Its easy to look at
how many are sitting on your desk, and how many are in each home, and
how many are built. How do you do that with nanotechnology? First of all
the science is really hard. You know even seeing the stuff to manipulate it,
much less figuring out how they all work together is a lot more advanced
than most research. And besides that, what is nanotechnology? The
government came up with a definition, [a trade publication] came up with
a definition ... and then we would all kind of find our own definition. It has
to do something different and it can't just be soot. But definitions were
hard to come by so how do you really know? -Nanotechnology Business
Leader, interviewed by Kathryn Aten
Right now the brand is entrepreneurs and innovators and nano companies.
It's not about what they're making. It's about who they are; transforming
this fundamental science into something 'cause there's not much of a
physical embodiment as yet of what nanotechnology is. So the brand of
nano is more about entrepreneurs, innovators, pioneers ... It's the promise
of the future. And the brand will be translated into what? It's critical when
it makes that translation, that transference, right, from who to what. We
have a very positive brand on this who. It's the myth of America. It's
about entrepreneurs, risk takers, pioneers that shape a better world and
future for all of us. -Nanotechnology Business Leader, interviewed by
Kathryn Aten
Creative invention and the entrepreneurial action necessary to transfom1 scientific
discoveries into commercializable technologies are recognized as extremely important to
firm and national competitiveness (Drucker, 1985). The emergence of areas of
commercial activity-termed organizational fields, industries or markets-has been
explored fi'om a variety of perspectives including economic (Klepper and Graddy, 1990)
and sociological (Fligstein, 1996,2003: Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Levenhagen, Parac, and
Thomas. 1993). The classic economic view assumes that markets exist ex ante. waiting
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for entrepreneurs to recognize them. However, when entrepreneurship and innovation are
based on new knowledge a market may not exist (Drucker, 1985), undennining the
validity of an explanation based on classic economic theory. Levenhagen, Porac, and
Thomas (1993) argue that materially-oriented analyses of market creation can be
complemented by socio-cognitive and political analyses to provide a more complete
understanding. These perspectives suggest that technology proponents play an active role
in the creation of commercial activity: neither characteristics of the technology nor ex
ante market demands can fully explain the emergence of commercial domains.
In emerging technology domains it is likely that neither founders nor potential
stakeholders are clear as to the nature of the technology and business opportunity.
Researchers argue that technologies require a defined institutional space (Dosi, 1982;
Van de Ven and Gamd. 1994), or technology field (Garud, Jain. and Kumaraswamy,
2002). A technology field is comprised of a pattern of relationships among objects and
humans related to a product and market (Calion, 1987; Garud and Karnoe: Gamd, Jain,
and Kumaraswamy, 2002). Activities within technology fields are constrained and
enabled by technology frames, sets of collective cognitions spelling out the meaning of
technologies and patterns of interaction among actors (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch, 1987,
Orlikowski and Gash, 1994). Technology frames emerge in technology fields through a
negotiated process between social groups (Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch, 1987; Garud, Jain,
and Kumaraswamy, 2002). This conceptualization of technology frames is similar to that
of organizational fields, which also comprise a shared set of meanings (Scott, 200 I).
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Entrepreneurs in emerging technology domains must gain legitimacy in order to
persuade potential stakeholders to supply resources and support necessary to transform
fundamental scientific discoveries into areas of commercial activity (Aldrich and Fiol,
1994). Legitimacy has been described as stakeholder consensus on competitive
definitions and categories (Levenhagen, Porac, and Thomas, 1993), the degree to which
stakeholders take new ventures for granted and accept them (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994), and
government fonnalization ofthe rules of an industry into laws and policies (Fligstein,
2003). These definitions imply that legitimacy is intimately associated, and perhaps
synon)'mous. with a collecti ve agreement on the meaning of a technology that is
congruent with business activity and can then be incorporated into business and industry
models. As illustrated by the quotations that opened this chapter, in the highly uncertain
environments of emerging technology domains. entrepreneurs must forge not only
organizations and a supporting infrastructure, but also the meaning of the technology.
Researchers have grappled with but, as yet failed to offer complete explanations
of how technology domains emerge. Much research on the emergence of domains begins
with an assumption that market need exists and entrepreneurs recognize and take
advantage ofthem (Constant 11,1987; Schoonhaven and Romanelli, 2001). With few
exceptions (e.g. Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Mcguire and Granovetter, 2003), the
attention of technology management research has focused on product technologi es for
which for an application is defined (e.g. Garud and Rappa, 1994; Tripsas, 1997; Munir
and Philips, 2005). However, some our most significant technological innovations are
born in the recl!m of basic science long before a known application exists. Befc)re a
110
technological discontinuity can occur, a basic science-based technology must traverse a
difficult path from scientific discovery to become an idea for a marketable product or
useable process. It is during this pre-emergence period that the meanings and interactions
that will influence technological trajectories and technology domains are formed (Kaplan
and Tripsas, 2(08).
I examine the pre-emergent period of technology development, when business
proponents are beginning to organize around nanotechnology investing, in order to better
explicate the activities and processes of the emergence of technology domains. I
introduce the concept 0 t' a socio-semiotic space, a meaning and interaction construction
zone, which mayor may not become an institutionalized field. I find that business
proponents engage in three sequential activities in their attempt to create an infrastructure
to suppOli the development of commercial activity around nanotechnology; constructing
a socio-semiotic space, positioning themselves as experts within the space, and
translating scientific, futuristic and opposition discourse for their desired constituents. I
discuss how symbolic power, accumulated through these activities, can allow a small
group of technology proponents to project a technology frame.
My analysis indicates that the assumption underling most research on emerging
technologies-that characteristics of technologies and market demand largely drive the
emergence of commercial activity and determine the path of technological trajectories-
may be inaccurate. Although these drivers have great influence once a product and
market are identified, the meaning, uses, and value of basic science-based technologies
are constructed and negotiated long before products and markets are clear. These
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influence the development ofresearch streams, perceived uses, proto-type products,
investment and regulation; before products and markets exist. Because most research
explores the emergence of technology after the construction and negotiation of meaning
has occurred, the best use of a teclmology appears evident, inherent in the characteristics
of the technology and market demand. Greater understanding of the processes of the pre-
emergent period, and in particular of technology framing through which the meaning of
emerging technologies is created and negotiated, will contribute to our understanding of
how new technologies emerge.
A better explanation ofho\v technology proponents create the sociopolitical
infrastructure necessary for emerging technologies to thrive will provide guidance to
business people and policy makers seeking to develop and support such technologies and
the domains that emerge around them. Additional1y. the findings of this study lend
support to arguments that managers seeking to implement new technologies in their
organizations should consider the meaning attributed to those technologies.
Summary of Methods
As explained in detail in Chapter III, I collected participant observation, archival
and interview data. In analyzing the embedded cases, I sought to identify the VCs'
actions and to understand the rationales behind them. The units of analyses included the
actions, "strategic tactics," (Fligstein, 1997) and stated rationales of the participants.
I began this analysis by constructing a timeline of key events and actions for each
VC based on participant observation and the YCs' current websites. I reviewed my notes
and printed the websites, and highlighted key c\cnts and actions to construct a yisual
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timeline. I selected as key, events that were mentioned frequently or described as a
milestone on the websites. This analysis guided my construction of a protocol for semi-
structured interviews, which I conducted after this initial analysis. I continued to fill in
details in the timeline and narrative as I moved to systematic coding ofthe interviews,
VC firm websites and conference presentations.
To develop a rich sense ofthe strategies and tactics of the VCs and how they
unfolded over time, I systematically reviewed the interviews, conference presentations
and web archive pages. As explained in Chapter III, using "open coding," in Atlas.ti, I
marked text describing actions and decisions as quotations (Muhr. 2004: Sheon, 2007).
Then, I used Atlas.ti's network view function to view the selected quotations and sort
them into similar "piles" (Sheon, 2007). I used the network view tools to review, sort and
rearrange the piles until all of the quotation segments \vere categorized. I crosschecked
my understanding against reports in the electronic media, highlighting and annotating
text using tools in Scrapbook, an add-on program for the Mozilla Firefox search engine.
These piles became the categories of activities that are the basis ofthe conceptual model I
describe in this chapter.
Finally, I returned to the whole of the data to explain the relationship between the
outcomes I documented though the analysis of nanotechnology frames in the larger
setting and the activities of the three focal VCs identified in my analysis of the embedded
cases. I reviewed all of my notes, memos and draft conceptual models and highlighted
persistent themes. I wrote memos and checked my understanding with academic
colleagues. J returned to the Atlas.ti dJtJbJse and mJrked JdditionJ] te:-<t describing
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participants' motivations, explanations and perceptions of causal influences. I then
worked back and forth between the data, my evolving theory and the literature to develop
a model to explain how technology proponents project a technology frame.
Case Description
Nanotechnology is the study and output of the control of matter on an atomic and
molecular scale, at dimensions of between 1 and 100 nanometers. A nanometer is one
billionth of a meter, which is about the width of three or four atoms. The National
Science Foundation estimated in 2000 that the market for nanotechnology products will
be over one trillion dollars by 2015 and that the industry will employ over 250 million
workers (NSF. 2001). While the commercial development ofnanotechnologies and their
diffusion into many sectors seems certain at the present time, the path to this point has
involved contentious positioning and discussion among government investment
commercial, and opposition communities.
After initial period of low-profile development relegated to science labs, scientific
discoveries, the first applications, and increasing investment by government and public
investors ushered in visibility, excitement about, and public opposition to
nanotechnology. Business interest, formal opposition and public awareness had begun to
take off when the data collection for this study began at the IBF's first Nanotechnology
Investing Forum.
The Construction ofNanobusiness
Thanks very much to all of you for coming. It's amazing how this event
took on a life of its own: somewhat like bottom-up self-assembly. One
year ago. this couJdl1ever have happened - bringing the investor
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community to the nanotech technology end of things. Six months
ago ... you couldn't have done this. But two months from now, as you see,
there is a whole stream of nanotech conferences. So we believe that the
timing of this event makes it a watershed event for the industry and it's
very exciting. Some exciting developments that are happening today for
the first time: the Nanotech Opportunity Report, published by CMT
Scientifica is hitting the air for the first time. We've also got CNRC, the
Council for Nanotechnology Research and Commercialization, which
proposes to be an interface between the university and government labs
and the venture communities ... [is] calling for papers ... Later on today,
three winners of our business plan competition will be presenting five-
minute speed pitches at the beginning of the cocktail hour. . .I would like to
acknowledge the person that really brought this together and made it the
legitimate watershed event that it is, I would like to introduce Meyya
Meyyapan, our chairman [applause]. -IBF's 2002 Nanotechnology
Investing Forum
This introduction began what participants acknowledged as the first conference focused
on nanotechnology investing in the United States. Such conferences have been
characterized as field configuring events, settings where people from diverse social
organizations assemble temporarily with the conscious intent to construct a new domain
(Meyer, Gaba and Colwell, 2005). Such events often give rise to critical turning points in
the emergence of domains of commercial activity (Lampel and Meyer, 2008). At these
events, people develop industry standards, announce new products, construct social
networks, recognize accomplishments, transact business, and, importantly, interpret and
construct meaning for and of emerging domains (Lampel and Meyer, 2008).
The attendees at IBF's Nanotechnology Investing Forum were exuberant, and
thrilled to be involved in the birth of what many referred to at that time as the
nanotechnology industry. The excitement is indicated in the comments of one of the
keynote speakers:
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My name is Steve Jurvetson. Thanks. I am actually amazed at the
attendees here, and I think it's a real testament to interest in
nanotechnology that so many people and so many areas of the world
frankly have come to this conference. I think it's the inaugural conference
of this topic and for IBF and its just a testament to the excitement. -IBF's
2002 Nanotechnology Investing Forum
Participants included VCs, aspiring start-up founders, the media, futurist nanotechnology
supporters, academics and government representatives including the chainnan of the
forum, Meyya Meyyapan, Director ofT'-.JASA's Center for Nanotechnology.
They came together to learn about nanotechnology business opportunities, make
connections, get funding and, in the words of Jurvetson and IBF's founder, to "start a
community'" IBF's CEOr explained the genesis ofthe conference as follows:
A few years ago we realized that there was an emerging community of
corporate investors that were interested in doing strategic investing. So we
pioneered the Corporate Investing Conference... Now, it came on the radar
screen that our investors were looking at the nanotech area and we were
interested in developing a forum to actually assist that community to
gather and facilitate infonnation and bring them in contact with the private
equity investor community. And hence, this conference...There are some
key groups which we identified during this process in the nanotech
area ...They are NanoBusiness Alliance, CMP, Foresight Institute, CNRC
which is a new initiative you'll hear more about, NanoSIG, Small Times
Publications and of course there are key venture funds that we have
speaking, universities, government and research labs and key companies
already demonstrating some success in this area. -IBF's 2002
Nanotechnology Investing Forum
These key groups mentioned above included the only three VCs specializing in
nanotechnology at the time, Star Venture Capital, NanoTech Investing, and T & T Group.
Between them, these three VCs were responsible for the founding of the first
nanotechnology trade association, the first nanotechnology trade magazine, the first
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nanotechnology report for corporations, the largest nanotechnology investing newsletter,
and for undertaking some of the first VC investments in nanotechnology.
Three young entrepreneurs with no experience in venture capital founded Star
Venture Capital, in 2000, as a VC finn specializing in nanotechnology. One of the
founders explains the genesis of the finn as follows:
[The idea for the] company started in late 1999 when the three of us got
together and had an idea to start a venture capital finn focused on an area
that was largely ignored by a lot of institutional venture investors. That
was in the materials science space, which later combined with mesoscale
physics and got the popular buzzword of nanotechnology. Recognizing
that we would be a new finn in the venture capital space, we looked
historically over the past thirty years at \yhat big. general-purpose
technology trends emerged, like the personal computer or biotech or the
Internet. And then we said "What is going to be the next prevailing
technology trend out there and how can "ve identify that? And then, not
only identify it, "How can we become experts in that space?" So being a
new finn, we looked historically at finns like Sevin Rosin or Kleiner
Perkins back in the 70s who really launched their franchises around the
personal computer. Interestingly enough, if you look at something like
Sevin Rosin the founder, Ben Rosin, had a technology newsletter that got
him access to certain companies... So in late '99 and 2000 when we came
together we spent a good nine months going around to universities
throughout the US and asking them a couple of key questions: "What
trends have you seen in tenns of government funding for a lot of academic
research and on top of that in what areas are you seeing explosive patent
growth? What areas are really looking promising in the year to come and 5
to 10 years out?" And increasingly, the common data point that we got is
that nanoscale science and technology, or advanced materials science, or
even this kind of convergence of biology, electrical engineering, and
physics were coming together under this popular umbrella tenn nanotech.
So, what we decided to do, is to take a page out of the previously
successful venture finns' histories and we started something that we find
pretty unique for any venture finn to have. We created three strategic
entities in media, in research and in politics. -Star Venture Capital
Founder. inteniewed by Kathlyn Aten
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Theses entities included a nanotechnology trade alliance founded in 2000, a nationally
distributed newsletter initiated in 2002, and a nanotechnology research report issued in
2001 and 2003, which was spun off as a separate research and consulting firm
specializing in nanotechnology in 2004.
Other VCs in attendance at the conference had noticed and acted upon these
developments in a similar manner. In 2001, T & T Group made a public announcement
that it would confine future investments to nanotechnology in order to take advantage of
the opportunity to specialize in this new trend. And in 2000, a group of experienced
venture capitalists founded NanoTech Investing with the intent of being the" the glue for
the industry." NanoTech's founder came from the computer industry had reached
conclusions similar to those of Star Venture's founders, and developed a media-based
approach.
[NanoTech's founder] noticed that computer magazines, PC magazines, in
his opinion, played a great role in the growth of the industry. They were a
way businesses and everyday consumers could leam about the technology,
leam about the hardware, see how other people were applying this
technology. [They could help consumers] keep up to speed on the
tremendous growth and capability, and these publications got a lot of the
credit for the rapid growth of the PC industry and of PC use overall. -
NanoTech leader, interviewed by Kathryn Aten
NanoTech thus launched a media organization in 2001 with the goal of creating a
website, trade magazine and conference series to educate business and consumers in
order to spur the commercialization of nanotechnology.
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The introduction to the premiere issue of the journal in September of 200 1, titled
"It starts small and simple... and then changes the world," illustrates the excitement of
those involved in emerging nanotechnology:
Consider the lowly nozzle. Until the late 1970s, ink jet printer heads were
made with nozzles that had been bored with tiny drill bits. The smaller the
.hole, the sharper the reproduction. It worked, but not well. Along came
engineers with a lithographic process that used tiny amounts of cheap raw
material to "grow" nozzles an atom at a time, each with a precise
microscopic hole. This simple process, one of the first commercial
applications of microtechnology, allowed a few workers in a small clean
room to crank out a large volume of identical, flawless nozzles. Printing
quality went way up. Prices came down ... One simple small tech
application, originally developed to help print the family holiday letter,
has spawned significant advancements in consumer products, automotive,
telecommunications, health care and other fields.
Now multiply that impact by the thousands of small tech devices that exist
today. And again by the untold number that will exist tomorrow. You
begin to see why... some believe we're at the beginning of the most
dramatic technological revolution in history. Our premiere issue ... is
devoted to introducing microsystems and nanotechnology to a wider
audience... This package will be a wake-up call for many in industry as
their companies face all of the benefits, and disruptions, that accompany
evolution in the marketplace ... Your world is changing in fantastic ways.
Rely on us to bring you information you'll need to be a part of small
technology's future.-- Nanotechnology publication, October/September,
2001)
By the time of the first IBF conference in 2002, the Nanotechnology Initiative, the first
large U.S. Government funding for nanotechnology, had just passed, and nanotechnology
was beginning to gain wider attention in the general media. NanoTech's media outlet
proclaimed in a headline of July/August of2002, "This year gave birth to an industry."
Shortly after the first conference, opposition to nanotechnology surfaced.
Reporters from the media outlets the yes founded covered opposition events in their
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news reports and editors responded to the events in editorials and opinion pages. Reports
covered calls for the nanotechnology community to respond collectively to the threat
posed by negative public perception. Editorials included narratives and metaphors that
would eventually be carried into the general press and would help to frame
nanotechnology as a business opportunity and national imperative. Nanotechnology was
compared to technologies that had come before, and presented as having similar risks.
For instance, following the September, 11 terrorist attacks, an editOlial titled "Fear of
misuse doesn't negate technology's benefits to society," ran in NanoTech's affiliated
media outlet:
When the first German V2 rocket slammed into London in 1944, its chief
designer Wernher Von Braun remarked to colleagues: "The rocket worked
perfectly except for landing on the wrong planet." The planet Von Braun
had in mind years earlier as a student was Mars. He wanted to build
rockets that would soar into space, and take mankind' s hopes and
aspirations with them. As TV commentator Eric Severeid noted upon Von
Braun's death in 1977, "There is always a dream to begin with, and the
dream is always benign." Von Braun didn't see his rockets becoming a
weapon of mass destruction in Hitler's grasp at world domination any
more than the scientists working in small tech see their systems playing
into the hands of a dictator or a terrorist. .. His technology was morally
inert. It was the people and governments that employed his rockets that
made them instruments of good and evil. The Wlight Brothers merely
wanted to get lift and distance at Kitty Hawk in 1903. Could they have
envisioned the use of airplanes for dropping bombs, or for commandeering
them as missiles that could be plowed into office buildings? Automobiles
convey people to schools, jobs and doctor offices, but they're also
sometimes the delivery vehicle for time bombs. Even such basic
technology as fertilizer can be used for evil purposes, as we saw in
Oklahoma City in 1995. History suggests that small tech will not be
immune to abuse either.
What's an innovator to do'? Proceed, of course, and with extrLl
speed ...Technological advantage is critical. -Nanotechnologv publication.
N01'('l71berlDecel71bcr ](){)J
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The VCs and leaders of the political organization they founded stressed the
national imperative to be a leader in the technology in meetings with business and
congressional leaders to encourage support for the emerging technology. These efforts
were described by one of the founders as follows:
"[We] would go down to Capital Hill to meet with people on the House
Science committee [and] spearhead these public policy tours where they
would invite some key corporations or VCs or people in the industry to go
down and testify in front of Congress on why more money should go into
nanotech." -Star Venture founder, interviewed by Kathryn Aten
The participants in the emerging domain attribute the passage of additional funding for
nanotechnology in 2003 to their efforts.
The Absence ofa Field
Nanotechnology proponents succeeded in gaining the recognition and support of
their desired constituency, thwarting calls for a research and de\'elopment moratorium,
and projecting a nanotechnology business frame as documented in Chapter V. However
despite this success, by 2008 the conference was reduced to a two-hour workshop, the
trade journal was had been relegated from print to electronic fonnat, the newsletter and
research and consulting organization had been renamed to focus on emerging
technologies, and participants seemed to have reached consensus that there would be no
nanotechnology industry. While academic research might suggest that this case is an
example of the failure of an effort by institutional entrepreneurs to create an
organizational field, most participants do not see it that way.
The discrepancy seems to result from differing assumptions regarding the best or
necessary outcome. Technology ,mel innovation management research exploring the
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emergence of technologies focuses on the emergence of organizational and technology
fields. The research builds from underlying assumptions that characteristics inherent in
technologies and market demand drive the emergence of organizational fields,
technologies require institutionalized fields, and that institutional entrepreneurs seek to
create organizational fields. The data in this study show a far greater degree of flexibility
and ambiguity around these assumptions than much of the literature suggests.
The technology proponents that are the focus of this study explained that their
decision to focus on nanotechnology was based in part on the ambiguity surrounding its
meaning. The fact that it might not become a recognized industry was seen as an
advantage. For example, one VC explained in an interview that he chose to focus on
nanotechnology because "it would be a common denominator which would be the
underling science and technology but there would be a lot of diversification in the
portfolio from an economic point of view in terms ofthe actually products that would be
produced." Another said he chose to focus on nanotechnology because "nanotechnology
was and is general, because it is something that affects all different industries." And
another noted, "We started with nanotech because it is very precisely broad ... It has a
porous definition, right?" The explanations ofthe VC's in this study mirror the findings
of a recent study, which shows that entrepreneurs' adoption of the label
"nanotechnology" for their start-up businesses has less to do with the nature of the
business than with founders' perceptions ofthe utility of the label (Granqvist, Grodal and
Woolley, 2009).
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From the perspective of the yes in this study, their efforts were a success. They
resulted in the government and corporate investment that nanotechnology needed in order
to become a commercially viable technology. Whether the businesses that supply
materials and create products with nanotechnology become a separate industry category
is not an important measure of success to most participants. For example, one participant
explained that in his opinion a nanotechnology trade organization is no longer needed
because it served its purpose: nanotechnology got the visibility, acceptance, and
investment it needed. This participant's perspective supports Hoffman's argument that
fields f0n11 around issues. not markets or technology (Hoffman, 1999). While there was
an issue, there was an organization. Once the issue was solved, the organization is no
longer needed.
An ongoing theme in this case history is pal1icipants' struggle to settle on
terminology for describing the nanotechnology domain. While many participants
originally refelTed to the nanotechnology "industry", others used the tenm; "space,"
"domain," "investing space," "area," "arena," and "enabling technology." In every
interview I conducted, interviewees volunteered their stance on what the nanotechnology
domain would be. For example the founder of T & T Group began our conversation by
stating, "First, I would say that I don't think there is such a thing as a nanotechnology
industry. Its just an enabling technology at the nanoscale."
By the end of the time period covered by this study, it became clear that from the
perspective of the p311icip,lllts, nanotechnology would not become an industry. They
continued to refer to nanotechnology liS II "space."' "area."' lind "d0l1111in'" In the final yellr
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of the conference, one speaker summarized the conclusion of the debate over the nature
of the domain saying, "At the first conference back in 2002-2003, I stood up and said
there is not, and there will never be, a nanotechnology industry, and I think we're seeing
that." However, the same speaker argued, "When you see large companies, corporations,
putting money into nanotechnologies, it's not just a scientific curiosity... there's
something there."
This debate, and the struggle of participants to find a word to accurately convey
their observations of the outcome of their effOlis highlights a gap in the academic
literature. Our existing concepts do not account for what comes before an organizational
or technology domain, nor do they account for how and why the construction of
temporary social organizations which do not result in a institutionalized field,
nevertheless generate resources and can be considered successful by their founders.
These temporary social organizations can be thought of as similar to scaffolding, which is
built and used during construction and dismantled when a required level is achieved
(perhaps to be reused in a reconfigured fonn in a future project).
Through my analysis of this case, I identify three activities, constructing,
positioning, and translating that allow technology proponents to project a technology
frame. I explain how these activities resulted in a domain of commercial activity. This
domain is unlikely to become an institutionalized organizational or technology field. It
nevertheless provided resources and served the ends of those who created it. I introduce
the concept of a socio-semiotic space to reflect the entity technology proponents
constructed and I develop a model to explain how a small group of nanotechnology
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proponents used the socio-semiotic space they constructed to generate resources and
project a technology frame in support of nanobusiness.
Projecting a Technology Frame
The data from this research revealed three sequential activities: Constructing,
Positioning, and Translating. These activities create resources and generate symbolic
power allowing technology proponents to define the emerging domain. Table 10,
explained in the discussion below, shows the three activities with illustrations from the
data.
Constructing
The first activity the YCs engaged in is constructing. Constructing is creating a
physical and cognitive infrastructure for an emerging technology. It includes founding
domain specific start-ups, SuppOliing organizations, and mediZl outlets. These entities
provide a physical and cognitive space in which technology proponents can negotiate the
meaning of an emerging technology and begin to interact v-lith those they hope will
become constituents. In their words, the YCs in this study were "entrepreneurs" and
"industry builders." They did not see themselves as solely investors. They sought to
construct a supporting infrastructure for nanotechnology. For example, as one founder
explained:
Our decision to focus on [nanotechnology] led us to say if this is a future
industry, what are the things that the industry needs to grow? We decided
... we would be a company that would be focused on the advancement of
[the] technology." -Nanobusinessfounder. inten'ie11'CC! bv Karl71yn Aren
The finn's website stated more simply. we will work as an "industry accelerator.··
Table 10: Activities and Examples from Data
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Activity! Quotcs from In tcrvicws Examples of activities from WebPages and press
Tactics releases
Constructing We created three strategic By building strong alliances with leading Small Tech
entities in media, in research research institutions, end users, entrepreneurs and
Founded and in politics to help us get investors, [we are] establishing a solid foundation for
organizations, better deal flow, which is the industry as a whole to flourish. [We] also
journals, pretty much the name of the recognizes the need to support global infonnation
newsletters, game in the venture world. transfer among the various entities who playa part in
associations, But also to help us increase the growth of Small Tech. To that end, we've created [a
nanotech the value that we would add media company]. This subsidiary company is
stock index to investments once we publishing a magazine, which has a circulation of more
nlake theln. than 22,000. It also features a Web site providing daily
news about the business of MEMS. microsysterns and
[It] was actually nanotechnology.
incorporated as an LLC in
March 2001 and they had a [We are] an Industry Accelerator(TM) dedicated to
reasonable staff and developing the Small Tech industry. The company is
launched \",ith the web site building a portfolio of gre3t comp3nies by investing in
in rV!ay, 2001. start-ups and e~lrly stage companies: pro\'iding business
and technical resources to support these companies:
and developing industrv- building resources.
Positioning They carved out their niche IWc are] a venturc capital firm focused on making
3S the domain experts in tlwt carly-stage invcstmcnts in nanotec hno logy and re lated
Wrote particular sector and growth sectors emerging from leading academic
reports. blogs, because thev werc known as lTnlL'rS of cxeellt'nce. lOur] managing partners.
press releases. the experts in thai area they investors. ad\'isor~ allll eXLL'ndcd nel\\ork arl' !L-\eragl'd
histories and attracted all the deal flow to provide unparaLleled access. expertise> and market
biographies and were able to make early intelligence to its p011folio companies. The finn's
stage venture capital bets principals are recognized internationally as thought-
that proved to be very leaders in the field of nanotechnology.
successful.
Since it was founded, NanoTech has established a
[The benefit] really is leadership position in the emerging field of Small
twofold. It is public and Tech. It is the leader in bringing Small Tech products
actual perception of us to the global marketplace.
being at the epicenter of
everything going on in
nanoteclmology.
Translating Our original goal was to Nanotechnology. the manipulation and control of
help business leaders with matter at the molecular level, has widely been
Told non- technical backgrounds recognized as critical for the future or economic and
hi(stOlies) of understand the technology. regional competitiveness, job creation. and
nano- technological superiority. [The Rcport] demonstrates
technology The purpose of the how nanotechnology atTccts every existing industry,
publication was ... education from Chemicals. Textiles/Apparel. Computing and
to the 1l13rket place .. so this Storage, to Transporlation, Energy. Po\\'er. Hcalthcare
is what nanotechnology is. and HOll1cland Sl'cmitv.
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Toward this end, the VCs constructed their own finns, nanotechnology start-ups
and supporting organizations. The VCs founded the first nanotechnology trade journal,
the most widely read newsletter, the nanotechnology trade association, a research
organization devoted to providing intelligence on nanotechnology to large corporations
and a nanotechnology stock index. They also sponsored the first nanotechnology
investing conference with the intent of bringing together and building a community of
people interested in commercializing the technology.
The entities the VCs founded were substantive and symbolic resources.
Entrepreneurs require resources to create organizations and commercialize technologies.
Resources include factors such as financial capital, human capital, intellectual property
and equipment. Resources can have both substantive and symbolic dimensions. The
substantive dimension derives tJ-om the material aspects of an object and the tangible
functions that it perfonns. So, for example, a VCs office is a substantive resource,
serving the intrinsic function of a place of work. The office can also have a symbolic
dimension. For example, acquiring a comer office symbolically signals greater
peITl1anence and legitimacy than working from home. Substantive resources can provide
the oppOliunity to generate symbolic resources, which enable founders to define the
emerging technology domain for others.
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) argue that "resources providing shared
representations, interpretations, and systems of meaning" generate cognitive capital. I
te1l11 these resources symbolic resources, in that their value is derived from symbolic
meanings. A symbol represents something else and conveys a socially constructed
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meaning that is different from the meaning conveyed by its material aspects or apparent
function (Zott and Huy, 2007; Morgan, Frost and, Pondy, 1983). A prestigious office
location can symbolically suggest status and prosperity (Zott and Huy, 2007; Oldham and
Rotchford, 1983).
The physical spaces the YCs constructed provided a place to meet with potential
partners and desired constituents, while the media outlets provided a means to construct a
domain-specifIc discourse and to disseminate the YCs' interpretation of events to a target
audience. When the YCs in this study acquired their first office, opened a new office, or
moved to more prestigious address. they issued press releases to accentuate ~md
disseminate the symbolic value of their new resource. And when YCs wrote reports,
spoke at conferences and met with Senate and Congressional leaders, they reported these
events through their WebPages and media outlets, conveying the symbolic message that
their expertise was recognized and valued (Zott and Huy, 2007).
Symbolically, these resources represented the beginnings of a cognitive category.
Together, the physical spaces, discourse spaces, and the cognitive category constituted a
space in which activities and technology could take on a unique meaning within the
context of the emerging domain. Within this space, nanotechnology proponents could act
and speak as though their imagined future were a reality. For example, within the
nanotechnology specific, domain the technology and activities associated with it could be
given meanings that were not accepted outside of the space: Nanotechnology could mean
a business opportunity; investing in companies seeking to commercialize products using
nano-scale materials could be termed nanotechnology investing. Withill the
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nanotechnology space, nanotechnology business proponents could experiment with
practices, identities, labels, and frames and determine which had the greatest potential for
building their domain.
By constructing entities, attending and sponsoring field configuring events such
as the first nanotechnology investing conference, and disseminating domain specific
discourse, the VCs initiated interactions at two levels, the structural and cognitive.
Lampel and Meyer (2008: 1027) explain that organizational fields emerge when at some
point "the density and intensity of participants' interactions reach critical thresholds at the
structural and cognitive levels'" The field acquires macro structural features that reinforce
its pennanence and members begin to become cognitively aware of the field and their
own identity as field members. Structural and cognitive elements reinforce each other as
paJiicipants construct cognitive representations of the "agglomeration" as an evolving
entity alongside their representations of their positions within "this entity" (Lampel and
Meyer, 2008: 1027). I use the ten11 socio-semiotic space to refer to Lampel and Meyer's
(2008) "agglomeration" and the nanotechnology business proponents' "space," "niche,"
"domain," and "community," which exists, generates resources and influences outcomes
even if it does not become an organizational field. I discuss this concept further later in
this chapter.
The nanobusiness socio-semiotic space, which the VCs constructed was
characterized by two key elements. The space was limited to nanotechnology and
therefore, was unpopulated. There were very few business people, and no institutional
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investors, focused on nanotechnology business opportunities at the time, as one of the YC
founders recalled:
Nobody or hardly anybody in the venture world is focused on nanotech."
[We] had idea to start our venture capital firm focused on an area that was
largely ignored by a lot of institutional venture investors in the materials
science space, which later combined with mesoscale physics, and got the
popular buzzword of nanotechnology. -Nanobusiness leader, interviewed
by Kathryn Aten
Another explained in an interview, "When [we] started, if you talked to the people who
were the experts or analysts-and there were only a handful of them at the time-most
people didn't know anything about it." These characteristics allowed the YCs to define
the situation in the nanotechnology business space they created.
The substantive resources they created in the foml of organizations and
documentation provided a physical space for meeting and talking about nanotechnology
and a media outlet for a limited, business-focused discourse. Symbolically, the entities
conveyed the existence of a nanobusiness niche and lent a sense of permanence. The
nanobusiness socio-semiotic space encompassed the experimental cognitive and
structural interactions that come before an institutionalized organizational field and the
space became a symbolic resource the YCs later used to position themselves as experts
and project their nanobusiness technology frame.
Positioning
The second activity the YCs engaged in is positioning. Positioning is the process
of building a reputation for domain-specific expertise. It involves the use of the
substantive and symbolic resources generated through the construction of the socio-
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semiotic space to position oneself as a central figure and expert within the space.
Constructing is the creation of the space by founding entities, whereas positioning is the
use ofthose entities; such as for example, constructing a building involves the activities
to create it and using a the building may involve living, working or holding events in it.
The VCs populated the media outlets and conferences they created with internally
generated discourse. Through positioning, they created resources such as a nanobusiness
label, reports, blogs, press releases, organization histories and founder biographies.
After constructing the nanobusiness socio-semiotic space, the VC firms used the
resources this activity generated to position themselves as experts within the space. As
one VC describing his finn's strategy explained in an interview, "[Our strategy] really is
two-fold. It is public perception and actual fact of us being at the epicenter of everything
going on in nanotechnology." They positioned themselves as experts by populating the
socio-semiotic space they had created with texts and then claiming authorship and
expe11ise in subsequent texts.
The VCs distributed texts through the websites of the organizations they founded
and invested in, the media outlets they created, and the conferences they sponsored. They
wrote reports, made conference presentations and made extensive use of the Internet to
disseminate blogs and newsletters. One VC described the launch of his finn's newsletter
and its symbolic value as follows:
It became the fastest growing newsletter in [our media partner's] history.
It grew from 0 to maybe 5000 subscribers in under two weeks. And then it
just ramped up fl'om there to ... distribution of maybe 90,000 people when
you combine the free Friday e-mail newsletter that my business paI1ner
types up. The report was what originally paid our salaries but it was
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probably more impOliant as credibility in the space ... You know it opens
the door to CEOs of companies like Pfizer. You can talk to them ... not like
a no-name from a new finn. -Nanobusiness leader, interviewed by
Kathryn Aten
By referring to themselves as experts in biographies they included in conference
programs, on their WebPages and in press releases they labeled themselves as nano VCs
and nanotechnology experts. A label serves to associate something with an explicit
meaning (denotation) and implicit meaning (connotation) (Pierce, 1931). Thus, the label
nanotechnology associates a product or business with an explicit category of technologies
based on the manipulation of matter at the nanoscale and also with implicit meanings
such as "futuristic," "trendy," or "threatening," depending upon the interpreter. In the
case of the nanotechnology VCs, the nano VC label denoted a limited category, in which
they could claim to be the experts. The label connoted the implicit meaning of cutting
edge and emerging technology, as explained by one founder in an interview, "[Our] name
signifies people who are extremely connected with the industry but also does represent to
a certain extent the brand of emerging technology or kind of the cutting edge." The VCs
used the reports they had written and their appearances on news programs as examples of
their expertise in this limited, cutting edge domain as in this biography:
He has been an invited guest speaker, lecturer, and panelist on
nanotechnology for CNBC, CNN, Harvard, Yale, Wharton, Columbia,
Cornell, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse First Boston, Capitol Hill,
government labs, and officials in France, Canada, UK, Spain, Singapore,
and Gennany. Widely recognized as one of the preeminent minds in
nanotechnology and finance, [he] has been invited by the White House
and Canadian Government to advise government organizations on funding
strategies. -NanD VC WebPage
Key to the value of the VCs gained through positioning is the uniqueness of the
infonnation the VCs provided and their ability to link themselves with the infonnation in
order to capture symbolic value. One founder explained the importance of this linkage as
follows:
We've focused on supplying unique, very hard to get content from a
research infonnation dissemination standpoint but also we've been fairly
savvy with the media and the press ... We've tried to make sure that if there
is any press either on CNN or NPR or going across the Wall Street circle
that we make sure that [our] name is in it. -Nanotechnology business
leader, inter.'iewed by Kathryn Aten
Positioning created durable resources in the fonn of written texts and the nano VC
and nanobusiness expert label. The value of these resources was enhanced by the rapid
and inexpensive proliferation ofthe texts on the Internet. As one pmiicipant explained,
nanotechnology was the first technology to emerge in the Intemet age, Thus, repolis,
press releases, electronic newsletters, and even conference programs and biographies are
easily accessible, and remain so. These resources have gained greater visibility and
pelmanence than they would have ifthey existed only in hard copy form, For example, a
search on "NanoTech Investing" using the Google search engine at the present time
results in 31 urIs from 2001,320 from 2005, and 388 from 2007. Documents, such as
conference programs, which prior to the Intemet would have had a very limited
dissemination and life, now remain easily accessible and generate lasting reputational
capital and symbolic value,
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Translating
The third activity the YCs engaged in is translating. Translating is restating ideas
expressed in one language or symbolic system into another while preserving the original
meaning. The YCs used resources they accumulated through their previous activities to
translate nanoscience into business opportunities. The YCs translated nanoscience into
nanobusiness by identifying and educating their desired constituent group by telling
narratives. They created resources by selecting evocative metaphors and memorable
exemplars, which diffused into externally generated texts such as Congressional records
and mainstreampress accounts. The \alue of these resources grew as the stories.
metaphors and exemplars were repeated by constituents and in the popular press.
Translation involyes negotiation bet\veen parties and results in reshaping meaning
(Zilber. 2006). This occurs for example when two pmiies trying to understand one
another go back and forth, "You mean ... " "No more like ... " "Oh, I see... " The YCs
defined their desired constituency as business and govemment leaders. They sought to
educate this constituency about the possible business applications and economic impact
of nanotechnology. As one YC explained in an interview, "Our original goal was to help
business leaders with non-technical backgrounds understand the technology." They used
their resources to define nanoscience as nanobusiness as described by one YC founder as
follows:
We spent the better part of two years ... meeting with Senators and
Congressman and trying to educate them on what is nanotechnology, why
is this good for job growth, and is this good for US technology leadership
and US competitiveness, and what are some tangible examples of how this
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could benefit a wide variety of industries. -VCfirmfounder, interviewed
by Kathlyn Aten
Their efforts were specifically targeted to translate nanoscience into nanobusiness by
emphasizing the commercial and economic implications of potential applications their
constituent group.
As explained in Chapter V, the VCs described business applications and products,
and de-emphasized or even debunked the more grandiose potential of nanotechnology.
They told stories of nanotechnology using appealing, emotive language as in this early
report:
With an onslaught of funding from almost every govemment science
agency, major contributions from titans of technology... you can bet
nanotechnology is not just a fad ... Commercial developments in
nanotechnology have and \vill continue to surface ... ushering in a new
frontier. -Nanotechnology report
Nanotechnologies were presented in metaphorical tenns, compared to other
technologies that are familiar and non-threatening. Metaphors, language that directly
connects seemingly unrelated referents, are "simplified articulations" (p. 1062) and the
first philosophical and psychological step in the development of mental models (Black,
1962; Morgan, 1980). Metaphors "lay down a foundation for language and terminology
specific to ... [a] given venture, organization, or industry" and " ... are valuable in
simplifying complex issues such that those not deeply knowledgeable about specific
contextual issues may share in their understanding" (Hill and Levenhagen, 1995). As
metaphors are accepted and used, the metaphorical concepts become understood as facts.
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The metaphor becomes accepted as domain specific language used to articulate formal
models and understandings.
The YCs were careful to position nanotechnology in terms of the next step in the
history of technological development:
There are materials with nanoscale dimensions that have been around for
hundreds of years or more ... If you wanna put a pretty word on it, you
would say carbon black has been synthesized in the incomplete
combustion of natural gas for twenty-plus years. If you wanted to be
gauche about it, you would say soot has been made by buming stuff for
much longer than that and these materials have nano-sized properties but
nobody was optimizing for particle size... in the late 1800s ... nano-sized
structures [have been) employed for a long time. The purposeful
engineering of them, is what's interesting. -/'v'Qnorechnologt" bus illess
leader, interviewed by Kathryn Aten
Other observers have noted that entrepreneurs can reduce resistance to innovations by
positioning them within existing institutional frameworks (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001).
The resources generated from constructing and positioning provided the YCs with
credibility and access to their desired constituents. The YCs were eventually able to
project their definition into the more general media, as explained by a founder in an
interview:
We've been able to not only to steer some of the direction ofTY
programming but also to load them up with ... [our research), which will
get to content for a lot of their presentations. -VCfirmfounder,
interviewed by Kathryn Aten
By presenting nanotechnology as the natural extension of past technologies and
commercial opportunities, the YCs reduced resistance to nanotechnology. The narratives,
metaphors, and exemplars they used, like the texts they created. became resources
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repeated in press accounts and by constituents and once again their value was amplified
because they wre readily available on the Internet.
The examples above illustrate two key aspects of the value created through
translating. First, the stories the VCs told were appealing, sufficiently so that they were
repeated in press accounts. A story related by the VCs about "nanotechnology" in
medieval stained glass was frequently repeated and appears in multiple urIs in a Google
search. Second, by positioning nanoteclmology as an extension of the ongoing trend of
miniaturization, the VCs were able to minimize resistance.
The VCs engaged in three sequential activities-constructing, positioning, and
translating. These activities were sequential in the sense that the later required the
resources of the former: positioning in the socio-semiotic space could not precede its
construction. For example, in early reports in a trade journal. one of the YCs was
consistently described as "fledgling." Whereas, in later years, the firm is described in that
same journal as "premier" and "leading." The first activities did not, however, cease
when new activities were introduced. Each of the activities provided the VCs with
resources. These resources enabled a small group to project a nanobusiness frame, first to
their limited desired constituency and then into the general discourse.
Socio-semiotic Space and the Projection of a Technology Frame
In addition to the three activities that VCs engaged in, the data revealed the VCs'
perception of causal links between their activities and the generation of symbolic power.
The YCs attributed positive outcomes to their activities, which they explained in response
to my questions about the benefits and costs their domain building activities. Working
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from these perceived causal links, my theory and the literature, I explain the role of a
socio-semiotic space in the projection of technology frames. The outcomes and examples
of the VCs' causal attributions are shown in Table 11 and discussed below.
Table 11: Participant Outcomes and Attributions
@utcollle Positioned as experts Influenced corporate Passage oflegislation to
investment and strategies provide federal funding for
nanotechnology
Causal And it was that original They work with major They put in all that work. If
Attribution report that really put corporations... [and] helped they hadn't worked to get
[us] on the map back in shape the strategy of how the bill passed. if they
200 I as the kind of go these companies are hadn't run the
to shop for. .. research embracing it. . .It helps conferences ... if they hadn't
and intelligence on senior management craft created all of this
nanotechnology. strategies and allocate information for the industry
resources for embracing they would han; nothing.
nanotechnoloCTv.
Perceived Outcomes and Causes
The participants in this study actively attempted to create a neVi business domain.
The descriptions the founders of the focal firms in this study were supported by their
peers, for example one business leader explained, "They put so much time and energy
and effort into influencing government thinkers, influencing VCs setting up conferences,
providing good speakers ...They did a lot of that ground work." The VCs in this study
perceived that their activities resulted in positive outcomes for their firms. As one
founder explained in an interview, "By positioning ourselves at the center of
things ... we've absolutely attracted deal flow." A business leader commenting on this
firm echoed this statement, "Any company started in nanotechnology is likely to fall into
one of ... [their organizations] at some point very early on. So from a deal flow
standpoint, they'1J see most ofthe deal flow out there'"
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The ves believed that their activities resulted in the recognition of
nanotechnology business as an entity by government and established business interests.
First, they see the passage of the NNI and other funding as evidence of that a domain
exists. As one business leader explained in an interview:
It exists. I mean there are stories about nanotechnology...There is an
NNI...And this was the beginning, the nucleation of the brand space for
the public because suddenly the tax payer went, wow, a lot of my money
is going to this thing called nanotech. It better be good. What is it? And I
think that as the industry is developed, we've started, the media picked up
on it and now people talk about nanotechnology, as a platform technology
that is going to enable these things. So there are good, positive
connotations to that brand that came simply due to the fact that the
govemment is willing to im'est in it the uni\'efsities believe it, and the
researchers are willing to follow it, and there are companies now formed
around it -Nanotechnology Business Leader, interviewed by Kathryn Aten
Second, the participants in this case specifically attribute the passage of govemment
funding to their eff0l1s. For example, one business leader acknowledged the imp0l1ance
ofNNI and attributed its passage, in part, to his organization's efforts in creating a
community:
I think the NNI initiative and the bill being passed ... said very loudly this
is a priority and we need to really focus on this as a core competence of
our research and development. [We] played a very critical role ... I believe
we have created a community of folks who use us to understand how the
technologies are being applied in different sectors and being able to think
through the different potential applications and how it might fit with their
business or where their business might fit into the larger product
community... [We] definitely had an influence at least among some key
players early on and then the ball got rolling... we played a role in that
[getting it started]. -Nanotechnology Business Leader, intenliewed by
Kathryn Aten
Similarly, a VC explained his fim1's role in gaining the supp0l1 of govemment leaders:
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So that was [our organization] and what ultimately that led to was the bill
that was promoted by Senator Wyden, of course, and Senator Hillary
Clinton... So Bush signed that bill into law in 2003 and allocated about $1
billion dollars per year in government funding for nanotechnology and that
was really a critical inflection point for this overall sector, if you want to
call it that, in that here was a permanent Congressional mandate to have
government funding go into nanotechnology. That's also helped set a lot
of the data points for nanotechnology, surpassing the overall level of
funding for the human genome project. Its also been one of the largest
government science initiative since the space race ... So, I guess that
summary of how we helped create a sector, or create an industry
depending on who you are talking to, is a hybrid of not only having
advanced knowledge ... but also in creating this kind of unique modeL .. -
Nanotechnology VC Firm Fonder, interviewed by Kathryn Aten
Finally, participants also credited themselves with influencing large corporations:
[Our] \vork with major corporations like GE, EMAT, BAXTOR, and so
forth and involvement with some of the largest corporations in the world
and some of the largest financial institutions and governments for that
matter has really, I think, helped shape the strategy of how these
companies are embracing it.
Although pmiicipants initially spoke of creating a nanotechnology industry, it
became clear that this was unlikely. However, as in the quotations above, the participants
take credit for the creation of something. I term this entity a socio-semiotic space.
Socio-semiotic Space. How domains of commercial activity emerge from
technological innovation has been a central and problematic question in technology and
innovation management research (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Hargadon and Douglas, 2001;
Garud and Rappa, 1994; Muir and Philips, 2004; Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). Recent work
has adopted the concept of organizational fields. However, organizational fields are by
definition institutionalized. An organizational field is "a cluster of organizations and
occupations whose boundaries, identities, and interactions are defined and stabilized by
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shared institutional logics (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006: 28). lnstitutionallogics "are
taken-for-granted, resilient social prescriptions ... specifying the boundaries of a field, its
rules of membership, and the role identities and appropriate organizational forms of its
constituent communities" (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006: 28). Recent research
exploring emergence draws on the notion of organizational fields (e.g. McGuire, Phillips,
and Hardy, 2001; Chiles, Meyer, and Hench, 2004). However, if entity is not or does not
become an institutionalized filed, academics, like the participants in the nanotechnology
space, are left without words to describe the phenomena.
I use the term socio-semiotic space to refer to the entity' that nanotechnology
business proponents constructed and in which they created and experimented with
meanings and pattems of interaction that constituted their nanobusiness frame. In a socio-
semiotic space. pal1icipants experiment with boundaries, identities and interactions that
may (or may not) come to be stabilized in an organizational field. Boundaries and rules of
membership are argued, identities of individuals and finns are put fOl1h and revised, new
organizational fonns emerge but may not stand the test of time. However, the meanings
and interactions that develop in the socio-semiotic space will influence the development
of the technology (whether within in a specific organizational field or dispersed through
many) as well as the specific organizational fIeld if one does develop. Additionally, the
meanings and pattems of interactions are resources available to participants for future use
in other situations.
1draw the telll1 socio-semiotic from the study of social semiotics, a branch of
semiotics (the study of signs). which focuses meaning making as a social practice
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(Thibault, 1991). Semiotics is "a fonnal mode of analysis used to identify the rules that
govem how signs convey meaning in a particular social system" (Fiol, 1989: 278).
Researchers adopting a semiotic perspective have used the tenn semiotic space to
describe dimensions of meaning around a patiicular sign (Tavory and Swidler, 2009). So,
for example, the meaning represented by an individual's dress can vary along the
dimension of fonnal to infonnal. Social semiotics is a reaction to what some researchers
felt was a neglect of the role of social influences and individuals in creating and changing
the meanings attributed to signs. Social semiotics includes the study of how people
design and interpret meanings, the study ofhmv semiotic systems are shaped by social
interests and ideologies, and how they are adapted as society changes (Hodge and Kress,
1988). To social semiotic researchers, signs are resources that people use and adapt as
opposed to fixed codes. 1use the tem1 "socio-semiotic" based on this perspective with the
tem1 "space" derived from my data to convey the space in which social interactions,
negotiations and meaning making activities occur.
I conceptualize a socio-semiotic space with the metaphor of a construction zone.
Like a construction zone, there is organization. Individuals act on goals. Pattems of
action and social structures develop and are constituted and reconstituted through the
actions of participants. However, the organization is rapidly changing based on the needs
of the project. It is emergent. Individuals must respond to the environment they are
building and each other as the project proceeds. Resources are created in the space. In a
construction zone, people use and create substantive resources, such as buildings, as well
as symbolic resources. The construction effort can come to represent something more
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than the edifices left behind as indicated by, for example, the plaques dedicated to the
people who have played key roles in large projects. Dams, for example, may represent
progress and ingenuity, or hubris depending on one's perspectives.
Like a construction zone, a socio-semiotic space is temporary. However, it may
become the basis for a more permanent entity, such as an organizational or technology
field as in the case of biotechnology. Or, as appears possible with nanotechnology, the
space may never become a recognized organizational field. In either case, the meanings
and interactions negotiated during the pre-emergent will influence the developing
technology and may provide resources for the founders of the space.
As in a construction zone, elements that are constructed will influence the final
organization after the entity ceases to be easily recognized as a construction zone. As the
roads and buildings laid down during the construction process direct traffic pattems in the
final site, the meanings and interactions constructed in a socio-semiotic space will
influence an organizational or technology field that emerges from it. The meanings and
interactions may become institutionalized in the form of industry and market categories,
industry recipes, organizational identities, and legitimate organizational forms and
practices.
Alternatively, as in a construction project that is halted midstream, some
resources (i.e. paths and roads) may remain available for use. In the case of
nanotechnology, these are substantive in the fonn of organizations, reports, and journals
and symbolic in the form of the nanotechnology business frame, the nanotechnology
business label. and the practices associated with nanotechnology investing. While it
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appears that there will be no enduring nanotechnology field, nanotechnology is thriving.
The texts, narratives, exemplars, metaphors, and labels created within the nanotechnology
socio-semiotic space remain available and continue to influence discourse. The
nanotechnology business frame remains dominant.
As in a construction project where individual contractors, and certainly the
architect, may profit or make a reputation even if the project fails, the founders of a
socio-semiotic space may accumulate resources that are transferable to new settings. At
least one of the ves and one of the supporting firms in this study explained their
intention use the resources they developed through their activities to create a
nanotechnology space in future emerging domains. One founder joked, "Maybe in a
couple of years from now you'll be talking to me about the new emerging technology
trend that we've identified." Another leader explained in greater detail:
We started with nanotech because it is very precisely broad, crossing with
lots of different sectors. It has a porous definition, right? And it's
something where we thought we could go in and build up a client base, .. A
lot of people are interested in a lot of science, and energy, and
environment, and then we can start to carve out industry practices, sector
practices for this that are not about nanotechnology. They are about a
broader field of science-based innovation. -Nanobusiness founder,
interviewed by Kathryn Aten
The concept of a socio-semiotic space is derived from the data in this research. As
do organizational researchers, participants in the emerging nanotechnology domain
struggled over what to term the "space" they acknowledged they were creating. I began
with their tenn "space" and drew "socio-semiotic" from the field of social semiotics to
convey the notion of signs as resources that represent designed and intellJreted meanings
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within a changing social system. This concept serves to describe the meaning and
interaction construction zones that are constructed to support domains of commercial
activity emerging around science-based technologies and mayor may not become
organizational fields.
Projecting a Technology Frame
By constructing a limited socio-semiotic space, this group was able to define the
situation for their desired constituents, gain their suppOli, and use the resources these
activities generated to project their frame into the larger discourse, as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 5: Projecting a Technology Frame
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Hallet (2003) defines "the power to define the situation in which interactions take
place" symbolic power. Hallett (2003) argues that cultural contexts are negotiated
structures that emerge through interactions between people. However, all negotiators do
not have equal power. Celiain negotiators can gain disproportionate power over the
negotiated structures that comprise the cultural context. Individuals gain power when
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they engage in practices that are valued, others imbue them with legitimacy by showing
dereference defined as "a symbolic means by which appreciation is regularly conveyed to
a recipient" (Goffman, 1967:56 in Hallett, 2003). Thus, for example, the general press
imbued the focal YCs in this study with legitimacy when reporters referred to the YCs as
experts, leaders, and pioneers.
A technology frame is a negotiated understanding of what a technology is and
how it should be used. The focal VCs in this study gained the power to define
nanotechnology, symbolic power, by creating sources oflegitimacy. In an emerging
industry the constituents and practices that \vill confer legitimacy J.re unclear. By
constructing a socio-semiotic space the VCs in this study were able to gain enough
symbolic power to define nanotechnology business and legitimizing practices within that
space. They were then able to position themselves as expelis within the space further
enhancing their legitimacy, which allowed them to translate nanotechnology into
nanobusiness for their desired constituency. This in tum, further enhanced their
legitimacy eventually allowing them to deploy symbolic power to define nanotechnology
for a larger audience.
The constructed niche-space provided a venue for specialized business interaction
and discourse. Founders were able to use this specialized space to engage in practices and
claim those practices as legitimate within the confines of the space. The resources within
the space enabled founders to position themselves as experts in order to generate and
claim additional resources and broaden their influence. As they become recognized as
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experts, the founders gained more resources and greater power to define the situation
until, as explained by one participant,
They marketed nanotechnology...How do you explain to people what
nanotech is, make people care about it, make teachers want to teach it the
universities, make people want to invest in it make people want to start
companies in it. All of that you have to make people care. At the end of
the day that's the question, I always say who cares. Until people care
about something, anything, whether it's a product or an industry, it doesn't
matter. And they made people care. They made people care about
nanotech.
By describing ambiguous and complex scientific discoveries in tenns of business
opportunities applications, the founders gained symbolic power as experts in
nanotechnology business. Business people, government leaders and the press came to
them for explanations and their stories were cited and repeated. Constructing, positioning
and translating can thus imbued a small group with symbolic power to project a
technology frame.
Conclusion
Most research on the emergence of technologies and commercial domains around
them begins with an assumption that market needs exists and entrepreneurs recognize and
take advantage of them (Constant II, 1987; Schoonhaven and Romanelli, 2001).
Additionally, with few exceptions (e.g. Hargadon and Douglas, 2001; Mcguire and
Granovetter, 2003), the attention of technology management research has focused
technologies for which for a product applications are defined (e.g. Garud and Rappa,
1994; Tripsas, 1997; Munir and Philips, 2005). Many significant technological
innovations are born in the realm of basic science long before a product or specific
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application exists. Science-based technologies traverse a difficult path from discovery to
a marketable product or useable process during a period of pre-emergence. During this
period meanings and interactions, which influence technological trajectories and domains
are formed (Kaplan and Tlipsas, 2008). Because most research begins with the
assumption of a product and market, and neglects this pre-emergent period, our
explanations of the emergence oftechnologies and commercial domains around them are
incomplete.
In this study, I examine the pre-emergent period of nanotechnology, when
business proponents of the technology are beginning to organize. This setting provides an
opportunity to focus on a previously neglected stage in the development oftechnologies
and emergence of domains of commercial activity. The data and my analysis reveal that
business proponents engage in three sequential activities in their attempt to create an
infrastructure to support the development of commercial activity around nanotechnology;
constructing a socia-semiotic space, positioning themselves as expe11s within the space,
and translating scientific, futuristic and opposition discourse for their desired
consti tuents.
I introduce the concept of a socio-semiotic space, a meaning and interaction
construction zone, which mayor may not become an institutionalized field. I also used
grounded theory methods to develop a process model describing three mechanisms
(constructing, positioning, translating) that participants invoked sequentially to create a
socio-semiotic space that promoted the emergence and commercial development of
nanotechnology. By constructing a socio-semiotic space, positioning themselves as
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experts within the space, and translating scientific, futuristic and opposition discourse for
their desired constituents, a small and relatively disadvantaged group of technology
proponents were able to project a nanobusiness frame into the general discourse. By
constructing a limited socio-semiotic space, this group was able to defIne the situation for
their desired constituents, gain their support, and use the resources these activities
generated to project their frame into the larger discourse.
Conceptualizations such as an industry, identity, or category, imply a lasting and
enduring quality of an institutionalized entity that has come to be taken for granted.
These concepts don"t describe the emergent changing and impe1l11anent nature of the
"space" that nanotechnology proponents credited themselves with creating.
Nanoteclmology is not an industry, an organizational field or technology field as defined
in the management literature, but the data show that nanobusiness become a legitimate
frame and participants credit themselves with creating a "space" which they used to gain
recognition and resources from their desired constituents.
Greater understanding of the processes of this pre-emergent period, and in
particular of technology framing, contributes to our understanding of how new
teclmologies emerge. By explaining how technology proponents create the sociopolitical
infrastructure necessary for emerging technologies to thrive, this study provides guidance
to business people and policy makers seeking to develop and support such technologies
and the domains that emerge around them.
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CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
How technologies and domains of commercial activity based on them evolve has
been a topic of interest to management and organization scholars for some time (e.g.
Dosi, 1982; Tushman and Andersen, 1986; Utterback 1994). However, the early
emergence of such entities remains under-explored despite calls for research (Meyer,
Gaba, and Colwell, 2005). Given the economic importance of emerging technologies and
ventures founded to commercialize them, it is not surprising that after decades of research
this question remains critically important to both researchers and managers (Kaplan and
Tripsas, 2008). Nor, given the difficulties of studying emerging domains, is it surprising
that most research neglects this period. However, without explanations that consider the
processes that shape the early emergence of technologies, our knowledge of the
technology development cycle and the emergence of commercial domains based on
technologies is incomplete. Scholars' neglect of the period of early emergence often
results in explanations that imply technological determinism and ignore the role of human
agency.
In this dissertation I investigated the processes through which scientific
discoveries become the basis for domains of commercial activity. I focused on the period
of early emergence, when the understandings of proponents, opponents, users, scientists,
and designers of technologies begin to fonTI. These understandings influence the end
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design and the success or failure of commercialization attempts. The analysis of this
period and the findings of this dissertation contribute to our knowledge of the technology
development cycle by identifying and explaining the understudied processes of early
emergence, in particular, technology framing. I contribute to our theoretical knowledge of
how science discoveries become the basis for fields of commercial activity by explaining
the process through which technology proponents project a technology frame into the
public discourse. The findings of this dissertation can provide guidance to managers and
policy makers grappling with rapid technological change.
Process Theory and Boundary Conditions
In this dissertation, I adopt a process approach (Mohr, 1982; Langly, 1999). The
emergence and commercialization oftechnologies, the evolution oftechnology
trajectories, and the institutionalization of technology and organizational fields are
processes. To understand these processes, how things evolve over time, and why they
evolve in the way they do, research must pay paliicular attention to events and time
sequences (Poole, Van de Ven, and Dooley, 2000). Process data deal with sequences of
events, involve multiple levels and units of analysis, are temporally embedded, and are
often eclectic including in addition to events, changing relationships, thoughts, and
interpretations (Langley, 1999).
In this dissertation, I developed a process theory explaining the role of technology
framing in the emergence of a commercial domain by identifying the sequence of events
that leads to the projection of a technology frame. I documented the emergence of
competing nanotechnology frames in the period prior to the identification of product
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applications. I identified three sequential activities of nanotechnology business
proponents: constructing a socio-semiotic space, positioning as experts within the space,
and translating scientific, opposition and futuristic discourse for a target audience.
I also introduced the concept of a socio-semiotic space, a meaning and interaction
construction zone, which mayor may not become an institutionalized field. By
constructing a socio-semiotic space, positioning themselves as experts within the space,
and translating scientific, futuristic and opposition discourse for their desired
constituents, a small and relatively disadvantaged group in terms of their initial resources
may project a technology frame into the general discourse. By constructing a limited
socio-semiotic space, the small group may be able to define the situation for their desired
constituents, gain their support, and use the resources these activities generate to project
their frame into the larger discourse.
This dissertation is a study of the emergence of science-based technologies. Not
all commercial domains emerge around science-based technologies. Commercial
domains may emerge around new services, business models, or product introductions that
are not based on scientific discoveries. For example, express shipping and craft brewing
introduced commercial domains that were not based on scientific discovery. As explained
in this disseliation, science-based discovelies and the domains that emerge around them
are likely to be particularly susceptible to linguistic, cognitive, and social processes.
Additional research will be required to determine to what extent the process described in
this study applies to other types of technologies and commercial domains.
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Contribution to Theory
How domains of commercial activity emerge, whether termed markets, industries,
organizational fields or technology fields, is a difficult yet important question. New
domains are the basis for new organizations, new teclmologies, and economic growth.
However, organizational theory provides only limited explanations of how entities
emerge. Studies typically focus on either change in existing domains or begin after the
social, cognitive and linguistic foundation on which new domains are based has been
constructed.
The predominant methods of organizational research are not well suited to the
study of emergence (Meyer, Gaba, and Colwell, 2005). Meyer, Gaba, and Colwell (2005:
470) speculate that researchers avoid asking questions about emerging social systems
because systems in flux violate "dogma about rigorous methodology." They explain that
because much social scientific theory and methodology begin from the assumption of
equilibrium, fields in flux are unappealing research settings. "Like emihquake victims,
researchers steeped in equilibrium assumptions usually run for cover, wait for the tremors
to stop, and then return cautiously to sift through the debris" (470).
Most accounts of the emergence of technologies begin when a product is
introduced or a use for a technology becomes widely accepted. Researchers often assume
that a technology develops and then a field and associated institutions fom1. Because
most research focuses on the later stages of emergence, it is hard to challenge claims that
the existing reality is an inevitable consequence of a technology. However, as I show in
this dissertation. \\'hen \iewed in real time, it is apparent that some elements of
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technologies and organizations that in hindsight appear inevitable are in fact constructed,
negotiated and contested.
New commercial domains for science-based technologies begin as imagined
futures. The data collected and analyzed for this study show that individuals, guided by
their imaginations, build the social, cognitive, and linguistic infrastructure that influences
technology trajectories and supports the emergence of commercial domains. Visionaries,
proponents, and opponents begin to speculate on the potential benefits, consequences,
and structure of possible domains long before they exist. People begin to experiment with
language to describe technologies, stories that exemplify potential applications, and
metaphors that suggest the possible implications of technologies. Speculative labels,
(his)stories, metaphors, and exemplars are repeated, and if collectively accepted, they
begin to be taken for granted. Collective fantasies can begin to gain structure. When a
new domain has emerged and gained recognition as an industry, it may appear to have
been the inevitable consequence of a new technology. However, as the data in this study
show, this may not be the case.
Early experimentation occurs in settings that permit the enactment of an imagined
future, such as in science fiction, at conferences, and in specialized texts. Some ofthe
earliest mentions of nanotechnology in the New York Times, for example, are in reviews
of science fiction novels. Early conferences attracted futurists and offered a setting in
which it was acceptable to talk of extreme life extension as a real and imminent
opportunity. Attendees at futuristic conferences discussed "how:" not if, humans will deal
with immortality. Similarly, attendees at the earliest Nanotechnology Investing Forums
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talked about "the nanotechnology industry" and listened to presentations by
representatives of a trade journal representing an industry that did not exist.
Experimentations in such settings form the basis for the cognitive and structural
elements that can subsequently become new domains. At this early stage, an emerging
domain is constituted of webs of meaning communicated through language and action,
rather than flows of resources. The ideational network precedes the organizational
network. As Sir Edmund Leach argues, "The world is a representation of our language
categories, not vice versa" (Leach, 1964: 34). A socio-semiotic space is the setting that
technology proponents constmct with, and for, their experimentations. I introduced the
concept of a socio-semiotic space to describe and define the agglomeration that comes
before an institutionalized field.
Because in its earliest emergence a new science-based technology domain exists
in the realm of the imagination, the use and construction of language-word choice,
stories, metaphors, labels-are key processes. The methods and setting I selected for this
study are well suited to the exploration of language and meaning constmction and, thus,
also well suited to provide theoretical insights into the early emergence of commercial
domains. Focusing on a single case allowed me to collect rich data and situate the case in
its history. By studying events as they unfolded, in real-time during the significant period
of the early emergence of a commercial domain, I was able observe participants'
experimentations. An interpretive, grounded theory approach revealed the role of
understudied social, cognitive, and linguistic processes in the emergence of technologies
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and commercial domains. The findings of this study contribute to theories of technology
and innovation management, organizations and management, and entrepreneurship.
Technology and Innovation Management (TIM)
As explained in Chapter II, the dominant model oftechnology evolution, which
has been tested and found robust in many industries, is based on a life cycle metaphor. A
new technology elicits competing designs that usher in an "era of fennent." The
competition and uncertainty ends with convergence on a dominant design. This model
begins with the competition between designs-products or applications compete for
dominance in a market. The model thus assumes the existence of both products and
market. As discussed in Chapter II and above, the model and the assumption of a product
and market ignore the earliest stage of technology development.
This study contributes to our knowledge of technology evolution by extending our
understanding to include the earliest stage of the technology lifecycle. I document the
emergence of technology frames prior to the existence of a concrete application for the
technology. The study shows that a nanobusiness frame emerged before widespread
commercial activity and that this frame influenced investment in nanotechnology by
govemment and large corporations. Furthermore, this study shows that some versions of
nanotechnology were defined as "real" while one was relegated to the realm of science
fiction. The meaning attributed to these competing versions of the imagined future
assuaged public fears ofpotential risks, influenced govemment and corporate investment,
and thus influenced the trajectory of nanotechnology" s development. This study suggests
that to understanel how a technology design emerges Lmd becomes dominant, researchers
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need to pay attention to the earliest language and interactions of participants in an
emerging domain.
Organization and Management Theory (OMT)
As I discuss in Chapter II and above, researchers have struggled with the question
of how new organizational entities emerge for some time. However, our explanations still
focus on predominantly on change, typically brought about by exogenous drivers, rather
than emergence. Much recent work has focused on organizational fields, a concept
central to institutional theory. The impact of institutions on organizations has received
much more attention than their origins (Powell, 1991; Barley and Tolbert 1997: Chiles.
Meyer, and Hench, 2004). Recent interest in institutional entrepreneurship (e.g. Maguire,
Hardy, and Lawrence, 2005) has begun to focus attention on earlier stages of emergence.
HO\vever. even in this literature, the focus usually begins after meaning has fom1ed as a
movement or collective identity. This study contributes to this literature by focusing on
the early construction of meaning, which fonns the basis for a domain if one emerges,
and by introducing the concept of a socio-semiotic space as a precursor to an
organizational field.
Connections Between Theories of Culture and Institutions
Recent years have witnessed burgeoning interest among management scholars in
the role of symbols and systems of meaning in enabling and constraining organizational
behavior. This interest is evidenced by a recent call for contributions to an Organization
Science special issue on organizational culture, and in the discursive tum in institutional
theory. Outside of the management field. studies that emphasize organizLltions as systems
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of meaning and highlight the cultural-cognitive construction of organizations and
practices are included under the broad umbrella of cultural studies of organizations.
However, within management, work on culture is found in at least two separate streams
of research: organizational culture and institutional theory. This study begins to connect
these two streams.
The plincipal divisions between cultural and institutional approaches in
management studies occur at the level and focus of analysis. Studies of organizational
culture look within organizations and examine "interactionally-constituted webs of
meaning," implying an important role by social actors, while institutional studies focus
on interorganizational relationships and examine "institutionalized cultural-cognitive
models and practices'· (Morrill, 2008). The findings of this study provide ideas for
understanding how cultural processes influence the emergence and construction of
institutional structures.
Connections Between TIM and OMT
The findings of this study make a connection between the TIM and GMT
literatures. The first study of institutional entrepreneurship in the management literature
following DiMaggio's (1988) introduction was a study of Sun's sponsorship of a new
technology. However, subsequent studies of institutional entrepreneurship have focused
on social and cultural change rather than the emergence of technologies or domains of
commercial activity. While institutional theorists have long considered technology an
instigator of institutional change and technology and innovation researchers have refered
to the importance of the institutional context. with few exceptions (e.g Hargadon and
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Douglas, 2001; Gamd, Jain, and Kumaraswamy, 2002; Munir and Phillips, 2005),
researchers have not made connections between the two. Likewise, the limited research
on technology framing does not address the creation of technology frames (Hargrave and
Van de Ven, 2004) or explore in detail how those who support a particular frame gain an
audience. By identifying the activities of technology proponents that result in the
projection of a technology frame, this study serves to make a stronger connection
between institutional entrepreneurship and technology emergence and evolution.
Entrepreneurship Theory
The findings of this study lend support to recent arguments that entrepreneurs can
create markets (Sarasvathy, 2001; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2004) and provides an
explanation of how. Traditionally, entrepreneurship literature has focused on identifying
traits of entrepreneurs and explaining how entrepreneurs recognize opportunities
(Davidsson, 2002). As much technology research assumes the a priori existence of a
market driven application, research explaining how entrepreneurs recognize opportunities
assumes that markets exist to be discovered. This study provides evidence that
entrepreneurs use social skills (Fligstein, 1997, 2001) to create opportunities.
Additionally, by identifying three sequential activities-constructing, positioning and
translating-that technology proponents engage in, this study specifies social skills and
explains how skills can lead to the accumulation of resources that support the creation of
commercial domains.
159
Implications for Practice
At the 2007 IBF Nanotechnology Investing Forum, keynote speaker Robert Joss,
then Dean of Stanford's Business School, related that under his direction the school had
recently undertaken a major revision of the MBA curriculum. Joss explained that he
became aware that although Stanford graduates were accepting high-level positions in
prestigious organizations upon graduation, many were not successful in those positions.
A survey of alumni revealed that they felt unprepared for the demands of the business
environment. In particular, Joss listed four challenges that alumni felt inadequately
prepared to manage effectively: technological change, govemment regulation. public
opinion and media relations, and globalization. The revised Stanford MBA curriculum,
described in Business Week (June, 2007) as foretelling the likely future of management
education, is focused on preparing students to meet these demands. As Joss noted in his
address, attendees at the Nanotechnology Investing Forum were actively involved in
managing at least the first three challenges. This disseliation does not address the forth,
globalization. The findings of this dissertation have implications directly relevant to the
practice of managers and policy makers dealing with each of the other three challenges
listed by Joss.
Managing Technological Change
As noted in Chapter II and above, academic management research has focused
little attention on earliest stages of technology emergence. However, this study suggests
that it is during this period that individuals and organizations begin to influence the
emergence of technologies. The entrepreneurs and business professionals in this study
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know this and have conducted their own research. In some cases their research has been
anecdotal but in others, as in the case of Star Venture Capital's two-year investigation of
research trends on university campuses, their research has been quite systematic. The
founders of each of the VC firms that are the focal cases of this dissettation claimed to
have based their strategic decisions on either their research or observations ofthe
development of previous science-based technologies. The willingness of professionals
doing the work of managing technology and innovation to conduct their own research
shows that they feel a need for knowledge of how managers influence the early
emergence of tecbnologies.
This study helps to fill this need. By indentifying the activities that technology
proponents engaged in, documenting relationships between these activities and
investment by government and large businesses, and by providing an explanation of how
these activities influenced the emergence of a commercial domain through the projection
of a technology frame, I have developed a theoretical explanation of the patterns that
business professionals have observed. This explanation suggests that those seeking to
commercialize science-based teclmologies would do well to become involved in the
earliest stages of technology development. And, importantly, business proponents must
be concerned not only with end applications and products, but also with the meanings
associated with technologies.
Managing Demands ofGovernment Regulation
Because complex technologies often have national consequences, govemments
are il1\o!\ccI in standard setting and regulation (Tushman ane! Rosenkopf 1992). In
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democratic societies, the public may influence decisions regarding regulation and
standards. Studies have shown that public perceptions of the risk associated with science-
based teclmologies are ambiguous and often inaccurate and can contribute to the
"stigmatization" of technologies (Gregory, Flynn, and Slovic; 2001). Technological
stigmatization "represents an increasingly significant factor influencing the development
and acceptance of scientific and teclmological innovation and, therefore, presents a
selious challenge to policymakers" (Gregory, Flynn, and Slovic; 2001: 4). Technology
stigmatization can elicit burdensome regulations, discourage investment, resulting in the
failure of product markets and thereby posing a serious threat to the success of emerging
science-based technologies.
Again, business professionals are aware of this challenge. In an interview', a
nanotechnology business leader underscored a point he had made in an earlier public
presentation concerning the importance of active engagement with politicians:
The politicians have been very clear. That quote that 1used [in the
presentation], was very unequivocal. "We're gonna legislate. Your job is
to make sure that when we do, we are informed. If you don't, that's going
to be your problem." -Nanotechnology business leader, inten'iewed by
Kathryn Aten
This study shows that a small group of relatively disadvantaged business professionals,
those with relatively few substantive resources, can influence policy. Proactively
engaging politicians very early in the development of a technology, demarcating a limited
space for business discourse, and framing a technology as a business opportunity can
influence government investment and regulation.
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Managing Demands ofPublic Opinion and the Media
The realization of opportunities created by new technologies requires public trust
(Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Public mistrust stemming from a lack of understanding or even
fear of a technology among stakeholders may pose a serious threat to the success of new
technologies. For example, in the case of electricity, the visible benefits of the technology
were offset by the just as visible dangers of electrocutions (Hargadon and Douglas,
2001). Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein (1980) found that experts tend to equate risk
with statistically accurate fatality estimates, but laypeople rely more heavily on subjective
characteristics to make risk assessments, incl uding the familiarity and obser\'ability of a
technology and their knowledge of it. Basic science technologies are not characterized by
these traits, and are thus often viewed by the public as risky.
Business people are well aware of this threat. The following is an excerpt from
the introduction to a business report sold to large businesses seeking guidance on
managing the risks of nanotechnology.
Imagine two futures ... it' s 2015 and nanotechnology is all around you.
You drive to work in a car with a scratch-proof clear coating enabled by
silica nanoparticIes, you listen to a portable music player with carbon
nanotube-powered memory chips, and your television's backplate is made
from silicon nanowires. The nanotechnology field encompasses dozens of
start-up ventures that have developed these technologies and hundreds of
large manufacturers that make use of them, together employing thousands
of people.
Or. .. it's 2015 and nanotechnology has been has been mostly forgotten.
After public opinion turned against nanotech in the late 2000's, the
incentives to develop nano-enabled products evaporated. Large
corporations found that any product associated with nanotechnology faced
a firestoml of controversy and decided that the gains from using it weren't
worth the reputation risk ancllikely market failure. Without these players
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bringing products to the consumer market, the path to commercialization
for start-ups dried up along with their access to capital. Products
containing nanoparticles disappeared (paraphrased from Nordan, 2005).
The report goes on to explain that both actual and perceived risks are likely to influence
the development of nanotechnology. As suggested by the above quote and as noted by
Robert Joss in his keynote address, practicing managers today must be able to effectively
address public opinion.
Organizational impression management refers to purposeful actions to influence
an audience's perception of an organization's image; the character and demeanor
organizations attempt to project (Elsbach. Sutton, and Pincipe, 1998). The organizational
impression management literature provides " ... a relatively elaborate picture of the forms,
uses, and effects of remedial impression management by organizations" (Elsbach, Sutton,
and Pincipe, 1998). However, few studies han examined how organizations use
impression management to avert undesirable responses to upcoming events (Elsbach,
Sutton, and Pincipe, 1998) and thus scholars can provide little guidance to managers.
This study begins to fill this gap by documenting and explaining the efforts of
technology proponents to tum aside opposition to nanotechnology. The study
complements the findings of Hargadon and Douglas' (2001) finding that innovators can
reduce opposition to innovations by positioning them within existing institutions.
Hargadon and Douglas explain how Edison designed his lighting system to mirror the
existing gas system in order to support its adoption. This study documents and explains
similar eff0l1s by nanotechnology proponents, but is noteworthy in that the efforts came
before an application was known. Technology proponents actively attempted to manage
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the meaning of nanotechnology, positioning it as the next step in a long history of
innovation. They lobbied successfully to eliminate federal funding for research streams
that were incongruent with this frame. This suggests that technology proponents can play
a role in shaping the public opinion and framing technology in a way that supports
commercial development. I explain how proponents can gain access to the public
discourse through constructing, positioning, and translating.
This dissertation contributes to our knowledge oftechnology evolution by
focusing on the understudied period of early emergence and the sociopolitical process of
technology framing. I contribute to our knO\vledge of how science di5cO\cries become
the basis for fields of commercial activity. The findings ofthis dissertation provide
knowledge that can assist business people and policy makers seeking to develop science-
based technologies and the commercial domains that emerge around them.
Future Research
The question of how technologies and commercial domains based on them
emerge and evolve has been of interest to scholars for some time. Despite this, our
knowledge ofthis problem is limited. This dissertation has begun to fill this theoretical
gap and also has implications for practice. However, this study has also revealed
additional unanswered questions. I detail these below.
How dofounders ofa socio-semiotic space capture the value of the resources
they generate? Which strategies are likely to lead to greater success? Firm competitive
advantage is influenced by constituents' perceptions, which drive decisions to provide or
withhold resources (Rindo\a and Fombrun, 1999: Barnett, 2006). Successful strategy in
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emerging domains requires that founders generate social acceptance of emerging
technologies (Shane and Venkataraman, 2003). However, because the social acceptance
necessary for the emergence of technologies and the definitions, boundaries and identities
on which it is based, are public goods (Roa, 1994; Barnett, 2006), all who operate in
consonance with these elements may gamer like benefits. However, technology
proponents do not undertake domain-building projects out of altruism. Rather, they seek
to establish an infrastructure that will contribute to their private advantage (DiMaggio,
1988). Research suggests that finns with strong reputations may be better able to shape
the development of an emerging domain (Sherer and Kyllngmook, 2002). Competitive
advantage may result from tactics intended to build finn reputation (Barnett, 2006).
Finns responsible for initiating collective projects in emerging domains may gain
reputation benefi ts. As a consequence of a fil111' s involvement in collective proj ects.
constituents may perceive it as a leader in the domain resulting in increased financial
resources and better infoD11ation. Although both theory and observation indicate that
founders undertake domain-building projects to gamer private advantage, extant studies
touching on collective projects and private advantage are limited and generally focus on
technology standards battles. Future research is needed to identify finn level strategies
for garnering benefits from investments in collective projects undertaken to generate
social acceptance.
While at this time it is too early to identify the financial outcomes of the
investments made by firms in this study, the funds they initiated will be reaching their
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culmination in the next few years. It will then be possible to assess the financial
perfonnance of the funds and to relate perfonnance to finn strategies.
What is the role ofconferences in the emergence ofcommercial domains? In
particular, how do conferences influence the creation of technology frames, professional
identities, and symbolic resources such as labels and narratives? Conferences are an
excellent setting to observe, interact with, and interview field proponents (DiMaggio,
1991; Fligstein, 1997). They are microcosms of emerging industries. Relationships are
forged, networks are constructed, boundaries defined, and standards are proposed
(Meyer, Gaba and Colwell. 2005). Attendees from trade associations, economic
development agencies, and networking organizations are actively engaged in efforts to
build new domains. Proponents compete for adherents, meaning, and media attention,
while collaborating to generate legitimacy for emerging technologies and financial
support for their commercialization. Conferences are construction sites where collective
identities are proposed, contested, and enacted. Conference organizers thus play an
influential, and largely unrecognized role in the emergence of new domains.
Conferences can also serve to reconfigure domains. In 2005, the mass media and
the venture investing community embrace.d the tenn "cleantech" in reference to business
activities undertaken to commercialize a family of new technologies that promised both
benefits to the natural environment and attractive financial returns. One prominent
venture capitalist pronounced cleantech "the greatest opportunity of the 21 st century"
(O'Rourke and Parker, 2006). IBF launched a cleantech conference. Nanotech
entrepreneurs and camp fol1awers emigrated to the cleantech space, where patiicipants
------ ---
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drawn from many ofthe same occupational groups were plunging into now-familiar
debates about cleantech's meaning, boundaries, and identity.
As explained in previous chapters of this dissertation, imprecise definitions and
nebulous boundaries are characteristic of emerging domains and pose challenges for
proponents. Social movement scholars have found that identity and meaning construction
are a requirement for collective action (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). To date, social and
organization theorists had said little about the role of conferences in collective efforts to
construct labels, boundaries, and identities in support of emerging domains. The data
collected and organized for this dissertation could be used to explore of the role of
conferences in the creation of these symbolic resources.
How do characteristics oftechnologyfj-ames influence their adoption? The
findings of this disseliation provide insight into this question. but fuliher research could
elaborate on the effects of specific frame characteristics and competing strategies by
comparing the frames and strategies of the social groups identified in this disseliation.
My findings suggest some characteristics of technology frames that may influence
their appeal and adoption. In my content analysis ofthe New York Times articles, I
identified the descriptions of potential tangible applications of nanotechnology. These
descriptions represent stakeholders' goals for the technology. In addition to the findings
reported in this dissertation, I identified two dimensions in the data, familiarity and time
frame. Familiarity refers to the degree to which an application is similar to existing
products and uses and is likely to change life activities or social relationships. Timeframe
refers to when the 3pplication is likely to come to fruition. Future research should better
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explain how characteristics of the technology frames identified in this study, beginning
with familiarity and timeframe, influence the adoption of technology frames and provide
specific guidelines for managers and policy makers. Further analysis of electronic and
print articles and reports I have collected could be used to explore this question.
Additional data on the historical cases (e.g. computers, biotech, genetically modified
food) could be collected in order to conduct a comparative case study.
More generally, as noted earlier in this chapter, additional research will be
required to determine to what extent the findings of this study apply to other types of
commercial domains and to test and extend the theory developed here. Research should
compare and contrast various types of commercial domains and domains emerging from
different science-based technologies. For example, as I have discussed, the findings of
this research suggests that characteristics of technology frames may influence the
acceptance of technologies and researchers have found that characteristics of
technologies influence public judgments. Recent studies have explored the role of
national culture in judgments about technology and science risk and suggest that national
culture may also influence public judgments (Nelson, 2001; Finucane and Holup, 2005;
Guehlstorf and Hallstrom, 2005). A comparison of the role of technology framing in the
emergence and commercialization of genetically modified foods and nanotechnologies
could begin to test the theory developed here. A comparison of the sociopolitical
processes related to the emergence of these technologies in different countries could
further explicate the boundary conditions that apply to the findings presented here and
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could provide guidance to managers dealing with the globalization of science and
technology.
In conclusion, early in my career as a doctoral student, I commented in a seminar
that I am fascinated by how science fiction becomes reality. A fellow student remarked
that this research problem could take a career to investigate and implied that it was
therefore not a good choice. I concur with the statement but not the implication. This
problem may take a career to investigate. To me, this is an advantage. I view this
dissertation as the beginning, rather than conclusion, of my exploration of technology and
the emergence of commercial domains. I expect the ideas. methods, and data presented
here to provide a solid foundation for my future work.
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
Goal of research: My early research has indicated that field leaders can influence the
development of technology domains. I want to understand how
founders in the nanotech domain participated in collective efforts to
build infrastructure and if/how they gained from their efforts.
Approach: I am using public data sources to understand evolution of the field and
identify leaders and interviews with leaders and attendance at
conferences to understand tactics, rationale, results of efforts.
The identity of informants will be kept confidential and the findings will be reported in
way that preserves the confidentiality of and private information. Do you mind if! tape
record our conversation?
I will ask fairly open-ended questions in 2 areas. First I would like to know about [firm
name] and your role in creating/supporting the nanotechnology domain. Next, I will ask
more specifically about initiatives to build the nanotechnology domain.
First, imagine that you are writing a novel about [firm name]. Please tell me the story of
the company and address changes in its mission and focus over time.
Can you tell me about the decision to focus on nanotechnology? How did this decision
come about, what was the rationale behind it, how was it implemented?
What have been the costslbenefits of this decision?
Please tell me more specifically about the decision to [specific domain building
undertaking]? Please tell me the st.ory of how the decision came about, what was the
rationale, how was it was implemented?
Were there any changes in the objective from [the firm's] point of view?
What were the costslbenefits to [firm] as a result of [the undertaking]?
Can you give me sense of how the benefits/costs have changed over time [for example,
how have the number and/or quality of proposals changed since your inception]?
Phase 1
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